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Meta-Education:

The Attempt to Get Beyond a Politicized Conceptual Framework in Philosophy of Education

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Introduction

That hoary question, what is it that philosophers of education do when they do philosophy of education, is answered variously. At least part of the reason the question is so difficult to answer is broached by Foster McMurray in his lectures on philosophy of education in the early 1980's: "It is not entirely clear that philosophy of education has a character distinctly its own. Above all, in ways of selecting and using non-educational materials, philosophy of education is extraordinarily controversial."[1] Indeed, this is a controversy that vexed philosophy of education at its beginnings. McMurray puts it this way:

> Among the many controversies is one which comes, so to speak, at the beginning. It is a controversy concerning how to define philosophy of education, how to establish its legitimate domain and the range of its inquiries. This kind of problem is not uncommon in the early history of any discipline. It marks the efforts of those who pioneered breaking off a piece of traditional philosophy and making from it the subject matter of independent inquiry. For much of. The 20th Cenutry [sic], philosophy of education has been recognized as a professional specialization, studied and taught in graduate schools of education. Nevertheless, the creation of a specialized subject matter devoted to a philosophic treatment of problems encountered in education—rather than of those problems commonly treated by philosophers—is not much in evidence.[2]

There is, in McMurray's estimation, a "failure of agreement" on the part of philosophers of education as to what the legitimate domain is.[3] This already implies that philosophy of education is of some value or use to education, broadly speaking, and that the controversy lies not so much in the nature of philosophy of education as in the contexts in which it operates. McMurray is not the only one to echo this sentiment. Many contemporary philosophers of education recognize the controversy in claiming specific roles and definitions. Denis Phillips and Harvey Siegel, who have long championed both the lengthy pedigree of philosophy of education as well as the ongoing significance of it for philosophy, admit there are problems in characterizing the discipline. Siegel, like

Phillips before him, points to "the inward/outward nature" of the field.[4] For, we are a 'philosophy of,' rather than a philosophy, and this seems to mean that we are responsive not only to ourselves, but to some other discipline, some other field, outside and beyond us.

Indeed, with Siegel, Phillips, and McMurray, we may surmise that philosophers of education would define philosophy of education according to the role it plays in other disciplines or fields. First and foremost, this is education, broadly considered, inclusive of its various sub-disciplines and sub-fields. But what, specifically, does philosophy of education do? There is no lack of consensus here: it *serves* education. Beyond this lies the question of how, specifically, it serves. There is less consensus on this issue. We have to turn to specific historical examples of philosophers of education that follow different schools of thought. For example, analytic philosophers of education served education through the conceptual analyses of terms and their respective definitions: teaching, learning, and their associated terminologies, such as instruction, motivation, reasoning and rationality, autonomy, indoctrination—all of which benefited from close investigation.[5] The struggle at the heart of political economies such as those involved in capitalist education systems (which is to say, all western, liberal, democratic nations) has been a feature of conflict models of philosophy of education.[6] There is, of course, Nel Nodding's justifiably well-known work on caring and education.[7] We can multiply examples here.

All this augurs for a specific role that philosophy of education plays: a role in which philosophy of education not only serves the larger field but serves it in a particular way. Through the 'schools of thought' approach (which McMurray, Phillips, and Siegel favour), it becomes readily apparent that philosophy of education's point of departure in dealing with issues and concerns of the larger field *is* what counts as important for that field. Beyond serving these issues and concerns (which is established by almost all philosophers of education), the specific role that philosophy of education accomplishes is to provide a standpoint, or perspective, from which the larger field of education benefits when taking this up. Philosophy of education, then, serves the larger field of education through providing a position from which education can potentially grasp and solve its issues and problems.

If we think about philosophy of education this way—if we conclude that *standpoints*, or *perspectives*, play a predominant role in what philosophy of education is to provide the larger field—then we can conclude that educators clarify their theories and practices by taking the perspectives philosophy of education offers.[8] This view insists that philosophy has a certain way of approaching problems that is instrumental for scholars and practitioners in the various fields of education. There is something about philosophy that serves educators in their quests to solve problems, and these quests concern, minimally (and in Harry Broudy's terms), the clarification of thinking, the roles of freedom and inquiry

in educational theory and practice, and the need for approaches and techniques to problems of theory and practice.[9] These problems, in turn, may largely be social, as in the problems that Dewey attempted to address with his philosophy of education, or they may prove largely conceptual, such as those of the Analytic movement in philosophy of education beginning in the 1950's and dominated the field until the 1980's.[10] They may be manifestly political, as the 'new' movements of Marxism and socialist theory in education proposed in the 1960's and 1970's.[11] In all cases, philosophy brings something to education in the guise of perspectives, and related standpoints, tools, and techniques, that are then taken up by educators in their application to problems and issues in the field of education.[12]

This view assumes a trajectory *from* education *to* philosophy and back *to* education: educational issues and problems invoke philosophies, which are then brought to bear on these issues and problems. The educational problems and concerns drive the philosophies that then supply the various attitudes of investigation, clarification, freedom, and inquiry (to use Harry Broudy's terms again) that are then turned toward the problems and issues of education. We certainly see this in abundance with respect to the Analytic movement in philosophy of education, whose avowed aim was to clarify concepts such as teaching and learning, instruction, discipline, autonomy, authority, and perhaps most important of all, the role and scope of reason in education.[13] We may say with some justification that *the dominant trend is not for philosophy of education to drive the problems and issues of education, but for the problems and issues of education to drive philosophy of education*.

More recently, educators have turned away from mainstream philosophy to embrace other disciplines. If Jonas Soltis is right, this turn has its impetus from within, as philosophers of education became increasingly dissatisfied with the 'schools of thought' approach.[14] Beyond this, sociology, anthropology, psychology, comparative education, cultural studies, postcolonial studies, critical race studies, and gender studies have all had tremendous influence over educational theory. In addition to philosophy, these are invoked in responding to educational problems and issues. The result is a mixed or even hybrid application of perspectives, methods, and standpoints, as well as specific claims; a result that certainly includes philosophy, though not exclusively, nor with the seeming stranglehold philosophy once held over educational theory.[15] The trajectory, however, remains the same: we move from educational issues and concerns to philosophy and other disciplines and their theories for guidance, and then back to the issues and concerns, hopefully with an augmented understanding and/or novel set of tools to challenge these issues and concerns. Again, we never begin with strictly philosophical questions; our point of departure is always educational issues and concerns.

There are, of course, milestones in the history of philosophy wherein scholars did deduce educational claims and even accounts from philosophy. If we were willing to stretch the

beginnings of philosophy of education back to ancient Greece, we might think of Plato's educational regime for the guardians of the ideal state as a strong instance of this. However, in so doing, Plato did not envision a philosophy of education; there was no concrete set of educational problems to which philosophy could then be applied.[16] It was rather the converse; education, deductively understood, must align with the philosophical claims already put forth. In *The Republic* at least, philosophy grounds the theory and practice of education. There is no discipline of philosophy of education involved in this deductive move. There is no 'breaking off' a piece of philosophy and applying it to educational issues and concerns because the issues and concerns are deduced from the thought experiment itself. Herein lies the point: philosophy of education, as a discipline, has education and education's problems and issues at its heart, and does not (or does not often) bring previously built-up philosophical claims or accounts to bear on these.[17] This latter state of affairs is established as a leading feature of institutions and organizations dedicated to promoting the field or discipline and is a hallmark of the Progressive Educational Association and the John Dewey Society—two of the earliest organizations dedicated to the institutionalization of philosophy of education.[18]

There is another possible approach; one that does not begin from philosophy, nor from the issues and concerns of education. Rather, it develops its own questions and concerns, and from these, a fully fledged philosophy of education begins to emerge. This is the approach I outline in *Problems in the Philosophy of Education* and from which I take my point of departure in this book.[19] Yet, my aim here is somewhat different than it is there: for here I am interested in *politics*, and specifically, the threat of *ideology* to philosophy of education. The chief aim of these three chapters is to counter the establishment of ideological premises, claims, propositions, and concepts in one's philosophy of education. This turns out to not be a straightforward matter. Issues of definition get raised whenever one attempts to pronounce this or that ideological claim. Issues of semantics and pragmatics—of meaning, of role, of function in discursive and behavioural practices—are not far behind. Beyond the linguistic issues involved are questions of what counts as legitimate criticism and what are the limits of rhetoric. Furthermore, there are claims and counterclaims from those of rival political persuasions; while both liberals and socialists appeal to the United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights, for example, they do so with differing ideal conditions in mind. Liberals might wish a domain of human interaction in which equality of opportunity is regnant, while socialists may wish for equity and equality of outcomes. These ideal conditions will colour the understanding of the otherwise accepted legal statutes. A philosophy of education, as I shall further argue, needs to be free of these ideal conditions.

The role of ideology in philosophy of education is therefore going to be a thorny one to examine, and doubly so, since my aim is to outline a philosophy of education that is resistant to ideology. This will necessitate a thorough discussion of several key features:

certainly, there is the question of ideology—its definition, role, and function in and out of philosophy of education. There is also a corresponding need to define philosophy of education and to characterize the role and function of philosophy of education, and this must be done somewhat in tandem with the discussion of ideology to avoid question-begging. More trenchantly, there must be available to us at the least the possibility of an account of philosophy of education that resists the incursion of ideology. This possibility turns out to be a complex feature of any philosophy of education that would grapple with educational issues and concerns while not held hostage to them. What I mean by this is a philosophy of education that has the independence to form and follow its own questions and concerns without being directed by, from, or towards, prevailing educational 'truths.'

We will need to examine what philosophy of education is defined as and composed of before we can get clear on how it can resist ideology. This will lead us into a discussion of how the various claims, statements, propositions, concepts, and meta-concepts work together to achieve a 'final' philosophy. Each of these phases or stages in the overall philosophy of education will need definitions and examinations of their roles and functions. The method by which they interrelate and regulate one another will also need addressing. Philosophical presuppositions that operate behind the scenes to condition questions asked and answered in the philosophy of education also require scrutiny. Finally, the questions that philosophy of education asks and answers will need to be examined as to their origin, location, and purpose in the overall edifice.

Some of this work depends on an examination of the history of philosophy of education. What were the questions of origin? Indeed, who asked them, when were they asked, and for what purpose? Does this imply that philosophy of education is an enterprise as old as philosophy, or is it of more recent vintage? Are we still tied to the questions asked and answered 2600 years ago? What about those asked 100 years ago?[20] Do we have our own issues and concerns, generated from educational theory and practice as it is presently understood? How is philosophy of education divided up? Does it respond to the traditional branches of philosophy, is it dependent on historical movements within educational theory and practice, or is it a balance of the two? How and why does this make a difference to philosophy of education? Some of this work depends on an examination of the philosophy in philosophy of education. What allegiance, if any, does philosophy of education owe philosophy? What is the role of philosophy when charged, for example, to supply schools of thought such as idealism, realism, or pragmatism? What is the role of philosophy in supplying content from its branches, such as metaphysics, ethics, and logic? Are there necessary principles that philosophy of education must have and hold, even if the overall claims are constructivist or functionalist? We soon begin to see the enormity of questions that arise when an attempt is made to counter ideology from within philosophy of education.

Some of these questions and answers have been attempted in *Problems*. Questions of origin, questions of the role of philosophy in and for philosophy of education, and questions of method for any philosophy of education that would claim for itself a self-sufficiency are addressed there. However, the question of ideology, which is my chief concern here, has not, I think, been sufficiently addressed. Indeed, ideology is rarely mentioned there, and when it is, it is confounded with other practices, such as the adoption of theory, with its aim or purpose in tow. Here, ideology is separated from other concepts and made to stand alone as a principal (perhaps the principal?) conundrum for philosophy of education.

With this in mind, we proceed to the heart of the book. The first chapter is entitled "Meta-Education as a Constellation of Meta-Concepts and Concepts," and is likely the densest. However, it has the virtue of beginning with the question of ideology, proceeding to a definition, as well as providing a functional accounting of concept and meta-concepts. It also outlines the role for philosophy of education to play in extirpating ideology and making itself resistant to its incursions. This, in turn, involves discussing several characteristics of philosophy of education that insulate it from ideology. The most important of these are its understanding of the concepts it wields. These range from lesser concepts, such as individual claims and propositions, to larger concepts, such as various pedagogies (my examples throughout the chapters are 'the pedagogy of hope' and 'the pedagogy of discomfort') to the meta-concepts of teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling. These meta-concepts are historic, but they are also functional; they are convenient constellations of older, existing, and future concepts. There is also a discussion of how these meta-concepts, of teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling, are brought together under the overarching meta-concept, education. In these chapters, I refer to this overarching concept as meta-education.

In the second chapter, "The Origins and Ends of Philosophy of Education (and Why these Matter)," I discuss the role of the political in philosophy of education. The leading thesis from the first chapter—that philosophy of education must remain immune to ideology—is carried to the subject matter here. Politics and political claims are equated with ideology if they are inserted *ab extra*, or from without, into the edifice of philosophy of education. There are several specific strategies that philosophy of education can use to thwart this insertion, and in this chapter, I examine these. I begin by first outlining a theory of the origins of questions of philosophy of education. This takes into consideration historical and logical aspects of questions that are central to the entire enterprise. These questions are drawn from *Problems* and are shown to thwart the insertion of ideological claims into the edifice by attending to only those questions developed from these original questions. With this complete, I turn my attention to politics, and to the very idea that political claims can have purchase on philosophy of education. It will be shown that any political claims

in a philosophy of education must emanate *from* that philosophy of education and therefore are *not* to be inserted *ab extra*. *Only attention to the original questions of philosophy of education, together with strict adherence to the philosophical presuppositions drawn from the branches of philosophy, protect against the incursion of political claims*.

In the third chapter, "The Presuppositions of Logic and Metaphysics in Philosophy of Education," I turn to presuppositions and specifically, their role in the formation of suppositions, or the hypotheses that play a major role in the philosophy of education. I begin by discussing the function of philosophical and theoretical schools of thought in describing philosophy of education. For example, some textbooks draw on historical accounts of philosophy such as realism, idealism, pragmatism, and existentialism, as well as theoretical accounts of education, such as essentialism, perennialism, progressivism, and reconstructionism. I call this the 'isms' approach. Another (less often employed) approach consists in drawing on the branches of philosophy; logic, metaphysics, the theory of knowledge, ethics and (sometimes) politics. I prefer the latter to the former, and in this chapter, I spell out why at length. Once this is completed, I turn to the issue of presuppositions and discuss their overall importance for a philosophy of education. The account of presuppositions draws on R.G. Collingwood's metaphysics and specifically, the account of presuppositions that buttress historical explanations.[21] Collingwood's presuppositions are basic and irreducible. They form a kind of substrate by and through which suppositions, or hypotheses, emerge. (They also serve to blunt the regress of conditions.) Two presuppositions, or sets of presuppositions, are discussed in this regard: presuppositions of logic and metaphysics. The logical presuppositions for a philosophy of education consist in methodology, and the metaphysical presuppositions for a philosophy of education consist in the conditions of transcendence and immanence. Why this is the case is discussed at length.

When we take in the picture of philosophy of education after an examination of its defenses against ideologies, we find the following characteristics: first, education is composed primarily of concepts. Concepts, in turn, run the gamut from the simplest claims and propositions to the highest meta-concepts, including teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling. These meta-concepts form constellations of lower concepts, each constellation and each concept therein relating to other concepts in an overall nexus or matrix of coherence and consistency. Philosophy of education consists as well in a methodology; a process involving hypothesis formation, deductive consequences, specific instances, and the general principle or kind that gathers these. Philosophy of education also consists in original questions that emanate not from educational theory or practice, but rather from deductive consequences of questions first asked and answered in and by philosophy of education. Finally, philosophy of education consists in presuppositions that inform the overall edifice as conditions that must be met

if the philosophy of education is to remain consistent and coherent, self-sustaining, and self-correcting.

To my mind, no extant philosophies of education meet or match these criteria; indeed, within the confines of these criteria, there are no extant philosophies of education. This is a bold and controversial claim, and it is not one that I make lightly, or as part of a rhetorical strategy to prop up my own position. Almost all philosophies of education commence from an unexamined premise or standpoint. An unexamined premise is one in which a philosopher's claims about this or that are taken at face value and applied in such a way as to solve an issue or problem in educational theory and/or practice without consideration of how those claims fit with the overall account generated. In this sense, almost all philosophies of education are 'cut and paste'; they either develop a philosophically informed account of this or that problem or issue from the claims of a particular philosopher or philosophy, or (even more egregiously), they deliberately select those claims from philosophers that coincide with their standpoint. In other words, philosophy of education seldom, if ever, develops philosophies of education; rather, it provides philosophical support for educational issues and problems, or philosophical perspectives by and through which understanding of central issues and concerns are realized.[22] I cannot make a stand for this set of claims here; I have done so in *Problems*. It must be understood that philosophy of education can only resist ideologies insofar as it is a product of its own questions and concerns, as it is self-consistent and self-correcting, and these questions and concerns cannot be features of 'philosophically informed' or 'philosophical perspectives' approaches to philosophy of education. Even if the claims or perspectives ground the further account brought to bear on the educational issue or problem, they will act ideologically, as fixed and final principles that do not and cannot vary in the overall accounting. For they are introduced ab extra and therefore are outside of the very methodology that would constrain their operations.

This brings me to my ultimate concern in writing this little book: if philosophy of education wishes to extirpate itself from ideology, to make itself as impervious as is possible to ideological claims and concepts, it must at all costs avoid the injection of a claim *ab extra* into its overall account. It must scrupulously avoid bringing an unargued philosophical or political claim to bear on its account; it must take care not to allow ends or aims from outside the philosophy of education to overtake it and it can never simply approach philosophical questions from a 'perspectives' or 'isms' standpoint. None of these will ensure that a philosophy of education remains free of ideology. Only by developing its own questions and concerns, only by constructing an edifice that does not rely upon, or borrow from, specific claims, 'isms', or 'perspectives,' can a philosophy of education avoid the imposition of ideology. Let us return to Foster McMurray's claim which opened this Introduction:

> For much of. The 20th Cenutry [sic], philosophy of education has been recognized as a professional specialization, studied and taught in graduate schools of education. Nevertheless, the creation of a specialized subject matter devoted to a philosophic treatment of problems encountered in education—rather than of those problems commonly treated by philosophers—is not much in evidence.[23]

I submit that McMurray's characterization of the field is correct, and furthermore, the field is *less unified* than it was when McMurry wrote in the early 1980's. If (and this is a big if) what we want is coherence, comprehensiveness, and cohesiveness in our field, we must alight on originary questions and develop these into philosophical programs. However, doing so means a willingness to take *only those premises* that are generated in and by the philosophical program as legitimate points of departure. "Breaking off a piece of philosophy," as McMurray suggests philosophers of education did to establish their domain, is no longer acceptable (if indeed it ever was).[24]

The history of philosophy of education in the 20th century during and after Dewey consists in repeated attempts at bringing a piece of philosophy to bear on an educational issue or concern. The turn from strictly philosophical accounts to sociological, psychological, anthropological, and lately, postcolonial, and cultural accounts, does not militate against the overall *modus operandi* of the discipline. Indeed, the later turn serves to move it further away from philosophy than it had otherwise been. Though this state of affairs is recognizable to almost all in the field, it remains largely unacknowledged. It remains so because we no longer see (or choose to see) the history of philosophy of education as emerging from original questions, rather than as responsive to specific educational (and social, political, and cultural) concerns. The worry, beyond the obvious utility of philosophy of education for educational issues and concerns (which, in any event, is *not* the responsibility of a philosophy of education), is historical-hermeneutical; reading current philosophy of education back into its history legitimizes the present concerns of the discipline, and this serves to mask or even erase original questions asked and answered by the discipline.

In one sense this is inevitable, as *retroductive posits* into the past do change what we took to be that past. This is a feature of our present reflection on the past, which is to say, it is a feature of our thinking the past. When we think the past, we do so by retrojecting our existing concepts, categories, and their material instances (our ideologies and overtly political concerns) on those prior understandings, including the ways previous peoples thought and acted and the reasons they gave for doing so. Indeed, this is just what it means to think the past. It is the business of the historian of philosophy of education to bracket this tendency, while remaining acutely aware of its power over their approach to the past. The acute historian forms a double consciousness—a consciousness of the past as understood in and by the characters that inhabit the past, largely ascertained in the close examination of context, and a consciousness of the present, with its attendant

social, cultural, and ideological concerns. The acute historian knows the difference and how to balance that difference in their scholarship.

Ideology, however, has *no interest* in subduing this tendency to retroject, for it wants a past that meets its needs. Thus, it projects its aim and end onto the past to show the past in line with the present circumstances. Ideology is a structural framework that makes available and supports understandings of philosophy of education and its history in line with its framework. Ideology retrojects into the history of philosophy of education and its attendant concerns its reigning suppositions. This has the effect of normalizing past directions in philosophy of education that approximate current concerns and pronouncing anathema those directions that do not. If not careful to maintain this double consciousness, historians of the philosophy of education are subject to this normalization in their scholarship.

Close attention to the history of the discipline in line with this double consciousness keeps that earlier past in view as philosophy of education 'paints its grey on grey.'[25] A philosophy of education that begins with (original) questions side-steps the unavoidable tendency to reconstruct the past straightforwardly in consideration of the present; it has unearthed the questions of philosophy of education at its origins and it keeps these front and centre as it develops its concepts and meta-concepts. Recognition of the vicissitudes of reflective thinking and its tendency to reconstruct the past is *de rigeur* for an account of philosophy of education that begins with its origins and proceeds to construct a scaffolding that in turn insists upon and ensures as best as it can an ideology-free program.

Aside from developing a scaffold resistant to ideology, there must be an answer to the question of recognition of these vicissitudes, and this, I submit, is to be found in doing good historiography. If, as McMurray claims, the history of philosophy of education at the beginning (at least in Anglo-America) consisted in 'breaking off a piece of philosophy' and putting it into service for educational issues and concerns, then, providing due diligence on the part of the historian to ideology and its retroactive posits established, the best path forward for a philosopher of education that studies this history is an *immanent critique* of philosophy of education's present enmeshment with questions and concerns outside philosophy of education's province.[26] This of course, implies that philosophy of education should attend to itself and to its own questions and concerns, and not to the questions and concerns of other disciplines, or even to issues and concerns of education. Rather than the circularity that this might seem to suppose, it is the case that the argument made for so doing is based not in an ideology or fixed principle that then serves as philosophy of education's end, rather *the to-be substantiated claim that a philosophy of education is to begin with its origins and proceed to develop a scaffolding that proves resistant to ideology.*

If, as I claim, ideology is the single most pressing threat to philosophy of education, and ideology, as a projection of present concerns onto past events and figures is its hallmark. the business of philosophy of education is to interrupt this projection. This demands nothing less than a sea-change in its ordinary disciplinary activity.[27] The aims and ends of philosophy of education, if philosophy of education is to avoid immersion in ideology, must come from within, and not from without. Indeed, this is the overarching thesis of this book. This requires a wholesale re-thinking of philosophy of education practiced as a discipline, including the reconstruction of journals and graduate programs, which I discuss in *Problems*. What seems demanded is the turn away from ideologically driven programs and research to those which emphasize the building of philosophies of education from questions of origins and logical, metaphysical, ethical, and socio-political presuppositions conditioning their further accounts. This, of course, means turning our attention from existing educational issues and concerns to those that emanate from philosophy of education understood as a self-supporting and self-maintaining edifice.

The question immediately raised is, how and where do we begin? I have made some suggestions in this vein in *Problems*: as I made clear there, the proper locus of change is with journals of philosophy of education, book series, and graduate education. This sort of program cannot be accomplished overnight; it will require the persistence of the discipline and will likely require an entire generation. Furthermore, it cannot proceed by fiat; those within the discipline must choose to undertake the change. There is little will to do so, to judge by the content of leading journals and the curriculum in graduate programs. The spectacle of a field beholden to the issues and interests of education writ large, will likely endure. Nevertheless, those that think this enterprise a mistake must continue to challenge the dominant narrative.

Notes

1. Foster McMurray, *Philosophy of Public Education*, edited by M. Oliker (Chicago: Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, 2000), 9.

2. McMurray, *Philosophy of Public Education*, 10.

3. McMurray, *Philosophy of Public Education*, 11.

4. Harvey Siegel, "Philosophy of Education," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2018 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/education-philosophy/#ProbDeliFiel; Dennis Phillips, "What is Philosophy of Education?" in *The Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Education*, ed. Richard Bailey, et al. (Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage, 2010), 1-19.

5. See for example, R, Dearden, P. Hirst, and R.S. Peters, *Education and the Development of Reason* (London: RKP, 1972), which covers all of these topics and more.

6. See for example, R.M. Brosio, *A Radical Democratic Critique of Capitalist Education* (New York: Peter Lang, 1994); Moacir Gadotti, *Pedagogy of Praxis: A Dialectical Philosophy of Education* (Albany, Ny: SUNY Press, 1996).

7. See for example, Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984/2013).

8. Robin Barrow and Ronald Woods, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 11.

9. Harry Broudy, *Building a Philosophy of Education* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1961).

10. Denis Phillips, "Interpreting The 1970's, or Rashomon Meets Education," *Educational Theory* 50, no. 3 (2000): 321-338.

11. Maxine Greene, "The Sixties: The Calm Against the Storm, or Levels of Concern," *Educational Theory* 50, no. 3 (2000): 307-320.

12. Champlin calls what philosophy of education brings to scholars and practitioners are "unique theoretical tools," and "the employment of these tools" in examination of education. N. Champlin, "The Distinctive Nature of the Discipline of the Philosophy of Education," *Educational Theory* 4, no. 1 (1954): 111.

13. See Paul Hirst, Introduction, *Education and the Development of Reason* (London: RKP, 1972); Denis Phillips, "Interpreting the 1970's, or Roshomon Meets Education," *Educational Theory* 50, no. 3 (2000): 321-338.

14. Jonas Soltis, "Introduction," in *Philosophy and Education: Eightieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, vol. 1, ed. Kenneth Rehage and Jonas Soltis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 23.

15. Megan Boler, "An Epoch of Difference: Hearing Voices in the Nineties," *Educational Theory* 50, no. 3 (2000): 357-381.

16. R.S. Peters, “Was Plato Nearly Right About Education?” in R.S. Peters, *Philosophers as Educators* (London, RKP, 1981), 1-15.

17. I am excluding accounts of educational theory in various philosophers’ overall works. For example, Plato’s ‘educational theory,’ or St. Thomas Aquinas’ ‘educational theory.’ These are of interest to educators, but not as instruments brought to bear on current issues and concerns, but rather for philosophical and historical interest.

18. Daniel Tanner, Crusade for Democracy: Progressive Education at the Crossroads (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1991).

19. James Scott Johnston, *Problems in the Philosophy of Education* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019).

20. I will discuss the debate between those that think philosophy of education emerged with Plato and those that think it is an institutional enterprise of the past 100-200 years, in Chapter Two.

21. R.G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940). Collingwood’s ‘Absolute Presuppositions’ were of course, the Creeds of Christianity, and particularly, the Holy Trinity. The idea of the three Persons in one Substance was the irreducible Ground of all suppositions that would be metaphysical in the history of metaphysics from the dawn of Christianity onward.

22. Extant textbooks on philosophy of education make this clear, as I will discuss in Chapter Three.

23. McMurray, *Philosophy of Public Education*, 9.

24. McMurray, *Philosophy of Public Education*, 9.

25. The allusion here is to Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. A. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

26. This is a project for the historian, not the philosopher.

27. Much of the discussion of what counts as a sea-change is to be found in James Scott Johnston, *Problems in the Philosophy of Education*, especially Part Two.

Chapter One

Meta-Education as a Constellation of Meta-Concepts and Concepts

1.1 Ideology and Philosophy of Education

Almost no one in philosophy of education wants to be perceived as openly ideological.[1] Yet, ideology is thought to be pervasive, and frequently charges of ideology are made against one or another epistemic, ethical, and political standpoint.[2] Often enough, claims of supporting ideologies is tantamount to the support of *indoctrination*. As indoctrination is a considered topic in philosophy of education and has a long history as such, and since practicing or professing an ideology is *ex hypothesi* doctrinaire, the issue is worth examining.[3] Consider Harvey Siegel's account of indoctrination in the *Britannica* entry on philosophy of education.

> A much-debated question is whether and how education differs from indoctrination. Many theorists have assumed that the two are distinct and that indoctrination is undesirable, but others have argued that there is no difference in principle and that indoctrination is not intrinsically bad. Theories of indoctrination generally define it in terms of aim, method, or doctrine. Thus, indoctrination is either: (1) any form of teaching aimed at getting students to adopt beliefs independent of the evidential support those beliefs may have (or lack); (2) any form of teaching based on methods that instill beliefs in students in such a way that they are unwilling or unable to question or evaluate those beliefs independently; or (3) any form of teaching that causes students to embrace a specific set of beliefs—e.g., a certain or a religious doctrine—without regard for its evidential status. These ways of characterizing indoctrination emphasize its alleged contrast with critical thinking: the critical thinker (according to standard accounts) strives to base his beliefs, judgments, and actions on the competent

> assessment of relevant reasons and evidence, which is something the victim of indoctrination tends not to do. But this apparent contrast depends upon the alleged avoidability of indoctrination, which itself is a philosophically contested issue.[4]

What is indoctrinated is the fixed and final understanding of the topic or perspective of the authority (in this case represented by and through the teacher or administrator). The means of indoctrination are also considered in these accounts; the 'how' of indoctrination is as important as the 'what' and the 'why.' Indoctrination is the corollary to ideology in these accounts precisely because it is ideology that is being indoctrinated into students. While this may seem a circular argument, when we examine what ideology consists in—in the largest sense, a worldview which is (almost) unquestionable, cannot be easily challenged, and holds great power over its adherents—the corollary comes into better view.

Nevertheless, ideology—and the study of ideology—has its uses. As Michael Freeden puts it: "The study of ideologies is unquestionably the study of substantive, concrete configurations of political ideas that matter to, and in, societies." [5] Freeden continues:

> That will present problems for many political philosophers. Even if we jettison the idea of ideologies as false and manipulative, and their study becomes no longer a question of confronting the inferior and the wrong, the ethicists among philosophers will find the inclusion of the ordinary as the focus of study difficult to digest, let alone implement. The upgrading of the commonplace and average runs against philosophical intuitions about the uniqueness, difficulty and high standards involved in establishing ethical theories and guidelines. Even Marxism, when purporting to focus on the so-called ordinary—the proletariat—rejected the thinking emanating from that class as insignificant, due to the distorting nature of alienation.[6]

Freeden claims that ideology is not only worthy of study, but also ideal for the reconnection of political theory with practice.

> Finally, but not least importantly, the study of ideology offers a route towards a reconnection of political thought with political science: a much-needed reconciliation of political theory with a focus on political processes and structures. It is not only that ideologies are competitions over the public control of political ideas, though that alone would classify them as quintessential political phenomena and move ideas to centre-stage of the political. For whoever controls political thought exerts considerable influence on political action, an argument as evident in Plato as it is in Orwell, and as implicit in Mill as it is in Shaw. It is also the case that ideologies actually exist as salient political entities—as Durkheimian 'social facts'—and that the social sciences are fittingly fascinated by the actual, even more than by the potential.[7]

Presumably, Freeden's sentiment is applicable to philosophy of education. Yet, and notwithstanding the importance of the study of ideology in political theory, as I will show, ideology has had, and continues to have, a baleful influence on philosophy of education.

Indeed, my opening premise of this book is philosophy of education is *entirely too politicized* and this makes what we undertake in our discipline susceptible of ideology. Political ideology I define following Freeden, as a core of arguments, claims, and assertions for democratic, autocratic, liberal, socialist, or one or another of the prevailing political standpoints.[8] To succumb to political ideology, then, is to begin one's philosophical articulation of an issue, problem, framework, or program from a political standpoint, regardless of whether that standpoint is front and centre, or a hidden ground, foundation, or point of departure for all subsequent claims. While not claiming there is a fool-proof method or even set of readily applied concepts for avoiding ideology in one's philosophy of education, I do think there are ways to resist its force, and the way I propose here is partly constituted of what I am calling meta-education.

Meta-education stands for a meta-conceptual constellation of various other conceptual constellations we operate with in philosophy of education, educational theory, educational research, and indeed, most other disciplines in the broader expanse of education. It is a constellation of three other conceptual constellations—teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools. I will not pause here to defend these constellations—I have done so in *Problems*—other than to point out their specific historical and philosophical characteristics. These characteristics in turn, make them suitable as conceptual constellations. A constellation, in sociological terms, is a figuration or configuration; a set or series of interdependencies.[9] Each of these conceptual constellations is composed of various individual concepts that are in turn composed of other concepts. There is a 'nesting' of concepts within concepts in any constellation, similar to a Matryoshka doll. What is important, beyond the content of the concept, is the way in which these concepts relate to one another to form a larger and higher concept—a meta-concept that ultimately forms the constellation of concepts I am calling meta-education. In this chapter, I want to take us through the method and the process of concept-formation that ends in the constellation-concept, meta-education. In so doing, I will rely on certain philosophical presuppositions.[10] I will introduce these as we proceed from the origins of the development of the concept through to its relationship with other concepts and finally, to meta-education.

1.1.1 The Politicization of Educational Concepts

It is close to axiomatic to say that philosophy of education is political to the root.[11] What I mean is that the concepts philosophy of education operates with in its various discourses are grounded in a particular vision of politics and furthermore directed to some political end. This ground/end could be utopian, as in a collectivist economy and culture, or it could be more commonplace, as in justice for minority populations and the disenfranchised. It could also be directed towards primary or individual rights and civil liberties, in keeping

with constitutional precedents and United Nations declarations and conventions. Consider, for example, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR):

> All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.[12]

Even such an innocuous sounding article as this is ideological when put forth as an opening premise or ultimate end of a philosophy of education. All the above cases constitute examples of political visions that ultimately serve to ground and/or direct philosophies of education. All these cases remove the strictly philosophical impetus of philosophy of education from those that would traffic in such grounds or ends.

To say that operating with these grounds or ends is ideological is also to say that those who follow and endorse such a philosophy of education are very often unaware of its ideological basis. It may simply seem the right thing to believe about humanity, our common nature, or the proper relationship of the government to the governed. Further support can come from philosophies themselves, especially those which champion the 'ends' of humanity, or fellow-feeling, or one or another account of justice. Yet there is nevertheless a strong difference between a philosophy which maintains justice (for example) as one of the ends towards which we strive, and an ideology; the difference has to do with the structure or scaffolding of premises, claims, assertions, arguments, and concepts formed and placed to reach that end. This scaffolding or structure has to do not only with conceptual *content* (as assertions, claims, propositions, and arguments) but also with the *methods* by which that philosophy relates this content to other content. The content and the methods are what composes the scaffolding, the structure of the very philosophy that would assert such an end.

In the absence of such a structure, such a scaffolding, the question of grounds looms. What will occupy this needed place and space? Too often it is filled by an ideological premise. This would be a political premise that is *untested* in the proposed philosophy of education. It would either be inserted *ab extra* to buttress the entire edifice or to give it a teleological claim to power. As ideology, it is beyond reproach; it cannot be tested or evaluated in the same respect as other components of the edifice, if at all. It exists outside and beyond the edifice yet serves to ground or direct the entire apparatus. Regardless of the nobility, the dignity, the humanity of the ideological core, it is *ab extra* and as such, has *no legitimate role to play* in the edifice of philosophy of education. It will do to provide an example.

All philosophies of education that are properly philosophical have structural features to them, which include at a minimum consistency and coherency. A claim, assertion, or argument must be followed by another that follows logically and conceptually from the first. Otherwise, they are simply non-sequiturs cobbled together to form a hodgepodge.

The introduction of a premise or claim that is not related to the other claims in the edifice, whether it serves as ground or end (or both), creates a mishmash of that edifice. An example of such an ideological stepwise chain of reasoning is as follows:

1. *(According to the core of the ideology I support), there are particular social institutions/behaviours/attitudes in the community, society, nation, world that are valuable.*

2. *Education has a valid role (verified through humanities/scientific/social-scientific theories, experiments, and results) to play in enacting these.*

3. *Education ought to/should/must take on the responsibility of enacting these values.*[13]

4. *Education will enact mechanisms/directives/policies/curricular changes to either ameliorate/mitigate/suppress or enact those events.*

5. *The result of education enacting these is/will be to enact these values amongst individuals, groups, communities, and states.*

This is the ideological chain of reasoning in what will become the ground and/or end of the philosophy of education. Now let us turn to the edifice itself.[14]

1. *Rational thinking (reasoning) is a common feature of human beings.*

2. *Rational thinking (reasoning) is necessary (though not sufficient) to have people act morally.*

3. *Education (teaching and learning, the curriculum, schools) helps foster rational thinking and acting morally.*

4. *Therefore, education is a necessary ingredient/component of learning how to act morally.*

Here is the skeleton of an account of morality for a philosophy of education. Notice the first premise is unsupported. In any *philosophy* of education, there must be no unsupported premises.[15] What, then, could we turn to for support? We might turn to ideology. For example, we might take the following ideological claim from the previous discussion and insert it at the beginning of the edifice.

> *'(According to the core of the ideology I support) there are particular social institutions/behaviours/attitudes in the community, society, nation, world that are to be valued.'*

This might be placed in such a way to buttress,

> *'Rational thinking (reasoning) is a common feature of human beings.'*

Brought together, these two might play the roles of major and minor premise, leading to a conclusion. For example,

> *'These particular social institutions/behaviours/attitudes in the community, society, nation, world, are to be valued,'*

and

> *'Rational thinking (reasoning) is a common feature of human beings.'*

Therefore,

> *'Rational thinking should be used by all to promote these values amongst individuals, groups, communities, and states.'*[16]

We now have an ideological premise grounding the claim for rational thinking and the way is clear to place rational thinking and its deductive consequences in the role of supporting the ideological agenda, which in this case would be to turn rational thinking towards the valuation of the particular social institutions/behaviours/attitudes in the community, society, nation, or world, with the implication that to not do so—to not adopt the ideological agenda—is to turn away from rational thinking.

1.2 The Meta-Concept, Education

Considering what has been said of ideology and ideological premises in the philosophy of education, I turn to a different model and understanding of what philosophy of education is to be; one without the affixed ideological apparatus of either grounding premise or indubitable end. This will lead me to an examination of the roots of conceptual development, the associated meta-level concepts of teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling, and the question of claims, assertions, and propositions and their role in these meta-concepts. I will begin with a discussion of the arch meta-concept, education, and proceed to the associated meta-concepts teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling, together with the role of claims, assertions, and propositions therein, in the following section. I will conclude with a section on ideology as regards this reconstructed model of philosophy of education.

1.2.1 The Roots of Conceptual Development

With the above example of ideological thinking in philosophy of education, we see how even the simplest philosophical claims can be held captive to ideology. Obviously, we will want to avoid such a situation in forming and developing philosophies of education and this will require acute attention to our conceptual formation and its attendant method. I do believe there is a way through the ideological thicket, and this way, *as a method*, invokes and involves phases or stages of conceptual development. This method has three phases or stages: conjecture or hypothesis-formation, deductive consequences or deduction, and generalization or induction.[17] I will lay out the development of the concept according to these three phases in terms of their function with respect to one another. With regards to conjecture or hypothesis-formation, we begin, so to speak, in *media res*. In this case, we have before us numerous concepts that serve as hypotheses; concepts that vary according to their contents and limits, their coherence and cohesiveness, their intensional and extensional capacities.

Let us take, for example, the concept of authority. Getting clear on authority has been a staple of philosophy of education since the 1930's. Here, we are after the predicates of the term. By intensional, I mean the capacity of a concept to include its specific instances, its features, characteristics, and attributes, together with the ability of the term to grasp these.[18] By extensional, I mean the capacity of the concept to relate to other predicates or attributes.[19] The latter involves the principles or operations the concepts use to judge whether or not a predicate is equal to other predicates; if a concept judges that two otherwise dissimilar predicates or properties are equal (though not in terms of their intensionality), then we may say that the principles of the concept are co-extensional.[20]

Among these concepts, three stand out for several reasons, including their historical longevity, their fitness to operate in tandem and/or conjunction with other concepts, and their near universality. These are teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling. These are the meta-concepts I am currently interested in, and I will work with these in what follows. Each of these is a hypothesis insofar as it is fallible. Its fallibility precludes either necessity or sufficiency, and as such, none of these has a self-supporting metaphysical ground or foundation;[21] they are exclusively functional. They serve to include and incorporate other concepts, which are also fallible. Hypotheses have deductive consequences, which generate specific ideal instances that we can match, or correspond. with extant educational claims, propositions, concepts, policies, and practices. In gathering these latter together under a rubric or kind, we form a general principle, which serves as the complete—though tentative—concept for those instances, and this is taken into every purported instance of that kind.[22] We can think of simpler concepts as nested in larger concepts, with teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling operating as the major meta-concepts under the overarching meta-concept, education. Now, what makes a concept both viable and fallible lies in its ability

(or inability) to gather its instances as well as its applicability or operational ability (or inability) to do something to some other concept or concepts. Concepts that 'do their jobs' survive and even thrive. Concepts that do not are jettisoned and/or reconstructed. To jettison a concept is also to favour another concept and employ it as a working hypothesis. To reconstruct a concept is to add or delete certain features to that concept, for example, restricting its scope to include certain features and only those features. What results in the jettisoning or reconstruction of a concept concerns its fitness to serve in operations involving reflective activity, such as judging, as well as practice, including its practical evaluation. For example, if the concept, 'zero-tolerance' operates to improve school safety and diminish the likelihood of ongoing violence and disruption, while at the same time maintains the rights and civil liberties of the children involved, then it can be said to operate successfully.

A concept that does not meet the operational criterion can nevertheless maintain its usefulness if there are no other concepts available to do a better job. This often means ad hoc adjustments and additions to the concept. At a certain point, the concept becomes unworkable, either because it neglects or is unable to grasp a fundamental factor, issue, or characteristic of the situation it serves, or it loses its consistency and coherency. This is roughly the failure of intension. A concept of 'zero-tolerance' that cannot handle the phenomenon of widespread school suspension and loss of learning is a concept that fails in terms of its operational ability and requires ad hoc adjustments to the hypothesis. An unworkable concept, one that collapses under the weight of its ad hoc hypotheses, is one that must be jettisoned or reconstructed. Reconstruction occurs in two phases: the concept is pulled apart and it is carefully examined for its ability to discharge deductive consequences.[23] These consequences must be individually ascertained and then meticulously accounted for in the gathering of evidence, or the specific instances that correspond with the deductive consequences. For example, in the case of the concept of 'zero-tolerance,' one deductive consequence is a reduction in the number of reported in-class episodes of violent behaviour. This consequence must reveal itself in the experimental phase or stage of inquiry. Failure to do so imperils the concept. The way is then clear to put forward a new hypothesis—a new concept. In this case, the hypothesis is not only that the new concept works as well as the older concept, but it is an improvement on it because it envelops more specific instances. There, the new concept is the rival of the old concept, and because it operates better, both extensionally and intensionally, it is the superior—and proper—concept for this and similar situations.

When a concept breaks down, it does so because it is fundamentally opposed to itself. As a concept, it contains its instances, or what it gathers and includes. These instances are generated by the deductive consequences of the hypothesis. Failure of the consequences to emerge in the particulars it is to correspond with is tantamount to a rupture or diremption in the concept, for in this case the concept is at odds with itself,

unable to match its form to its content. This necessitates jettisoning or reconstruction of the concept. Breakages in lesser concepts occur frequently, as older concepts struggle to contain counterfactual conditionals, and odd or new instances. The cohesiveness and consistency of the concept is strained to the breaking point if it is not supplemented by an ad hoc hypothesis that grants an exception to this or that case or instance falling outside of its purview. Consider:

> 'All zero-tolerance is operationally and experimentally justified just in so far as it does not contravene a student's individual rights and civil liberties.'

In this case, the counterfactual clause is the limit of the universality of the concept. Add enough ad hoc hypotheses, and the concept collapses under its own weight. The concept's operation is acutely compromised, and so it must be reconstructed or replaced.

1.2.2 Conceptual Relations: How Constellations Form

Of course, concepts do not operate in a vacuum. A great part of what counts as their *extensionality* concerns their relations with other concepts. While a concept may be intrinsically coherent and consistent with respect to grasping its instances, it is meaningless unless it operates together with other concepts. As concepts operate together, the crisis of one concept threatens others. A concept that is unable to sustain itself could threaten an entire research program if left to gather numerous counterfactual instances that are not addressed. Fortunately, the presence of other concepts often necessitates a challenge to the broken concept, and aids in its replacement. Take once again the case of 'zero-tolerance;' if the counterfactual of the child's rights and civil liberties threatens the concept, then an ad hoc hypothesis that limits the universality of the concept can be employed. If numerous ad hoc hypotheses threaten the stability of the concept, then the concept can be reconstructed as a similar concept, say 'targeted behavioral consequences,' that is able to satisfy the counterfactuals. If this concept is already available as a similar—though ultimately distinct—concept for operations in schools, then it becomes a successful rival, and perhaps a replacement for 'zero-tolerance.'

Concepts operate in constellations. I have discussed this in the introductory paragraphs of this chapter regarding the nesting metaphor. Just as instances are taken up by and included in concepts, so concepts are taken up by and included in constellations of concepts, or meta-concepts. Meta-conceptualization, or nesting, provides for a constellation-wide response to the failure of single concepts, as it allows for reconstruction or replacement through the operation and legitimation of similar but distinct concepts. Though each concept in a constellation is indelibly unique, these often share the same or similar instances, which makes them ideal as replacements or, in the case

of reconstruction, bridge-concepts. Under the meta-concept, 'school,' both 'zero-tolerance' and 'targeted behavioural consequences' share instances, and this facilitates the reconstruction or replacement of the former by the latter. The constellation itself is structured to give form to the various concepts and meta-concepts that exist within. This constitutes the scaffolding discussed earlier. When we proceed from concept to meta-concept, we do so in terms of the relations of one concept to another. Each concept forms relations with each other concept and the totality of these relations is a meta-concept. The meta-concept serves to not only bring the individual concepts together, but it is also operationally equivalent to that individual concept. To say 'school,' therefore, is to say 'zero-tolerance' if 'zero-tolerance' is an accepted (unchallenged) concept. 'School' carries its various conceptual instances.

A meta-concept may also house otherwise contrary concepts. 'School' may house not only 'zero-tolerance' but 'individual rights and civil liberties.' On the face of it, these are dissimilar, if not contrary. However, through the meta-concept, these can be brought together in such a way that their contrary features are bracketed, and their operational suitability made to rest on what they have in common—or what is not contrary in them. This is arguably the way most meta-concepts operate. Outright contradictoriness, as manifest in the lack of equivalency, symmetry, and reciprocity amongst concepts *is* a problem for meta-concepts,[24] but whereas a single concept stands or falls on its consistency and coherency, a meta-concept can handle contraries just insofar as it is able to keep the concepts within the ambit of its operations. Indeed, meta-concepts serve to buttress otherwise problematic single concepts, as they turn these towards a different goal or end than the concept would otherwise have if left alone.

1.2.3 The Constellation or Meta-Concept of Education: Meta-Education

A meta-concept of education, or meta-education, is the overarching concept. It consists in the meta-concepts of teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling. These in turn, consist in less complex concepts, which ultimately consist in simple concepts, such as assertions, propositions, sentences, and statements. Altogether, these form the edifice of education. The meta-concept of education is inclusive of all concepts involving education, and all operations therein. In *Problems*, I have called the meta-concept of education the thinking and acting on our shared humanity. We can also think of this as the end (though not ontologically preestablished) to which all meta-concepts and their concepts are put. The meta-concept has as its content nothing extrinsic to itself, for it is nothing other than the various meta-concepts and concepts that form its content. This is not ideology; the meta-concept education presupposes only its content and nothing further. It is not driven forward by any single meta-concept, concept, or specific content, but by the entirety of its conceptual apparatus together with their operations. No

one concept or meta-concept within education dominates. This obviously includes political concepts that arise out of the various operations educational concepts perform.

What, then, results in the failure of the meta-concept of education? Strictly speaking, the failure is occasioned by and through the collapse of the meta-concepts teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling. These fail when they are unable to hold together the various lower concepts that form their contents. *The entire edifice stands, or falls, on the capacity of the meta-concepts to house their concepts, and for these concepts to gather up and include their instances, their particulars*. These instances are only instances insofar as they are grasped by their concepts. This requires testing to claim that the instances are in fact proper for the concept. These instances are to follow from the deductive consequences of the hypothesis, and therefore must correspond with the consequences of the hypothesis. Any mismatch or lack of correspondence signals failure of the hypothesis. There is a structural isomorphism between the hypothesis, its deductive consequences, the instances that are to be tested for, and the resultant generalization. If this isomorphism is imperilled, the entire apparatus is threatened with collapse and a reconstructed or new hypothesis may well be occasioned.

An ideological concept (which could itself be a concept or meta-concept in some other program) would have to operate in the constellations of concepts set by the meta-concept, education. It would have to share at least similar features with other concepts to be grasped by a higher concept. Its contradictions with respect to other concepts would have to be somehow mitigated in the meta-concept. While it may prove to have operational value for this or that concept or meta-concept, the net effect would have to be the ability to operate in tandem or conjunction with other concepts and meta-concepts to a further end; the end that is the meta-concept, education. Now, we might suppose that a thoroughgoing ideological program can accomplish this, for it has and operates with concepts and meta-concepts that are of a piece with one another; its means and ends are, or at the very least appear, coeval and coterminous. Additionally, the situations in which it operates—the situations having instances that serve to 'test' its deductive consequences—are comprehensible in terms of the rubrics of the ideology.[25] Yet, to think that such a program can accomplish what a thoroughgoing philosophy of education that rests on non-ideological concepts does would be folly. The hypotheses that a philosophy of education forms and utilizes arise from a situation that is at least partly composed of instances dependent on the structural isomorphism of the hypothesis, its deductive consequences, the resultant particulars, and their generalization, and *not* from a political core that serves as, or supplies, an unargued premise. The basic criterion for a new hypothesis is the failure of an existing concept to do what is intended of it: to gather instances together in a kind or class, and to operate together with other concepts. In a coherent and cohesive philosophy of education there is no direct political agenda at the level of hypothesis. Ideologies and the political agendas they imply arise out of the

establishment of consistent concepts and the ends to which they are directed, and not from simple concepts as hypotheses. Of course, hypotheses do concern teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling, and as such, they concern meta-concepts. However, they are not in themselves considered the content of these meta-concepts, nor are they the overarching end of these concepts. It is meta-education, which as the arch concept which has these less-complex concepts as its content. In other words, the beginnings and ends of the meta-concept are to be found in its content, and not *ab extra*.

I want to say a few final words about ideology and the meta-concept, education. What distinguishes ideology from a research program in philosophy of education, is that the latter is a coherent and cohesive structure or edifice that neither requires, nor suggests, a premise *ab extra*. To saddle itself with such a premise, particularly if that premise is tied to some larger political agenda, would be to traffic in ideology. The only acceptable path to avoiding ideology is to begin with hypotheses that arise out of situations that educators are facing because it is these situations that contain purported instances of the deductive consequence, and it is to these instances that the deductive consequences must correspond. These situations are existential and experiential, as opposed to policy-specific or legislative-political. Furthermore, the origins of such a program, such as a philosophy of education that would concentrate on situations, cannot be found in a specific political premise; it must take the shape of a more fundamental and inclusive claim regarding the nature of our shared humanity. I believe I have isolated such a claim, and this is the basis of the question of origins for philosophy of education as I have developed in *Problems*.

1.3 The Meta-Concepts of Education: Teaching and Learning, the Curriculum, and Schools and Schooling

We have examined thus far the meta-concept, education, and established its meta-theoretic provenance. Now we will want to dig further down into the bedrock of concepts involved in education. Here, we will examine the leading meta-concepts that make up education; these are teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling. Meta-education is composed of further concepts, and each of these concepts are, as regards their specific content, meta-concepts for this content. These meta-concepts in turn have their own concepts, and these concepts in turn are composed of various single assertions, claims, propositions, and statements. For each of these meta-concepts, I will ask and answer two questions; first, what is its historical provenance, and second, what distinguishing features and characteristics, which take the guise of claims, assertions, propositions, and statements, are to be found within? I will also provide a discussion of their transformation considering internal and external dynamics.

1.3.1 Teaching and Learning

The meta-concept, teaching and learning, together with the meta-concepts, curriculum and schools and schooling, is itself a constellation of lower concepts, which in turn are constellations of singular claims, assertions, propositions, and statements about this or that aspect of educational theory and/or practice. Therefore, when we examine teaching and learning, we are examining it at, and from, different levels of organization. Most of what I have to say here concentrates on the meta-level organization or meta-concept; the level at which the constellation grasps its content, in the guise of further concepts, including their assertions, statements, and propositions. (I will save the discussion of singular assertions, statements, and propositions for a further chapter.) To say teaching and learning is a meta-concept is to say that it has logical and epistemological properties, such as intension and extension, syntax and grammar, and a basis in an as yet-specified nest or nexus of relations to other meta-concepts. It also invokes and implies a history. This history is not exhaustive of its various meanings, though it does provide a point of departure for the various uses of the concept.

The history of the meta-concept, teaching and learning, could conceivably be traced back as far as the genesis of written tablets and other documents. We find these in the archaeological sites of the Middle East, China, India, and other significant locations. It certainly became a feature of Egyptian and later, Greek writings. On the understanding of teaching and learning proffered here, statements, claims, and assertions about the transmission of cultural and social knowledge from elders to youngers by numerous means counts as decisive.[26] The basic components of teaching and learning, then, are to be found in various propositions and practices that involve child-rearing, and to what we now call the socialization of children, together with formal instruction in and through social institutions. In this understanding, parents, families, relatives, and others in the kinship group bear the responsibilities for teaching and presuppose organized and bureaucratic institutions delivering specified instruction.

Self-conscious attempts at organizing teaching became a mainstay of civilizations.[27] We know a good deal about ancient Greek education because of unearthed documents as well as literature, histories, philosophy, and other sources.[28] What was primarily a parental and familial practice gelled into an institutional one; of course, this is the development of curricula and schools. Specific methods of teaching, together with opinions about what counted as learning, was present by the 5th century BCE, particularly in Sparta and Athens. Indeed, some philosophers of education are bold enough to suggest that philosophy of education began its ascent with 5th century BCE thinkers and practices.[29] Regardless, the stage was set for a conglomeration of ideas and their respective practices, which undoubtedly did have a profound impact on the cultural formation of ancient Egypt, Greece and later, Rome.

This *cultural formation*—the broadest term I can find for the aim and impact of teaching and learning—was inclusive of individual, familial, communal, and social-political formation.[30] Here, the amalgamation of socialization and what we now call education—formal instruction together with its attendant evaluation of the students' progress—took place. The rise of the Greek Academies and their offshoots in Rome extended teaching (and learning) to older children and young adults. The cultural formation that began with young children was thus extended and this served to heighten the level of sophistication of content and practices. The establishment of the universities in the Middle Ages was the solidification and bureaucratization of these earlier tendencies. These institutions, in turn, served as a point of departure for the modern university, which had its adult rite of passage in the German research universities of the 19th century, and was then transplanted across the globe.

The historical movement of teaching and learning, viewed from this perspective, is one of simple-to-complex. Simple claims and assertions, together with their concomitant practices, become nested in concepts that in turn become larger and more complex. However, this should not be understood as a linear progression; a dialectical pattern is a better one to describe the phenomenon, for it would seem the jettisoning or reconstruction of older propositions and claims in favour of novel ones *is* the historical case. Some assertions are omitted and, consequently, the new shape is different than the old. Other than perhaps the broadest of assertions (e.g., 'It is important to rear children in a family,' or 'It is expedient to bring children together in some sort of organized environment to learn.') most of the earliest assertions are no longer to be found in prevalent concepts. To say a concept within the meta-concept, teaching and learning, is complex is not only to say that it is composed of many lesser concepts; it is also to say it has undergone a great deal of historical revision, and ultimately looks nothing like the assertions and propositions with which it began. It has, in short, been reconstructed.

When we ask about distinguishing features and characteristics, we are asking about the content of our concept. Teaching and learning are, first, to be taken as one; the concepts within are to be understood as logically and practically reciprocal.[31] Of course, they are not logically equivalent such that they meet the stringent demands of logical equivalence in a dyadic system or truth-function table. However, and especially in practice, they do invoke one another such that we can only think of them one-sidedly when considered apart. It is of course acceptable to analyze the concept into its two main components—form and content—and to examine features or characteristics of one or the other in experimental studies. Yet, for a philosophy of education, attention must be paid as well to their reciprocal nature. The constellation, teaching and learning, contains concepts that are in turn composed of lower-level concepts. We might think of the study of pedagogy as a component of teaching and learning, and within pedagogy, lower-level concepts such as, for example, the 'pedagogy of hope,' or the 'pedagogy of discomfort.'[32] Likewise, with

learning, we might think of the study of inquiry-based learning as a component of teaching and learning, and within this, a lower-level concept such as 'case studies' or 'group projects.' Of course, within each of these meta-concepts and lower-level concepts are claims, assertions, statements and propositions about their relevance and effectiveness.

Concepts do jockey for position. All things being equal, a concept that can include more particular instances and extend its range across other concepts will prevail over a concept that cannot. There is a sort of rivalry between concepts, here; what will ultimately decide the fate of the 'pedagogy of hope' and the 'pedagogy of discomfort' (aside from ideological and political interference) is the ability of one or the other to prevail against its rival. While these concepts are complimentary under the meta-concept, their tendency to stay complementary only persists if one does not outstrip the other in terms of coherence, consistency, and range. When we speak of the constellation of concepts, then, we are speaking of concepts that are not static and inert, rather in near-constant interplay.

Meta-concepts and their concepts are composed of claims, assertions, propositions, and statements, and these have functional characteristics or uses. For example, observation statements such as 'Johnny is sleeping in class,' are assertions just in so far as they are put forward to be evaluated. The propositions that take form in concepts are assertions or claims that are proven or remain to be proven; some are facts; others are more tentative.[33] Of course, the underlying premise here is that all assertions and claims are fallible, in that they could be, if examination were extended long and deep enough, proven faulty. However, that is the concern of a particular philosophy of education and I will not dwell on it here. These propositions take, for example, the logical form of subject-predicate (as in the above). They consist in nouns, copula, and verbs, as well as adjectives and adverbs. They conform to the rules of logical syntax and grammar. Together, they form the content for the meta-concept that includes them under its rubric.

As a collection of assertions and claims in the guise of statements and propositions, these form the most rudimentary of concepts. A proposition is a concept, for it consists in a logical syntax and grammar, performs a function (whether observational, illustrative, or assertional, indicative, aspirational, explanatory, etc.), and perhaps most importantly, depends on a host of other propositions.[34] We might say it is *irreducibly relational*, in that not only can it not stand on or by itself but gains its meaning in the context or nexus of other propositions which together are combined to form the larger meta-concept.[35] Singular propositions work with other propositions under the aegis of a dominant meta-concept. We might, for example, consider the proposition, 'white children have privilege' as a singular concept in the 'pedagogy of discomfort.'[36] The proposition makes sense only in relation to other singular concepts, such as 'privilege inhibits empathy' or 'African American children are not granted the privilege white children have.' Together, these make sense only under the meta-concept, 'the pedagogy of discomfort,' or one characteristically similar.

Conceptual success or failure, then, depends on the ability of the concept to marshal its singular propositions. Contradictory propositions cannot be maintained by a simple concept, and larger concepts that contain contradictory propositions implode. For example, if the 'pedagogy of discomfort' were to adopt as a singular proposition, 'all children are equal at birth,' it would seemingly contradict the singular proposition, 'white children have privilege,' and this would prove detrimental to the larger concept. Now it may be the case that the point and purpose of the concept, 'the pedagogy of discomfort,' is precisely to make the provisions for the equality of all children at birth, but this must be articulated fully at the outset of concept-formation. This would still require the extant observation and claim that children are, indeed, not equal at birth. Existential concepts (propositions of the way things are asserted to be) and aspirational concepts (propositions of the way we would like things to be) must align in the meta-concept at the risk of conceptual confusion or contradiction, which heralds the breakdown and subsequent jettisoning or reconstruction of the concept.

Concepts and meta-concepts (including the meta-concept, education) must not only be amenable to their singular propositions, but singular propositions to their concepts. This means that there is a reciprocal relationship between the content the singular propositions provide and the form of the concepts, such that they are inextricably bound together. This is tantamount to the singular proposition (as tracking its specific instance) grasping its concept and being grasped by the concept, in turn. This goes as well for concepts and their meta-concepts. Not only do meta-concepts stand or fall on their content—their specific instances in the guise of concepts—but the content is shaped by, and functionally driven towards, the meta-concept. A singular proposition that has no overarching concept is barren and lifeless; its functional capacity is limited to the single assertion it portends. Of course, this is not how propositions operate; for they always portend a situation in which the claim is nested in a set of other claims, and this is because they always operate with, in, and through, meta-concepts.

Singular propositions are taken up in a context or nexus of related propositions, and together, these form the ingredients, the assertional content, for the larger meta-concept. Propositions that are at least non-contradictory and logically and epistemically amenable are brought together under a larger concept, which includes these and extends their range to other concepts. In this way, we say the scaffolding that begins with singular propositions (always already situated in a context or nexus of concepts that imply its agreement or disagreement with these), coalesces into a larger concept (say, white privilege), which is then taken up in an even larger concept ('the pedagogy of discomfort'), then in the meta-concept (teaching and learning), and finally, the meta-concept education, or what I am calling, meta-education. This is the constellation of concepts that takes us from the most basic propositions to the highest and most inclusive notion. Here is a diagrammatic representation of the nesting or constellation.



It may be beneficial to talk in more detail about how the constellation takes place. Each concept and meta-concept have an influence on their instances that goes beyond mere grasping and inclusion. This influence I will call, following Hegel, the retroactive projection of posits.[37] In the case of a meta-concept grasping its concept and that concept's instances, it widens their extensions through bringing them in line with other concepts and those concepts' instances. Yet there is more here than the mere extension of concepts because larger concepts and meta-concepts introduce new understandings and new meanings into those lesser concepts and their instances. What I mean by this is the projection of the standpoint of the larger or meta-concept back onto the content of the lesser concepts and their instances. Let us take the concept,

'Children are susceptible to bullying.'

Brought under the meta-concept of schools and schooling, this concept takes on novel meanings and understandings. What we posit about bullying when considering schools and schooling in present-day education serves to inject dominant moral and political understandings onto the concept. *The inclusion of concepts in a larger or meta-concept retroactively posits new understandings and new meanings onto those concepts, effectively reconstructing them. They no longer carry the understandings and meanings they once did, for they are transformed by the act of inclusion.* The meta-concept retroactively projects its unity and totality onto the various simple concepts, changing their nature from isolated rules or principles that grasp only their instances to extensive principles that grasp not only their instances, but instances of other concepts. Any current

concept in either of the meta-concepts teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling, is susceptible of this retroactive posit. This means that new meanings will be invested in these concepts such that they are no longer the concepts they once were, and in many cases they will no longer look as they did in previous iterations.

The standpoint or perspective of the larger concepts and meta-concepts changes the relations of claims and assertions deep within; this is the upshot of bringing a concept under a larger or meta-concept. This ensures that the meta-concepts that house the lesser concepts exist and operate in a dynamic system, rather than a fixed one: it resists the claim that the structural edifice is fixed and rigid. The very inclusion of a claim, assertion, proposition, or statement in a larger or meta-concept guarantees the claim will not be what it once was. Its extensional capacity will widen significantly, as it takes on more and more relations with other concepts, and its intensional capacity—to grasp what it portends—will be augmented and expanded by this increased extensionality and the availability of novel relational instances. The upshot is, for example, that bullying will look different and have a different meaning because of its inclusion in the meta-concept.

1.3.2 Curriculum

The case is likewise with the curriculum; this is a meta-concept that relates to other meta-concepts (teaching and learning, schools, and schooling) and houses its various concepts and propositions. The curriculum has the same genetic relation to the *cultural formation* discussed as the impetus for the meta-concept, teaching and learning. The curriculum has a history, which, as with teaching and learning, is traceable to the beginnings of teaching and learning.[38] For what the curriculum constitutes is (tautologically) the content of teaching and learning. This content includes propositions and practices (as specific instances) belonging to socialization (parenting and familial relations) as well as formal education. As curriculum grows side-by-side with teaching and learning and the schools and schooling, we should expect that the various technologies associated with the curriculum (desks, chairs, tablets, papyrus, scrolls, vellum, illustrated manuscripts, primers, books, writing instruments, computers, etc.) would also come into being. These and many other technologies associated with the curriculum are also to be found in schools and with schooling, and it should therefore come as no surprise that the meta-concepts of all three incorporate these.

Of course, the curriculum concerns not simply technologies as material items, but ideas, propositions, and the range of concepts involved in its meta-conceptual rubric. The ideas of the curriculum as well as their application (as technologies) in the guise of materials thus constitutes the content (though not the only content) of the meta-concept, curriculum. Indeed, we should not make too much of a distinction between ideas and their applications or technologies, for, as far as the meta-concept is concerned, the latter spring

forth rather effortlessly from the former. Furthermore, curriculum theory, the domain of ideas, is best understood in a reciprocal relationship with its applications; the use and misuse of these applications, these technologies, is what sheds light on the overall functioning of the concepts in the meta-concept, curriculum. The failure of overall functioning is what ultimately leads to the breakdown and reconstruction or jettisoning of these concepts. The simple-to-complex metaphor that I have used to characterize teaching and learning applies as well to the curriculum; the curriculum is constituted of simple concepts, as propositions, statements, claims, and assertions, that operate in a nexus of concepts, all under the rubric of the meta-concept, curriculum.

The simple-to-complex metaphor, however, might be thought of as entertaining a linear progression of concept to meta-concept; a progression in which simple concepts added together form a meta-concept in a building block-like fashion. However, this is not the case. Any meta-concept will change the nature of the simple concepts therein. What I mean by this is that a dialectical process is undertaken when the meta-concept enfolds its simple concepts. No longer are these simple concepts the same as they were prior to the advent of the meta-concept enfolding them in its constellation. There is a retroactive reversal, a retroactive posit, to use the Hegelian trope, which takes place.[39] This has been discussed as regards the meta-concept, teaching and learning. The same retroactive posit that widens the scope of the concept's reach and challenges its hegemony over its instances applies to the meta-concept, curriculum. In this reversal or posit, the simple concept relates to other concepts, some of which are contrary and would otherwise negate the original concept. However, under the aegis of the meta-concept, the simple concept has the wherewithal to resist negation, and emerges extensionally stronger and fitter. The upshot is the change in meaning of the original concept.

Within the nexus, concepts jockey for position. Simple concepts are tweaked, reconstructed, or replaced insofar as they do not relate, or relate poorly with other simple concepts. Obviously, the contradictoriness of concepts with respect to one another under the aegis of a larger or meta-concept (as with the curriculum) is the signal event resulting in change. Indeed, this rivalry between concepts determines the overall content of the meta-concept. To keep with our examples of 'the pedagogy of discomfort' and 'the pedagogy of hope,' we might characterize a single concept or proposition within the latter as 'The popular class ought to develop its own language.' Now this is a function of the curriculum in so far as it is an obligation that in turn emanates from purported curricular objectives, which are of course also strongly related to the twin objectives of teaching and learning. It would be contradictory to another proposition, say, 'The teacher has the right to mandate their curriculum.' These two assertions cannot co-exist under the rubric of curriculum and so one or the other needs at least modification to maintain its relationship with the other under the meta-concept.

The nesting of curricular concepts in larger concepts, again, is a feature of all meta-concepts. Each curricular concept, even at the level of the most basic proposition, must relate to its fellow concepts and be amenable to uptake in a larger or meta-concept. This relationality is what is chiefly responsible for ensuring the contiguity of primary or basic concepts; the capacity for the larger or meta-concept to grasp its basic concepts is the establishment of consistency and coherence across the concept. Additionally, there is a need for the meta-concept of teaching and learning to be congruous with the meta-concept of the curriculum. This is supplied at two levels. The first is the overlap generated when the two concepts are brought into relation with one another. Teaching and learning must be able to grasp at least the bulk of the basic concepts of the curriculum, and vice versa. Teaching and learning must be able to grasp 'The popular class ought to develop its language' as well as the curriculum. If it cannot, there will be difficulties aligning the two meta-concepts. The second level concerns meta-education. It is the role of meta-education to relate its meta-concepts, and this means bringing contrary (though not contradictory) content within those meta-concepts together. For a meta-educational understanding, such a proposition as 'The popular class ought to develop its language' must be relatable to other propositions in the meta-concept, the 'pedagogy of hope,' and in other pedagogies as well as curricular theories. If this proposition were to run up against another proposition, say, 'Textbooks should illustrate only nationalistic principles,' then there would be conflict.

Singular propositions in the meta-concept, curriculum, operate just as singular propositions in the meta-concept, teaching and learning; they are taken up in a context or nexus of like propositions, and together these form the ingredients—the assertional content—of the larger or meta-concept. Once more, the qualities of non-contradictoriness and logical amenability to one another and to the larger, meta-concept, are required for that concept to operate. We can once again consider the metaphor of scaffolding, this time using the example of the 'pedagogy of hope.'



1.3.3 Schools and Schooling

The meta-concept, schools and schooling, shares all the features of teaching and learning and the curriculum, including their congruity with respect to their basic and larger concepts. Schools historically came late to the game; formalized instruction and its attendant curriculum likely only developed in civilizations, which places their birth at or around 4,000 BCE.[40] Nevertheless, earlier concepts and propositions of socialization, child-rearing, and familial relationship patterns were established at the very beginnings of civilizations and subsequently taken up into the burgeoning concept of schools and schooling. Thus, we have the spectacle of the earliest versions of these meta-concepts operating in tandem, sharing one another's concepts, ironing out the differences and disagreements through rivalry and the jettisoning and reconstruction of contradictory concepts in favour of congruous ones. Tautological as it might seem, it is nevertheless appropriate to claim that the basic concepts of schools and schooling are those shared with the basic concepts of teaching and learning and the curriculum, and these interrelate and interpenetrate under the aegis of meta-education.

Propositions and low-level constellations in the meta-concept refer to those ideas and practices that involve schools and schooling directly. These propositions and low-level constellations must be compatible or made compatible with the (coherent and consistent) high-level constellations, including the meta-concept. By way of example, 'Homework is due on day Y according to policy X' must be congruent with the higher-level concept, 'All homework must be fairly and equitably assigned and graded,' which is itself a concept that is dependent on other concepts involving fairness and equity. If the meta-concept of

schools and schooling involves, for example, the 'pedagogy of discomfort,' it must align in terms of its lower concepts with this. So, for example, 'Homework is due on day Y according to policy X' must be in line with the pedagogy's prevailing propositions, and the pedagogy's prevailing propositions must in turn be in line with the meta-concept, schools and schooling. Of course, larger concepts and the meta-concept *will* transform the proposition or concept, specifically through relation to other propositions. What this means is the concept will be jettisoned if it is extensionally inadequate or reconstructed if it is limited by one or more clauses. Indeed, bringing it under the ambit of a larger or meta-concept virtually guarantees that it will change. As with teaching and learning and the curriculum, the force of the retroactive posit of new meanings onto the proposition will ensure its transformation through taking its place amongst the various other concepts to which it is now related.

We can think of the scaffolding for schools and schooling similarly to teaching and learning and the curriculum: in this case, we will extend the diagram to include meta-education.



The meta-concept, schools and schooling, has unique concepts, both basic and complex, that distinguish it (though not to the extent of contradiction) from teaching and learning and the curriculum. For example, the meta-concept, schools and schooling, directly involves concepts that in turn involve, and represent, social institutions, and some of these social institutions lie beyond the school. Legislative and governmental bodies,

together with their policies and apparatuses, bear down on schools. Likewise, parent groups and business organizations and other social institutions—including but not limited to religious institutions and universities—have a stake in the teaching and learning and curriculum that takes place in schools. Indeed, it is hard to think of an institution that is not involved at some level, whether direct or indirect, with schools. We might say that, though teaching and learning are indirectly responsible to, and influenced by, these institutions, schools and schooling is most responsible to, and influenced by them.

The meta-concept, schools and schooling, is the most vulnerable meta-concept, for it is the most likely to be influenced by ideology. Whereas teaching and learning and the curriculum are obviously susceptible of ideology, schools and schooling are the institution directly responsive to the legislation, government, university, media, and other extraneous influences, and is often the gate through which ideologies travel. The meta-concept, schools and schooling, is thus practically impinged upon by various claims, mandates, and commands, many of them ideological in nature. This presents a unique issue for the meta-concept, as specific propositions are often foisted on it from without, and the business of the concept is to somehow integrate these into its overall scheme. The concept somehow must make room for a proposition (often couched as a policy directive or law) that contradicts other leading propositions under its aegis. As far as the concept goes, this is a recipe for disaster, as this means fracture of the concept.

There is a difference that makes a difference between the ordinary—and dialectical—development of propositions to larger concepts and the subjection of the concept to outside propositions; the subjection serves to thwart the concepts' coherence and consistency. To integrate the outside proposition or propositions, the larger concept must incorporate the latter into its existing logical form and content. This places the various propositions and larger concepts that house these at risk of contradicting the new concept, and the new concept of contradicting the propositions and larger concepts. The result is conceptual failure, owing to conceptual conflict. While this may not be an important feature for practical applications of the meta-concept (e.g., carrying out the functions of schools and schooling), it does rob the meta-concept of its consistency and coherency—bulwarks, I might add, against the very conceptual confusion and collapse that results from the conflict. In this case, schools and schooling serve distinct and contradictory conceptual ends.

It will do to provide a clear example. Suppose the proposition, 'White privilege is to be challenged in our district' is one of many in an overall 'pedagogy of discomfort' that has been taken up as a legitimate model for teaching and learning in the state's schools. Legislation from the state government is introduced that insists upon 'No child shall be made to feel shame, guilt, or attention owing to his, her, or their race.' If the 'pedagogy of discomfort' were somehow to include this proposition, it would do so with harm to its overall consistency and coherency. The meta-concept, 'pedagogy of discomfort' would

be unable to license the extension to this proposition, and the resulting limit would necessitate adjustment to the meta-concept:[41] specifically, an ad hoc hypothesis to the effect of, 'The meta-concept, 'pedagogy of discomfort' operates apart from the following proposition 'No child shall be made to feel shame, guilt, or unwanted attention owing to his, her, or their race.'' Enough of these established contradictory propositions, together with their ad hoc responses, will serve to bring the larger concept of 'pedagogy of discomfort,' down.

A philosophy of education that would be comprehensive cannot bear the weight of contradictory concepts. While it may be the case that *theories* with contradictory propositions (and contradictory opening premises and ends) can uncomfortably coincide, a *philosophy of education* must be inclusive of all it purports to understand, and this means all propositions must be understood as operating in non-contradictory relations.[42] A philosophy of education whose meta-concept is schools and schooling that contains the 'pedagogy of discomfort,' must have an acute sense of what lies without, as well as within, its conceptual boundaries. It will not be able to introduce such propositions as 'No child shall be made to feel shame, guilt, or attention owing to his, her, or their race' into its scheme without conceptual confusion.

1.3.4 Further Illustrations

To begin with, it is important that we stress *the interconnectedness and interrelations* between the three meta-concepts, teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools. I envision the following Venn diagram as representative of this interrelationship.



Now this diagram stresses the equivalence of the space of interrelations amongst the three meta-concepts; in this space, all three are equally involved with one another and with education. This relationship is to be seen from the standpoint of education, as if it were looking upon its components. Of course, from any one standpoint, the others are involved and invoked. Thus, from the standpoint of teaching and learning, the curriculum and schools and schooling will look like:



From the standpoint of the curriculum, they will look like:



From the point of view of schools and schooling, they will look like:



Within each of the meta-concepts lie concepts which are themselves composed of lower concepts, with propositions, statements, claims, and assertions occupying, so to speak, the basement level. Each of these concepts, from highest to lowest, must be congruent with the others. This means they must be able to relate to one another through extension (in its logical sense). There is no room for an orphan concept, let alone a concept that is disruptive to the schema. As we have discussed, in cases where such concepts are introduced, an ad hoc hypothesis must be attached to the prevailing concept. The weight of additional ad hoc hypotheses will eventually bring the entire concept down, with repercussions for related concepts and meta-concepts. We will want to keep this proviso close at hand as we examine the force of the various critiques regarding the intrinsic political nature of concepts in educational theory and philosophy of education, which I will discuss in the upcoming section.

1.4 Politicization of Teaching and Learning, the Curriculum, and Schools

It is now time to return to the issue of ideology. The risk of introducing propositions from outside the philosophy of education is the introduction of ideology into the meta-concept of teaching and learning, the curriculum, schools and schooling, and ultimately, meta-education. If, as we have discussed, the 'pedagogy of discomfort' is a larger concept that our philosophy of education operates with, then the introduction of 'No child shall be made to feel shame, guilt, or attention owing to his, her, or their race' cannot be introduced without qualification. Furthermore, this qualification is likely to result in the jettisoning and/or reconstruction of the concept, 'pedagogy of discomfort.' This would likely take the form of an ad hoc hypothesis: 'In all situations involving schools, except for this case…' The practical upshot of this aside is *the concept has now been infected with ideology because a proposition from outside has been successfully injected into the meta-concept and has directed that meta-concept to an end or aim contrary to its esteemed purpose.* The formation of an ad hoc hypothesis only covers up the damage to the meta-concept; while the meta-concept makes its way along with reduced practical effectiveness in the school districts for which it is reserved, it reveals a conceptual crisis of confidence. Its centre cannot hold.

The concept 'pedagogy of discomfort' is put to a different end, a different purpose, than which the conglomeration of propositions that make up the simpler and larger concepts was originally set. The proposition of exclusion in the instances of shame, guilt, or undue attention, covertly changes the outcome of the original meta-concept. No longer is it consistent with its simpler and more complex propositions that together form the constellation of concepts in the larger concept; *it is no longer the same concept*. If the concept, 'pedagogy of discomfort,' as a concept under the meta-concept, schools and schooling, were to allow inclusion of the ad hoc hypothesis, 'In all situations involving schools, except for this case . . .' the meta-concept would be diminished. Add enough of these ad hoc hypotheses and the meta-concept collapses. The structural feature of all philosophies of education, that of consistency and coherency, cannot be maintained when a claim is put forth that bears no logical relation to other propositions; the introduction of a claim that is not related to the other claims in the edifice, whether it serves as ground or end, ultimately creates of that edifice a hodgepodge, and this is just what a philosophy of education becomes if it attempts to include such outside, ideological claims as the above.

This thesis is subject to this obvious retort: schools are already political. They have always been political, they continue to be political, and they will continue to be political. Not only that, but this thesis also depends on their *political nature*. For this thesis is dependent on the meta-concepts and lesser concepts in terms of their relations from lesser to greater—from top to bottom and bottom to top. At the most developed levels (for those that believe philosophy of education is inherently political) lie political claims, assertions, and propositions that serve to either ground and drive the model or constitute its end. I shall

characterize the first criticism as genetic/historical, the second foundational, and the third, teleological. I will take these up in turn.

1.4.1 The Genetic/Historical Critique

The genetic/historical critique would have us assume that the novel philosophy of education here presented is unwilling to, and incapable of, calling itself a philosophy of education insofar as it is unmoored from its history and genesis. The genetic/historical critique claims schools are thoroughly political—historically, presently, and for the future. Of course, the criticism turns on what is meant by political, and I will (somewhat arbitrarily) define political philosophy (or philosophy that deals with the political) following David Miller:

> Political philosophy can be defined as philosophical reflection on how best to arrange our collective life our political institutions and our social practices, such as our economic system and our pattern of family life… Political philosophers seek to establish basic principles that will, for instance, justify a particular form of state, show that individuals have certain inalienable rights, or tell us how a society's material resources should be shared among its members. This usually involves analysing and interpreting ideas like freedom, justice, authority and democracy and then applying them in a critical way to the social and political institutions that currently exist.[43]

'[C]ollective life' is my focus here, and clearly, teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling involve collective life to the deepest degree.[44] Thus, it might seem that the genetic/historical (and we might even say sociological and anthropological) critique has a valid and forceful claim. Yet, we cannot presuppose that all aspects or elements of teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling are political at root; nor, more importantly, can we make the straightforward inference that philosophy of education, therefore, is to be constructed on a purely political basis.

More to the point, the genetic/historical critique, taken to its conclusion, would have philosophy of education in thrall to politics. It would demand that, owing to the beginnings of philosophy of education in political life, with an end towards a better political life, philosophy of education must grant political life and the principles that stem from it, primacy. *Indeed, this is what most contemporary philosophy of education insists on,* but this is mistaken. Aside from the obvious claim that history is not destiny, philosophies of education are philosophies precisely because they *do not allow* their histories to dictate to them what will come.[45] If, as the genetic/historical critique maintains, education is manifestly political in its history, sociology, and anthropology, then is it also political in its philosophy? If it turns out to be political in its philosophy, is it political in one direction, in one way? The point of asking these rhetorical questions is to re-introduce to us the

specter of *ideology*: philosophy of education cannot be constrained by a fixed and preestablished political direction, for it to be so is for it to succumb to ideology.

What does this mean for a philosophy of education that is self-consciously dependent upon its genesis and history? It means that, while certainly aware of this dependence, and carefully attuned to political events that affect education, such a philosophy of education must nevertheless avoid taking on political theories and incorporating them into its schema without at the very least rigorous ascertainment of their effects on the varied concepts and meta-concepts involved.[46] For, to place any concept or proposition from a political theory in the guise of directing and controlling extant concepts and meta-concepts is precisely what ideology consists in. In other words, the genetic/historical criticism can lead us to no license to invoke and include propositions and concepts from political theories and have them direct and control the edifice. We recognize our ancestry in the questions of collective life, together with the ongoing importance of this, while at the same time we insist that, for philosophy of education, no single proposition or concept will direct and control the concepts and meta-concepts of education.

1.4.2 The Foundationalist Critique

The foundationalist critique insists that, at bottom (for those that believe philosophy of education is inherently political) lie political claims, assertions, and propositions that serve to drive the model or program. As such, according to the foundationalist critique, the model of philosophy of education presented here rejects this foundation, and therefore it cannot call itself a philosophy of education in any valid sense. This is a metaphysical variant of the genetic/historical criticism. With this variant, there lies either an *a priori* principle or dogmatically held claim that necessitates philosophy of education remain political in its propositions, concepts, schemas, and frameworks, up to and including the meta-concept, education. Now, I do not imagine many nowadays hold to this stronger metaphysical claim, although there is a weaker, non-metaphysical variant that is often invoked; one which also has affinities with the genetic/historical criticism. In this variant, philosophy of education has always had as its working principle a set of political claims that serve to drive it forward, and all philosophies of education are therefore manifestly political in idea and content. I will henceforth follow this latter line of criticism.[47]

To the extent that this criticism overlaps with the genetic/historical criticism, some of the same arguments apply *mutatis mutandis*. However, there is an additional, somewhat different argument happening here which demands a separate response. This concerns the certainty of the claim that philosophy of education has always driven itself forward on the basis of political claims. A counterfactual historical example might be of assistance, here. The example I think demonstrates best the failure of the claim is to be found with the early figures of progressive education, notably Rousseau and Kant. It is well known

that both placed morality (as an account of the good will) prior to politics (as a set of claims or principles of collective life).[48] Rousseau's account of *amour propre*, and the various ways it destroys ethical and political life, together with Kant's insistence that the moral education of the child include "training to autonomy," are exemplifications of this.[49]

In fact, there is an even stronger, more forceful argument at our disposal: if philosophy of education is manifestly political from the get-go, what is the nature of the relationship between its politics and the other branches of philosophy—metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics? We would of course have to say that the relationship is one of *subordination* of these to politics and its claims. In this scenario, philosophy of education's metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics would serve politics and its claims in a manner akin to secondary concepts serving primary ones; concepts that buttress political claims and concepts not yet having domains of their own. This invites the unsatisfying prospect of a philosophy of education with no account of these, save as they relate to the political claim. All of this is to say that unless philosophy of education's metaphysical, logical, knowledge-theoretical, and ethical issues are driven exclusively by political claims and concepts (in which case there is no philosophy of education, for it all succumbs to ideology) there is more—much more—going on in a philosophy of education than the formation and operation of political claims and concepts. Since no one (or almost no one) is willing to admit the *reductio ad absurdum* of the former, we must place our stock in the latter.

1.4.3 The Teleological Critique

If the foundationalist criticism claims that philosophy of education is always political because it has its *fons et origo* in political claims and concepts, the teleological criticism claims that politics constitutes philosophy of education's proper end. Philosophy of education is not only irredeemably social and political owing to its genesis and history but driven towards a better and better approximation of collective life. Increasingly, this life is global, with attention to developing nations and to minorities and the disenfranchised.[50] The specific claims of contemporary philosophies of education may differ, but the aim of a better collective life does not. We might want to say that there is a political imperative to collective life of a certain sort; a life that better and better approximates the conditions of equality, equity, fairness, enfranchisement, the establishment of primary economic and social goods, and other goods and rights in accordance with the United Nations' various covenants and declarations.[51] In all cases, the end justifies the means; what a philosophy of education will direct itself towards is a better approximation of this collective life and such a philosophy as the one championed here does not and cannot do that.

There is of course a value judgement attached to this line of argumentation; any philosophy of education that would not self-consciously drive itself towards better and

better approximations of collective life is suspect. The response brought forward will have to counter the criticism on a logical/conceptual front. The criticism presupposes the betterment of collective life is the proper end for philosophy of education. It may certainly be the end for other disciplines in education, such as politics, sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, etc., but is it indeed the end for *philosophy of education*? Aside from rehearsing the earlier objections and responses, my answer will be no. This presupposition of the criticism is a particular aim or end for certain philosophers, historically understood, though not for all.[52] More importantly, this criticism presupposes the role for *all education* is the betterment of collective life. Historically, that has not turned out to be the case,[53] and to *insist* upon it is to commit to ideology. A philosophy of education cannot have as a proposition or principle a claim that cannot withstand scrutiny, even including the claim that the proper end or aim of philosophy of education is the betterment of collective life.[54] Propositions and principles, together with their larger concepts and meta-concepts, are structured to be responsive to other propositions, principles, and concepts within the overall edifice, and not to propositions and principles *ab extra*. Of course, one *could* develop a philosophy of education with the pre-determined end of the betterment of collective life, but this would, with respect to all we have said, be *prima facie* rooted in ideology, and the contradiction of concepts within would render it a hodgepodge.

On the account put forward, ideology is the introduction of propositions, principles, claims, assertions, and concepts into philosophy of education, *ab extra*. It matters not whether philosophy of education is said to be grounded in, or aimed towards, a better and better approximation of collective life. The way such a principle is used unmasks it as ideological. We do not do philosophy of education when we begin with a solid and certain principle and merely deduce its consequences, nor do we do philosophy of education when we assign an end to which all our propositions and concepts must then aim. A philosophy of education is constructed as a scaffold, proposition by proposition, concept by concept, concept by meta-concept, to education as the ultimate concept that is inclusive of all. In this edifice, meta-education is the complete constellation of each and every lesser concept and meta-concept. This demands fallibility on the part of each proposition, concept, and meta-concept. There can be no a priori or assumed certainties, including those of origin and end. Ideologically motivated philosophies of education claim at least one unargued or undefended premise—a premise that is treated as off-limits to scrutiny. The damage to the edifice is to be found in the need for more and further ad hoc hypotheses to maintain this premise, at the cost of limiting the operations of other propositions and concepts. What we ultimately get is a hodgepodge, an overall set of propositions and concepts that are at odds with each other because they are driven in different directions—those of the concepts and meta-concepts on the one hand, and that of the ideological premise or premises on the other. Since the ideology is steadfast, the result will be capitulation on the part of the concepts and meta-concepts. A properly

rigorous philosophy of education must, in my opinion, not only be consistent and coherent, but also systematic A systematic philosophy of education is one in which aims and ends, means and consequences, premises, propositions, concepts, and meta-concepts, operate in tandem and form a reciprocal, mutually supportive interrelationship. This means that the edifice and the scaffolding of which it is constructed, must have weak links challenged and replaced by stronger, fitter, ones. Ideological premises must be prevented from establishing themselves, and when established, isolated and rooted out. The meta-concept education serves to place this constellation of interrelating, mutually supporting concepts and meta-concepts in relief. It is not an end to which all concepts and meta-concepts aim; it is the constellation of these concepts and meta-concepts, understood in their unity and wholeness.

Notes

1. I say almost no one, as there are a few that do. For example, Cris Mayo takes up the gauntlet by openly maintaining an ideological standpoint in her refusal to countenance leading philosophies of education that supposedly occupy a neutral position with respect to political events. See Cris Mayo, "Philosophy of Education is Bent," *Studies in Philosophy of Education* 30 (2011): 471–476.

2. It is fashionable to claim that neo-liberalism and its attendant practices and institutions are ideological. The charge of ideology is often laid against systems, such as the system that perpetuates white privilege. Seldom are individual scholars called out for being ideological, though obviously one's political beliefs can easily become fodder for such charges. The case for philosophies of education is a bit more complex: certainly, politically motivated philosophies of education, such as essentialism or perennialism, could and likely would be charged with the epithet, ideological. The question is, are these philosophies of education as opposed to educational theories, or even educational ideologies? Getting clear on these questions is necessary if one wants to undertake an examination of leading theories and their role, if any, in supporting ideological platforms and politics. I discuss the relationship of philosophy of education to theory in *Problems*, Part I.

3. Classic takes on this question include John Dewey, "Authority and Social Change," *School and Society* 44, no. 10 (1936): 457-466; Kenneth Benne, *A Conception of Authority* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1943); Kenneth Benne, "Authority in Education," *Harvard Education Review* 40, no. 3 (1970): 385-410; L.A. Snook, *Indoctrination and Education* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972). See also, R.S. Peters, *Authority, Responsibility, and Education* (London: Routledge, Kegan, and Paul, 1959).

4. Harvey Siegel, "Philosophy of Education," in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2018, https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-education. Notice that Maurice Cranston's definition of ideology (upon which Siegel relies) places praxis as the unique component of ideology: "**Ideology**, a form of social or political philosophy in which practical elements are as prominent as theoretical ones. It is a system of ideas that aspires both to explain the world and to change it." Maurice Cranston, "Ideology," in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2018, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ideology-society. Michael Freeden, on the other hand, would reject this definition of ideology; for Freeden, it is not a matter of or for social or political philosophy, for these are rather twin forms of political thinking. See Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 27-28.

5. "Nevertheless, the term is very common, though not beloved, among scholars, writers and academics, and it has an illustrious pedigree, although regrettably also a notorious one". Michael Freeden, "Ideology and Political Theory," *The Journal of Political Ideologies* 1, no. 1 (2006): 3-22, 2. See also, Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*.

6. Freeden, "Ideology and Political Theory," 2.

7. Freeden, "Ideology and Political Theory," 15.

8. Freeden, “Ideologies and Political Theory,” 77-78, 426.

9. S Roseneil and K Ketokivi, “Relational Persons and Relational Processes: Developing the Notion of Relationality for the Sociology of Personal Life,” *Sociology* 50, no. 1 (2016): 149; Tatiana Savoia Landini, *Norbert Elias and Social Theory,* ed. T.S. Landini (Dordrecht, Springer, 2013), 13-30. As regards Elias, I am thinking specifically of his constellation of constraints, which are necessary for all civilized life. See Norbert Elias, *The Norbert Elias Reader*, eds. Johan Goldblum and Stephen Mennell (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 237.

10. A fuller discussion of these presuppositions will be the task of Chapter Three.

11. Who? Certainly Marxists, neo-Marxists, and cultural studies theorists, such as Michael Apple, Henry Giroux, Jean Anyon, Peter McClaren, Barbara Applebaum, Kathy Hytten, Gloria Ladson-Billings, bell hooks, etc. It would be easier to locate those *that do not think* education is at root political, than those who do. Perhaps Harvey Siegel doesn’t. Regardless, those who do are in the majority and I suspect this has been the case since at least the 1980’s.

12. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article One, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.

13. Note the naturalistic fallacy here; in the claim, there is a move from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought.’

14. Paul Hirst, Introduction, *Education and The Development of Reason*, ed. R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters (London: RKP, 1972) xii.

15. Though there are philosophical presuppositions involved - presuppositions that condition further premises, claims, principles, and concepts. I will discuss these presuppositions at length in Chapter Three.

16. Notice once again the naturalistic fallacy in the movement from the minor premise to the conclusion.

17. These terms and their associated accounts come from C.S. Peirce. See C.S. Peirce, “Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis,” in *The Essential Peirce*, vol. 1, eds. N. Houser and C. Kloesel (Bloomington, In: Indiana University Press), 186-199. I will have more to say about these later in the chapter.

18. These features might include discipline and indoctrination, together with all the claims and propositions involving these. See, for example, Footnote 3.

19. Hilary Putnam, “Meaning and Reference,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 70, no. 19 (1973): 699–711; Robert Paul Churchill, *Logic: An Introduction*, 2nd edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).

20. Melvin Fitting, “Intensional Logic,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2015, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-intensional/

21. Though, as I shall discuss, they have logical and metaphysical (and epistemic and ethical) presuppositions. These presuppositions act as conditions, limiting their role

and scope. I shall discuss the presuppositions of logic and metaphysics in Chapter Three.

22. As hypotheses, we can see these as ideal types. As principles, these have more force and are considered true until they are no longer able to grasp their instances, relate to other concepts, or a better concept is devised. Needless to say, all general principles are hypothetical, though not all hypotheses are principles.

23. We will say that consequences follow *biconditionally* from the hypothesis. Biconditionality insists that the truth of the hypothesis rests with the truth of its deductive consequences; if the consequences fail, so does the hypothesis. I will discuss this most fully in Chapter Three.

24. For the definition and accounts of the uses of these terms, I ask the reader to refer to Churchill, *Logic: An Introduction.*

25.We may understand this as meeting the criteria set by the ideological core of the program. See Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 77-79.

26. John Dewey, "Democracy and Education," in *The Middle Works of John Dewey,* Vol. 9, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), 5.

27. Tyrel Eckleson, "How and Why Formal Education Originated in the Emergence of Civilization," *Journal of Education and Learning* 9, no. 2 (2020): 29, DOI:10.5539/jel.v9n2p29.

28. Mark Joyal, Iain McDougall, and J. C. Yardley, *Greek and Roman Education: A Sourcebook*. Routledge Sourcebooks for the Ancient World (London/New York: Routledge, 2009).

29. James Muir, "The Evolution of Philosophy of Education Within Educational Studies," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 28, no. 2 (1996): 1-26; James Muir, "Is There a History of Educational Philosophy? John White vs. The Historical Evidence," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 36, no. 1 (2004): 35-56.

30. Cultural formation undoubtedly shares similar attributes with "Collective Life," of which David Miller claims political philosophy consists. See David Miller, *Principles of Social Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1999).

31. John Brubacher, "The Challenge to Philosophize about Education," in *Modern Philosophies and Education: The Fifty-Fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of* Education, ed. Nelson B. Henry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), 289-322.

32. Megan Boler, Feeling Power: Emotions and Education (New York: Routledge, 1999); Paolo Freire, Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 2.

33. We might consider this a difference of degree. See Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). For Sellars, what gives these assertions the imprimatur of fact is their immediate acceptance of their status by the language community. It is a fact because it meets all the criteria of a fact under existing rules of the discourse. Nevertheless, its factual status

proves hypothetical; any fact can be challenged under the rules of the discursive practice.

34. Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 77.

35. Robert Brandom, *Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

36. The reference is to Boler, Feeling Power: Emotions and Education.

37. G. W. F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline: The Science of Logic,* # 159-160. Hegel discusses retroactive positing as regards categories in thinking. In reflecting, we change the contents of ordinary consciousness. They are no longer what they once were. We can see them in unity, rather than in opposition.

38. Joyal, McDougall, and Yardley, Greek and Roman Education: A Sourcebook.

39. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline: The Science of Logic*, edited and translated by K. Brinkmann and D. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), # 159-160. Hegel avers to the overcoming of Reflected Being in the Concept; the Concept retroactively projects its presuppositions into Reflected Being with the upshot of Reflected Being, including all the contents of ordinary consciousness, free or self-determining.

40. Joyal, McDougall, and Yardley, Greek and Roman Education: A Sourcebook.

41. Boler, *Feeling Power: Emotions and Education*, 176: “Curriculum of self-reflection. In most humanities courses, students are challenged to subject their own self-image, beliefs, and values to investigation. This self-reflection lends itself to emotional resistance in the form of "defensive anger," "fear of change," and "fears of losing our personal and cultural identities.” “In educational programs for youth and adolescents, some instructors have implemented curricula aimed at encouraging students to develop a critical consciousness within subject-specific material. Instructors can teach language arts, science, and social science lessons while guiding students to connect academic material to their experiences, explore themes of social justice, and discuss these ideas collaboratively in the classroom.”

42. Or, must be understood as related in their contradictoriness (e.g., as contradictory aspects of a further, failed concept).

43. David Miller, “Political Philosophy,” in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, DOI:10.4324/9780415249126-S099-1

44. Does philosophy of education support this and why? There are, of course, specific notions of collective life as well as general notions. Philosophy of education must tread carefully, here. To indulge a specific notion would be to constrain philosophy of education to a particular set of cultural conditions that serve to limit its ground and scope. For this reason, philosophy of education should concentrate on general notions, for example, what all cultures have in common with respect to their collective existence. Specific practices will emerge as the philosophy of education grasps its instances and these are grasped in turn.

45. This is tantamount to resistance to the genetic fallacy.

46. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 27-28. The precise relationship between theory (and philosophy) and ideology is somewhat fluid. While there is clearly no equivalence, there is overlap. I follow Richard Flathman's definition of political theory in what follows. Richard Flathman, "Political Theory," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (1999), 720-721. I will discuss this definition more fully in Chapter Two.

47. I take it that James Muir holds to this variant of the foundationalist claim. See Muir, "Is there a History of Philosophy of Education?"

48. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Émile, or On Education*, trans. A. Bloom (New York: HarperCollins, 1979); Immanuel Kant, "Lectures on Pedagogy," in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*, ed. and trans R. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). The moral education of the individual child was a particular concern of the burgeoning progressive education movement that began with Johann Basedow's *Philanthropinum* in the 1770's. This was bound up in the instruction of the children in natural religion. On Basedow, see R. Louden, *Johann Bernhard Basedow and the Transformation of Modern Education* (London: Bloomsbury, 2020).

49. The term, 'training to autonomy' comes from B. Herman, *Moral Literacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

50. I am thinking here of the various human rights initiatives, especially those covenants and declarations of the United Nations. Taken as a whole, these drive us forward to an equitable and culturally sensitive collective life.

51. This would be a legal imperative, such as is set out, for example, in the UN's UDHR. See Sharon Todd, "Ambiguities of Cosmopolitanism: Difference, Gender, and the Right to Education," *Education in the Era of Globalization,* ed. D. Bridges, K. Roth, and I. Gur-Ze'ev (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 65-82.

52. For example, it is not entirely clear that this was an end for Analytic philosophers of education practicing in the 1960's and 1970's. Though they generally espoused the importance of virtues, the good life, and the use of our reason, they did not direct their espousal to global human rights or the various Covenants and Declarations of the United Nations, nor to specific contexts, such as minority disenfranchisement in leading Western, liberal-democratic nations.

53. Indeed, it only began to become the case in the late 20th century. Much, if not most, education for subjects of various nation-states has been traditionally nationalist, espousing the values and virtues of that nation. This is arguably still the case in the United States, which has only begun to challenge the dominance of nationalist narratives in its history textbooks.

54. The question arises; can it have this as a condition? The answer is, no. Having this as a condition would limit inquiry.

Chapter Two

The Origins and Ends of Philosophy of Education (And How These Matter)

2.1 On the Origins of Questions

We have now examined the conceptual scaffolding involved in the relationship between propositions as simple concepts, their larger concepts, the meta-concepts of teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling, and their combined roles in meta-education. We see that the creation of a stepwise, mutually reciprocal, and developmental model is a strong way to ensure that philosophies of education resist ideology. This chapter continues in that vein, with an examination of the origins and ends of philosophy of education. One thesis of this chapter is that philosophy of education's questions of origin were formulated in the late 19th and early 20th century. Furthermore, the context was the struggle between idealism on the one hand, and functionalism and experimental psychology (including the philosophical school of Pragmatism) on the other. The struggle and development were essentially American and German, with functionalism and experimentalism crudely representing America and idealism roughly representing Germany.[1] Issues of teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling took their points of departure from this origin. These in turn looked back on the history of educational thought and its uses of education, both in theory and practice. The notion of cultural transmission and collective life loomed large in what would become the origin of the philosophy of education in Anglo-America, and this is demonstrated in the earliest extant documents. This has tremendous importance for philosophy of education in the

present day, as attention to collective life and cultural transmission is what will serve to keep the discipline on its proper path, not to be diverted by ideological aims and ends.

Though this chapter is about origins, it is ultimately about aims and ends. For the origins of the philosophy of education suggest its direction, as well as the intrinsic (though not a priori or metaphysical) goal it moves towards. If the origins of philosophy of education lie in collective life and cultural transmission, there must also some favoured intrinsically developed end in which these are manifest, and this end is presumably better than other ends, insofar as it maintains these origins. This minimal condition will be my opening premise. Of course, this immediately raises the question of ideology: what *specific* sort of origin and what *specific* end is being presupposed, here? Indeed, isn't the presupposition of origins and ends just what ideology consists in? The answer to the second question is a straightforward yes. So, we must carefully distinguish any ideological presuppositions involved in answering the first. We must, in fine, show that the origins and ends of a philosophy of education come from the development of that philosophy of education, and not *ab extra*, or without. We must also show that the origins and ends of philosophy of education are consonant with its means, including its method, and its premises, concepts, and meta-concepts. This will involve attention to some of the conclusions of our previous chapter—particularly those involving constellations and the move from the concept to the meta-concept.

In the first part of this chapter, I will survey the leading accounts of the history of philosophy of education with a view to isolating what I consider to be their origins. Then I will turn my attention to isolating the origins of the institutionalization of philosophy of education in Anglo-America in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. I will show that these origins are congruent. Next, I will examine the conceptual need for these origins and why only these origins will do for a philosophy of education. In the second part, I will discuss the movement of the concept that is the origin to its meta-concepts of teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling, all under the meta-concept, education. The point here is to demonstrate the end or aim of education is not to be found *ab extra*, but rather as a legitimate internal posit of the philosophy of education as it grows and matures. In the final part, I examine the issue of ideology once again, demonstrating how the philosophy of education beginning from its origins to the establishment of its own, internal ends successfully resists the injection *ab extra* of ideology. This will lead me to a conclusion regarding the need for philosophy of education to counter incursions by maintaining itself as congruent with its beginnings and ends.

There is a divide between those that think philosophy of education's origins are traceable to Greek antiquity and those that think they are found in the leading documents and institutions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Of course, at least part of what would constitute an answer turns on the definitions of philosophy and education as well as the establishment of the historical markers for the relationship between the two, and this is

something that has been neglected. I will discuss the issues involved by asking and responding to all three. I begin with the question of education and its origins, then on to philosophy of education and its origins, and finally, I move to the relationship between the two in terms of their origins. My claim is that, while both sides in the divide have good reasons to prefer their story, the story itself depends on the three interrelated issues in question and unfolding these suggests an origin for philosophy of education in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

2.1.1 Education, Philosophy, and Ancient Greek Antiquity

The debate between those that think Greek antiquity holds the key to the origins of philosophy of education and those that think the origins are to be found in the 19th and 20th centuries is best represented on the first by James Muir.[2] Muir claims that philosophy of education is a vast enterprise stretching back to Plato and beyond. I think Muir is right about the origins of *education* and even *educational thought*; these *are* self-consciously present in ancient Greek literature, documents, plays, manuscripts, as well as in the works of Plato, Aristotle, and others. It would be folly to claim otherwise. Nevertheless, it is important to examine just what is present in these regarding education—though education is clearly theorized about in ancient Greece, is it the case *that philosophy of education* is theorized? If it is not the case, what is the relationship of philosophy of education to what is theorized?[3]

The traditional claims for ancient Greek civilization theorizing and enacting a philosophy of education comes from an estimation of Plato, Isocrates, and later, Aristotle, as theorists of pedagogy. There certainly is a strong argument for the label of 'theorist' in the case of each of these thinkers. In the broadest sense, a theorist is one that reflects on the practices of education, and Plato, in a number of his dialogues, chief among them the *Meno* and *The Republic*, certainly does this. Isocrates certainly accomplishes this in his rhetoric of techne.[4] Aristotle does as well, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*. Muir is right to pick these representative examples out, but does this constitute a philosophy of education? My answer is no. It is important to see why. To begin with, the theory of pedagogy in the *Meno* and *The Republic* are brought forward in the service of metaphysics—specifically, the account of virtue and the good. This takes the form of recollection in the *Meno* and education of the Guardians in *The Republic*. The proper end of the recollection sequence, whereby the slave boy is brought to knowledge of geometrical principles, is the form of intellectual knowledge, or virtue.[5] In claiming that virtue cannot be taught, the theorization of pedagogy turns on drawing out existing knowledge rather than on instilling positive knowledge into the slave boy. Characteristically, the pedagogy of recollection is shown to be a maieutic enterprise. The theorization of pedagogy is in the service of establishing an account of virtue, which is in

turn to be traced to the Gods by and through the ascent of the soul (*nous*). The philosophy of education, if there is one, does not have to do with education per se, but rather with the ascent of the soul to divine knowledge of its own recollection, which is in turn established through the maieutic of Socrates.

The education detailed in *The Republic* concerns the guardians of the city and their end is, of course, justice in and for the state.[6] This virtue is cultivated through selective omissions (poetry) and commissions (gymnastics) of curricular content as well as by Socratic methods, with the elenchus front and centre. Justice is of course a virtue that leads to the highest virtue—the good—and subsequently, the nature of the discussion in *The Republic* concerns an account of the good. However, pedagogy is once again in the service of justice and its overarching virtue, the good, and the theorization of pedagogy is a means to this end. The curriculum of the guardians and the associated elenchus is a means to inculcating virtue in the offspring of the citizenry who would lead the state. Isocrates' pedagogy, on the other hand, is not concerned with metaphysical beginnings and endings, for it is self-consciously rhetorical. It alone deserves the appellation, pedagogy, for it alone has its purpose and function in the cultivation of the child's intellectual and moral development for its own sake.[7] Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* might at first glance seem more promising, for it has the establishment of the moral virtues as the proper end of reason and this directly involves socialization and formal education.[8] Yet pedagogy once again turns out to be a means to the cultivation of the virtues and not a virtue itself. Thus, the theorization of pedagogy is not on the same level with the theorization of practical wisdom (*phronēsis*).

The establishment of the Academy and the Lyceum in the wakes of Plato and Aristotle, and of schools in the city-states more generally, might lead us to suppose that pedagogy was treated as an end, and not merely a means.[9] These schools certainly had pedagogies invoked, and a curriculum was present.[10] It may seem, then, as if the schools had in their possession all they needed for the theorization of pedagogy as a legitimate end, but this would be incorrect. Though these schools subscribed to the broad cultural emphasis on *paideia*, and the Academy and Lyceum developed methods for rigorous philosophizing, the philosophies propounded were not equivalent to the methods of instruction or to the curriculum; philosophy was not equivalent to its methods and materials. For philosophy was metaphysical, and the methods and materials involved were means, adjuncts to the establishment of accounts of the divine.

In all cases of philosophy (not rhetoric), pedagogy is theorized and is so as a means to the good and to practical wisdom. In no case is it a fully-fledged philosophy or even a stand-alone account of such a philosophy. (Though, and paradoxically, Isocrates perhaps came closest.) We can say that the ancient Greek philosophers theorized a pedagogy that would serve an overall account which is philosophical in some respects. However, that philosophy concerns metaphysics and its undergirding of ethics, especially the good

and wisdom, and as such, the theorization of pedagogy operates as an adjunct to these accounts and not on a stand-alone basis. Pedagogy, as theorized by the ancient Greeks, is an instrument, a means to the truth or the path to its establishment. It is not a rival to, or replacement for, the truth. That truth is metaphysical; indeed, it is divine. Pedagogy, on the other hand, is a worldly means to a divine end.

2.1.2 Philosophy and its Origins

The quest for a philosophical account of the cosmos and the good life presupposed a means of communicating this to others. This communication involved pedagogy as we understand it: an account of the principles and practices of transmitting the content of philosophy (as claims, propositions, arguments, accounts, together with their proofs and rebuttals) and the establishment of evaluative principles and techniques. We might say that these went together with the philosophical accounts. A pedagogy, in other words, grew up alongside the philosophy. Of course, we would not want to make the mistake of taking this pedagogy *as equivalent to* the philosophy that is developed and proffered. We need a separation of the means and methods by which the philosophy is transmitted and made available to others from the philosophical account itself. The elenchus is a method of question and answer that has its goal the acquiring of truth and it is not intended as an end in itself. The goal was always the truth, and the truth was divine.

It is with later, and particularly with modern philosophies, that method becomes something more than a means to truth and reality. In these perspectives, not only is method said to lead us to truth and reality, but it is also the necessary and sufficient path to that truth and reality; absent this method, they cannot be approached. Indeed, we might go so far as to say that the method *is* truth and reality. Truth and reality for Socrates did not depend on our grasping them fully and completely, whereas grasping (or deducing or intuiting) truth and reality for early modern philosophers was precisely equivalent to their certainty. This is the point in which teaching and learning, the curriculum, and philosophy of education, begin to become viable as a philosophy. The ‘inward turn’ to reason brings philosophy and its methods together in the quest for the truth and reality of the self and world. It is this ‘inward turn’ that is most responsible for the fusion of means and ends, i.e., the theorization of pedagogy brought together with philosophy. Pedagogy became a philosophy of education when education moved beyond a merely theorized set of principles and practices to become self-conscious with respect to its role and scope. Pedagogy began to be understood not as extraneous to, or a mere means to, the faculty of our reason, rather as an intrinsic element of reason itself.

The impetus for the foundation of philosophy of education, then, is to be found in the awareness of reason’s role in matters of pedagogy, including teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling. This awareness was gradual and took the better

part of 300 years.[11] Now, there is certainly a line to be drawn between the pedagogical theorization common to Plato, Aristotle and others of ancient Greek and Roman persuasion, and the moderns; for it is just this theorization that is being transformed into a philosophy of education. This transformation belongs to modern philosophy, particularly to the 19th and early 20th centuries, and this is the thesis of J.J. Chambliss and James Kaminsky as against James Muir.[12] It will do to examine just what constitutes a demonstration for the origins of philosophy of education to be found at this late stage.

Chambliss and Kaminsky do not specifically claim that philosophy of education became self-conscious in the 19th century; for his part, Chambliss claims that German idealists turned their attention to cultural formation as a sort of end to which ethical behaviours (virtues and virtuous acts) and virtuous citizenry tend. The impetus is therefore ethical. Kaminsky examines the institutions that were formed by philosophers of education, including associations, research journals and programs in universities, beginning in the early 20th century. Both Chambliss and Kaminsky are correct in locating the origins of philosophy of education in these respective theoretical and practical attempts against those that would stretch philosophy of education's beginnings back as far as Socrates and Plato. There is, however, more to this story. For the origins of philosophy of education concern not only its attention to cultural formation, the formation of virtuous citizens, and the establishment of institutions, but also the (dawning) self-consciousness of its overarching enterprise; this is to be found in the sort of questions it asks and answers. Here, I submit, there *is* a grounding question that philosophy of education asked of itself at the beginning of its enterprise.

The grounding question, the question at the base of philosophy of education's origin, is that of the nature of the relationship between philosophy and education; that is to say, what is the nature of philosophy of education? This question, together with its answer, is tantamount to the self-realization of the discipline, and this is an *act—the first act*—of disciplinary self-consciousness. It is not a matter of simply re-conceiving what past educationally minded philosophers were doing when they wrote what appears from our vantage point to be philosophy of education; this is far too facile and omits the contexts in and from which they were writing. It is not merely that "People rediscover and reconstruct philosophy of education in each new encounter with the tradition, with each new retelling of how previous thought and present concerns intermingle," unless philosophy of education is already established.[13] This grounding question was not posed, according to Kaminsky and Chambliss, until at least the 19th century.

It began to occur to thinkers in the 19th century that philosophy of education was a legitimate sub-discipline of philosophy and education. Thomas Tate's *Philosophy of Education; or, The Principles and Practice of Teaching* published in England in 1857, republished and introduced to American teachers in 1885, was the first shot across the bow. Even though Tate used philosophy of education in the title, the manuscript was

anything but systematic. It covered the topics of pedagogy from a practical standpoint, and theoretical attention was limited to the claims of classical empiricism and British sense-psychology.[14] The exact point at which disciplinary self-realization took place is, I think, with the translation of Karl Rosenkranz's lectures from the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* in 1874.[15] Until this time, there was a 'science of education,' to use William Torrey Harris's term, but not yet a philosophy.[16] Only after the publication of these lectures, and later, the publication in English of Rosenkranz's full manuscript in 1886, with addenda by Harris, was a self-consciously coherent and consistent philosophy of education put forth.[17] Furthermore, Rosenkranz's Hegelian-inspired philosophy of education was systematic—a feature that was lacking in Tate's work. It is the nature of a philosophy of education that Rosenkranz (and Harris) attempt to define and analyze, particularly in the opening chapter of the book.

The pedagogical theorization of the ancient Greeks is nevertheless included in the 19th century developments that lead directly to philosophy of education. Additionally, the central concerns of developing an account of pedagogy as teaching and learning, curriculum, and schools and schooling is present in the latter, and indeed, it is front and centre. So, there can be no talk of the exclusion of these topics from the purview of philosophy of education. It is this *inclusive notion* of philosophy of education that is made self-conscious in the institutionalization of university programs, journals, and associations in the first half of the 20th century.[18] Associations that arose in the 1930's, such as the John Dewey Society, the Progressive Education Association, and later, The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, are evidence of this self-consciousness on the part of philosophy of education. With the impetus to answer the question of what the nature of philosophy of education is, together with the institutional apparatus in the guise of programs, journals, and associations, philosophy of education began to develop a disciplinary self-consciousness. Thus, philosophy of education, as a discipline with self-awareness, was born.

2.1.3 The Conceptual Basis of Philosophy of Education

The question of concepts is indelibly tied to the origin of philosophy of education in an act of self-consciousness. The backdrop to question of philosophy of education was characteristically the role and scope of cultural transmission as it manifests in teaching and learning, and the means with which to carry it out, including the curriculum and schools and schooling. At the same time, this overlapped a good deal with other theorizations of pedagogy and could not stand apart without further discrimination. What made philosophy of education unique (aside from its relationship to philosophers and philosophy) lay in its treatment of educational concerns. The attempt was made to bring philosophical methods to bear on educational problems. Even this, however, was not

enough to distinguish philosophy of education from other enterprises, as we see lately with respect to critical theory, anthropology, gender studies, critical race studies, post-colonial studies, and cultural studies, all of which draw on philosophy as well as other disciplines. *What sets philosophy of education apart from other disciplines is attention to the metaphysical, logical, epistemological, and ethical accounts*, and specifically, to their *coherency and cohesiveness*; the conceptual basis of philosophy of education is to be found in these consistent and coherent accounts.[19]

The irony of course, is that very few of our extant philosophies of education have these consistent and coherent accounts, though if pushed almost all would claim them. For many reasons, I think Dewey's is the last, indeed, the only, philosophy of education that has accounts with such consistency and coherency, perhaps because he attended to metaphysical, logical, and epistemic concerns, both in his philosophy and philosophy of education. As far as I can see others do not. They begin with an educational issue or problem and seek an existing philosophical solution, or in a slight modification of this, they draw on an existing philosopher's account and supplement this with an extension to an educational problem or concern. Of course, these are no philosophies of education, merely appendages. My point is not to disparage existing accounts of philosophy of education; it is rather to stress the importance of consistency and coherency in one's account. It is to push us to move from an opening question in philosophy of education to a fuller account of its concepts and meta-concepts.

Concepts are propositions, at base. A proposition has a logical syntax and grammar. We think of a simple concept: 'Johnny is failing.' This concept has a syntax, consisting in the form of subject-predicate. It has a descriptive grammar consisting in a noun/proper name, a verb/copula, and an adverb. Propositions are the building-blocks of larger concepts; the attachment of a set or list of conditions to Johnny's failing greatly increases the complexity of the concept. Compare the above simple concept to 'Johnny is failing mathematics this term, as he has not turned in a single assignment during the COVID-19 pandemic that has forced schools to close and instruction to occur online.' As we see, causal and other relational attributions to a simple proposition augment the complexity of the concept. In a similar manner, philosophies of education are made of simple concepts that enlarge or are enlarged as qualifications are added. The qualifications, however, are not random; they must follow from the simple concept as consequences follow in a deductive inference.

What differentiates a philosophy of education from an empirical enterprise such as sociology or policy studies is, content and context notwithstanding, the role of inferences. In the latter, empirical data is often understood to be taken as evidence or refutation of a pre-established hypothesis; the hypothesis tells us what to look for, and evidence in the guise of observable or measurable instances of the hypothesis are confirming. Not so in philosophy of education: the deductive consequences that follow from hypotheses set

what counts as the instances for the concept, and these instances in turn, buttress or refute that concept. The hypotheses are at first, a set of originary questions that serve to produce deductive consequences that are then understood as ideal specific instances which, when in correspondence with existential-material specific instances, form a generalizable rule or principle. Another way to put the point is to say that a general rule or principle grasps its instances as a result of these instances' being deductive consequences of the hypothesis. Subsequent concepts are introduced that align with the existing concept; there may be contrariness regarding what constitutes the instances, though there cannot be manifest contradiction. The relations built up between concept and concept form a meta-concept—a concept that houses distinct, though not contradictory, concepts. This is how the scaffolding of a philosophy of education is erected.

The original question of philosophy of education was asked at the outset of its institutionalization. This question had, in turn, a pedigree that stretched back as far as ancient Greece and Egypt, and likely earlier. This is how the two leading accounts of the formation of philosophy of education can be brought together. This question concerns education in its broadest compass. The systematic study and corresponding account developed from the question, formalized at the level of institutions, programs, and associations, *is* philosophy of education. I have discussed this question and its deductive consequences elsewhere.[20] Here, I present the question without further argument. The question, divided into three parts, is:

1) What is the nature of the process of the social transmission of the (normative) features of human existence from one generation to another?

2) What subject matter is necessary for the cultivation of the person-in-community-in society (including cosmopolitan society) that is in accord with the answer(s) to the question of teaching and learning?

3) What aims, ends, and make-up (structural and interpersonal) must the school possess to carry out the obligations of teaching and learning and the curriculum as set forth in divisions 1 and 2?

Notice these divisions concern what will become the three meta-concepts of education: teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling. The question of origins is therefore inclusive and its deductive consequences and particular instances will lead to further concept-formation, in turn leading to the development of the meta-concepts. It is once again to this development we now turn.

2.2 The Development of the Concept

Higher organizational levels of concepts are built upon simpler ones. The simplest concept is a straightforward proposition, claim, assertion, or statement. Propositions consist in deductive consequences which follow directly from the claim made. To isolate their deductive consequences, propositions must take, or be placed in, the form of a hypothesis. So for example, let us take the claim,

> 'Johnny fails all his mathematics tests.'

While this seems like a simple and straightforward fact of the matter, it is nevertheless a tentative claim, dependent on a number of factors, including meeting the discursive criteria for a fact. These criteria include, minimally, a strong conjectural status; the hypothesis must stand out from the general principle under which that fact would ordinarily be captured. It must also meet various other discursive criteria, such as the ability to be communicated to others as part of a practice that includes the giving and taking of reasons, in Wilfred Sellars's sense of the term, as well as the capacity to be social sanctioned by the community that takes up such hypotheses, namely, the community of philosophers of education.[21] Therefore, the hypothesis must be in such a form that it can be reasonably sanctioned, authorized, legitimated, or rejected. Placing the claim in the guise of a hypothesis renders, 'If Johnny takes a mathematics test, he will fail,' and now the claim is susceptible of deductive consequences.

There are two important considerations regarding the questions. First, they are framed in the guise of hypotheses, and second, they are fallible and therefore subject to jettisoning or reconstruction. The deductive hypotheses that follow from these questions are put in the form of hypotheses bivalent and biconditional (with one exception). Before proceeding, I will discuss these terms further. To say a hypothesis is bivalent with its deductive consequences is simply to say that the hypothesis is either true or false. If it is false, then it requires jettisoning or reconstruction. Falsity will be discussed further below. To say that a hypothesis is biconditional is to say, given the hypothesis, the deductive consequence is also true. This is best represented as 'P iff Q.' The truth of the deductive consequences, then, follows on the truth of the hypothesis. There is one qualification: deductive consequences are *tentatively* biconditional with their hypothesis. If the hypothesis falls, so do the deductive consequences, and as we have indicated, what makes a hypothesis fall is its inability to grasp its specific ideal and existential instances.

Let us suppose that one of the deductive consequences of 'What is the nature of the process of the social transmission of the (normative) features of human existence from one generation to another?' is 'There are normative features of human existence.'[22] This deductive consequence leads to the search for specific instances. A specific instance is both theorized (an idea) and an existential or material instance of that idea. So, we would

be looking for an existential instance of the idea that could then be taken up into a generalized principle, i.e., we would be looking for examples of what counts as 'normative features of existence.' In this case, we would doubtlessly alight on examples of parents teaching their children certain values, overtly and covertly, and would collect these up towards the formulation of a general principle. The establishment of a variety of these specific instances of deductive consequences leads to the formation of a richer and more robust concept than the hypothesis first indicates. It is this revised concept that is pushed into service in the formation of further concepts and ultimately, meta-concepts such as teaching and learning.

We build on concepts one-by-one when we formulate a general principle and establish the validity of the opening hypothesis. In this way, concepts generate new hypotheses. (What does the existing concept have to say about this new situation of zero tolerance? Can it bring the practical instances of zero tolerance under its rubric? Can it absorb this idea/practice?). The success of the hypothesis leads to further growth of the concept, and failure of the hypothesis forces an ad hoc response ('this concept applies to a, b, c, …, and y, though not to z'). This obviously concerns the extension of the concept to rival concepts. Additionally, the *intensional* dynamics of the concept are important to consider. If the concept accepts too many ad hoc qualifications, it runs the risk of becoming a nest of contradictory propositions; the consistency and coherency of the concept can only tolerate so many ad hoc qualifications before it groans under its own weight. As I indicated in the first chapter, enough of these ad hoc additions will bring down the concept.

Let us again refer to the diagrammatic representation of the relationship between simple and complex concepts. As in the previous chapter, we use the concept of white privilege and the meta-concept of teaching and learning:



Now let us suppose that a contradictory concept is introduced *ab extra* into the meta-concept and is taken up ad hoc. The resultant larger concept must now accept the contradictory concept with the proviso that the larger concept stands, though only with the qualification that it does not extend to the domain of the contradictory concept. The diagrammatic representation looks something like this:



Prima facie, this claim (as a simple concept) does not seem to be relatable to the concept, e.g., 'Holly passes for black, but has white parents, grandparents, and great grandparents,' and an ad hoc hypothesis must be made at the level of the larger concept (the 'pedagogy of discomfort') to accommodate this.[23] To say that white children have privilege across the board is to make a seemingly false claim. (The question, what would count as a refutation, looms large here.) The ad hoc hypothesis serves to make an exception to the concept's logical range. A nest of these is what ultimately brings down the larger or meta-concept. The fitness of the larger concept is jeopardized and a new or rival concept may be tasked to replace the old. This would be a concept that better grasps what are otherwise contradictory instances while maintaining its overall consistency and coherency. It would begin as a hypothesis, followed by its deductive consequences, and finally grasps the instances, ideal and material, of those consequences. Ultimately, it becomes a new concept that operates more effectively than the previous one.

2.2.1 Teaching and Learning, the Curriculum, and Schools as Meta-Concepts

Within a larger concept, lower concepts jockey for position. The concept, 'pedagogy of discomfort' contains many simple concepts as propositions that operate in a fractious environment, as this environment is one that contains contrary (though not contradictory) lower concepts. In terms of the operational features of the lower concepts, the larger concept attempts to keep control of these through their relations. Some concepts grasp certain instances and different concepts grasp others. The 'pedagogy of discomfort' may grasp 'Sally is uncomfortable with stories of white racist behaviour,' as well as 'Devonte is thankful that this issue is being discussed.' The 'pedagogy of discomfort' must easily grasp both or risk introducing or exposing a contradiction. Larger concepts such as the 'pedagogy of discomfort' are content for even larger, and meta-concepts. The meta-concepts discussed in our earlier presentation were teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling. We will return to these now.

Meta-concepts do not simply form when we look at practices taking place under the rubrics teaching and learning, or schools and schooling; this would be arbitrary. Instead, they are formed from deductive consequences that originate with the leading original questions asked of philosophy of education. As we have seen, originary questions concern the following:[24]

1) What is the nature of the process of the social transmission of the (normative) features of human existence from one generation to another?

2) What subject matter is necessary for the cultivation of the person-in-community-in-society (including cosmopolitan society) that is in accord with the answer(s) to the question of teaching and learning?

3) What aims, ends, and make-up (structural and interpersonal) must the school possess to carry out the obligations of teaching and learning and the curriculum as set forth in questions 1 and 2?

From each of these, deductive consequences arise. It is these deductive consequences that initiate the search for specific instances, both ideal and material, that are then gathered to see if a general principle can be elucidated. For example, in teaching and learning, one of the deductive consequences will be:

> 'Engage in social transmission by receiving from elders and passing to children.'

Specific instances of this engagement must be located, both as ideal and material. Likewise, with the curriculum; in this case, one of the deductive consequences will be:

> 'The end of teaching and learning will be coterminous with the end of the subject matter.'

Again, specific instances of this coterminal consequence must be located. Finally, with respect to schools and schooling, one of the deductive consequences will be:

> 'Schools are that institution in which the ends of teaching and learning and subject matter come together,'

with the practical instances validating the correctness of the hypothesis. In each of these cases, the ability to grasp these instances portends the formulation of a general principle —a rule that stands unless and until a better rule obtains. The content of every meta-concept consists in these principles and their content. The meta-concepts are only as strong as their ability to organize that which they contain, i.e., the greater and lesser concepts housed within. Though it is highly unlikely that a meta-concept such as teaching and learning could be threatened with jettisoning or reconstruction, what is contained within certainly is, and it often does get replaced. For example, corporal punishment is no longer an acceptable practice in schools and schooling, and this has led to a revised understanding of what school and schooling consist of. Corporal punishment, in the understanding we are generating of the conceptual development in philosophy of education, is not simply a practice that suddenly becomes wrong owing to outside pressures; it is wrong because of its contradiction with the existing normative concepts housed in the meta-concept, schools and schooling, and its fitness there can no longer

be maintained. It no longer has a home amongst the other normative concepts that fulfill the instances of the meta-concept.

2.3 Ideology and the Origins of Philosophy of Education

The above example points out a central feature of the development of concepts and meta-concepts, namely, that this development is intrinsic to the concepts. Concepts such as the 'pedagogy of discomfort' and meta-concepts such as teaching and learning are, for philosophy of education, not to be understood as a random grasp of this or that extraneous idea or practice; they are to be thought of as grasping and including only what their deductive consequences portend. Additionally, their deductive consequences can only follow from what the principle or hypothesis allows. We have here a tight, consistent, and coherent model of philosophy of education; one in which the basic concepts are nested in the larger concepts, the larger concepts in the meta-concepts of teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling, and these in the meta-concept, education. Though the system is obviously not air-tight (nor should it be), it is sufficiently structured to resist incursions *ab extra* from having a deleterious impact on the overall edifice.

In the model of philosophy of education discussed here, we place the original question in the guise of a hypothesis, which elicits deductive consequences. These consequences are bivalent and biconditional with their hypothesis. These consequences are looked for in ideal and material instances and, if and when they are found, are brought together as a general principle, concept, or rule. Failure to locate ideas and material instances of these consequences augurs negatively for the formulation of a general principle and threatens the hypothesis. The encounter of contrary (though not contradictory) instances requires ad hoc adjustments to the hypothesis *if* it is to become, or remain, a principle. Enough of these ad hoc adjustments brings down the concept and it is either replaced or reconstructed. This goes for all levels of conceptual organization, from the simplest to most complex.

As discussed in the previous chapter, ideology is the imputation *ab extra* of a political claim or proposition. It therefore has no place in a considered philosophy of education, i.e., one that begins with original questions and proceeds through deductive consequences to concepts as principles, and ultimately, to meta-concepts. The imputation *ab extra* is tantamount to the arbitrary replacement of an originary question with an ideological one. The ends and aims of philosophy of education would be surrendered to the ends and aims of the ideological concept and the entire edifice would be placed in jeopardy, for the deductive consequences of this concept *ab extra* would be vastly different from the existing deductive consequences of the established edifice. This difference would necessitate breakdown and a complete change of direction for the

edifice. The edifice would no longer be philosophical, because the internal scaffolding, built up from proposition to concept to meta-concept, would no longer be available. Instead, the aims and ends of the ideological concept would drive the construction of the (novel) scaffolding. Lest we think that this would simply be a different yet robust scaffolding compared to the one of philosophy of education, it is important to note there would be little attention directed towards the relationships between concepts because the end would drive the entire apparatus, rather than the thought of maintaining coherence and consistency amongst seemingly contrary concepts. We would be faced with the spectacle of numerous conflicting concepts, yet all put to one aim or end; the upshot being the establishment of a set of conditions mandated by and through the ideological concept.

The difference here is one of internal vs. external aims and ends. In a philosophy of education, internal ends, or ends that are developed inside the edifice, drive that structure forward. These internal ends are constructed of the practical instances grasped by their principles, which in turn follow from the deductive consequences of the hypotheses. Novel instances are handled by ad hoc qualifications that ultimately result in jettisoning or reconstruction of the principle or concept. This is not the case in ideology, where no novel instance gets in the way of the (ideological) principle. This principle dictates what counts as a practical instance rather than the practical instance dictating what counts as a concept. This is how ideology is tautological; there can be no disconfirming practical instances in ideology, for ideology drives what we take to be practical instances.[25]

Philosophy of education can never be an ideology, for philosophy of education is built from the ground up, beginning with original questions, proceeding to deductive consequences, then to the search for confirming or disconfirming ideas and material instances, and finally to the establishment of a general principle that will serve until it collapses under the weight of disconfirming instances and the resultant ad hoc hypotheses. The constellations of concepts and meta-concepts are in turn formed of these logical movements of propositions, claims, assertions, and so forth. *An ideology would have to be inserted into the conceptual edifice of a philosophy of education to establish itself as a beginning or end of the philosophy of education*. Subsequently, as we have said, this would destroy whatever presumptions the adjusted account had to offer philosophy. However, a suitably strong philosophy of education would inhibit the possibility of this occurring. For, in a properly developed philosophy of education, there is no weak point into which ideology can inject its principle or proposition.

We have discussed the possibility of ideology as an end for philosophy of education in the previous chapter and rejected this. Here, we will want to discuss the possibility of ideology as original question and what happens to philosophy in its wake. What would philosophy of education look like if an ideological question were inserted *ab extra* and then considered as its origin? What would it look like if philosophy of education took its point of departure from an ideological proposition? I submit it would look like a *mandate*

and *not* philosophy. What I mean by this needs to be discussed before we can continue. As we have seen thus far, philosophy is the consistent and coherent (indeed, systematic) edifice that begins with original questions, leads to further and further complex concepts that operate as constellations of lesser concepts, and ultimately to the meta-concepts of teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling. It ends in the meta-concept, education. A mandate, too, may well end in education, but what education looks like under the auspices of a mandate, considered in terms of its components (its meta-concepts, its larger and smaller concepts), differs from within a philosophy of education. For a mandate, fixed and final, is definitionally ideological, and therefore drives any subsequent concept and meta-concept; this means that ideology's operative question, whether framed as original or as teleological (as an end to be reached), will doubtless drive the subsequent formation of concepts. Ideology may have constellations of concepts, all driven towards the fixed and final, but these constellations and these concepts are not the results of a process involving hypothesis formation, the establishment of deductive consequences, and the gathering of the specific instances of those consequences under a general rule or principle. The instances matter little except as proofs of the already established principle. In the case of instances that do not accord with the principle, the prevailing strategy is either ignorance, or a tautological response, e.g., 'this is the effect of not following the ideology or acting in contradiction to the ideology'.

I am saying that the entire apparatus of ideology is anti-hypothetical and anti-fallibilist. Indeed, it is *unfalsifiable*, insofar as the principle, either of origin or of end, is pre-established. The result is a tautology in which disconfirming instances are ignored or explained away and confirming instances are offered as supporting evidence. In cases where an ideological mandate is clearly in conflict with an existing program, the program is rejected outright (hence, no longer part of the mandate), or modified to bring it in line with the mandate at the expense of its conceptual coherency and consistency. We might want to represent the ideological counterexample to the philosophy of education in terms of this (hierarchical) diagram:



Here, it is the ideology, represented as 'All children must have the right to equal education,' that drives teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling, and mandates that every program involved in teaching and learning and the curriculum (including the three random examples, above) meets the criterion of the ideology. It does not much matter *how* it is done; what matters is *that* it is done. Presumably, all three have the conceptual capacity to handle this end, though not without internal change. All three programs are measured by the origin, which is ideological, and must therefore ensure their varied contents match this origin or risk rejection. Differentiated learning might have conceptual problems, represented as conflicts between its various concepts and propositions, in meeting its new mandate. (This of course will depend on what equal is understood to mean.) In any event, what changes concerns not the ideology, which is an impervious mandate, but the various concepts within the meta-concepts. In this case, it is the conceptual content in the various representative programs. The ideology remains as it is regardless of its ability to conceptually grasp the concepts and meta-concepts.

A robust philosophy of education does not have an ideological origin, as does the example above. Its origins follow conceptually from its means and its higher concepts from its lower concepts. The various concepts and meta-concepts are immune to mandates *ab extra*. This is how and why philosophy of education can be understood as consistent and coherent, whereas an ideology of education can only ensure consistency and coherency at the expense of breaking concepts and meta-concepts of programs apart to establish the ideological origin. In philosophy of education, conceptual conflict is handled by a process of reconstruction or jettisoning of principles in favour of new hypotheses; in ideology, conceptual conflict is handled by rejecting concepts, and even whole programs that cannot or do not meet its mandate, or through tautological claims as to the inclusivity of its enterprise.

Ideology is, as Freeden puts it, a 'core' that cannot be approached.[26] Philosophy of education's core, on the other hand, is composed of interlinked concepts that can and do

get jettisoned or reconstructed. This makes philosophy of education and its method fallibilist. The strongest characteristic of philosophy of education in contrast to ideology is its fallibilism. Philosophy of education is a self-correcting enterprise, whereas ideology is not. I think the concern with establishing ideological mandates in a philosophy of education is evident by this juncture; philosophy of education will, should it grasp an ideological principle or proposition and take it onboard, become hostage to that principle. It will no longer serve itself in a self-corrective enterprise, instead it will serve the ideology. In serving the ideology, it will become something other than philosophy of education.

2.4 Philosophy of Education as a Political Enterprise

We have seen thus far how claims, propositions, concepts, and meta-concepts, including teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling, are formed from origins, become constellations housing simpler concepts, and lead to the meta-concept, education. We have also seen what ideology consists in and how ideology infects philosophy of education when isolated claims or mandates from outside are injected into the edifice; they hijack the philosophy of education's origins, methods, aims, and purposes. We have also seen how philosophy of education can resist this incursion. I now want to turn to the prospect of philosophy of education as a political enterprise, with the overall aim of resisting this temptation to ideology. This will allow me to discuss the relationships amongst philosophy of education, political philosophy, political theory, and ideology. Sorting these out proves to be important in resisting the incursion of ideology into philosophy of education.

2.4.1 How Political Propositions and Concepts are Ideological

We have maintained thus far that any insertion *ab extra* of a proposition or principle into the edifice of philosophy of education is ideological. We can be more precise. It is ideological in two senses: in terms of its *commitments* and in terms of its *operation*. As I have not yet fully differentiated these two. it becomes important to do so for what follows. As the ideological proposition or principle is injected *ab extra* into the philosophy of education, so the commitment the proposition or principle it entails is *ab extra*. The proposition or principle's commitment does not follow organically from the philosophy of education; rather, its commitment lies elsewhere. Of course, the philosophy of education has its own commitments, which develop from the original questions asked, through to the concepts, larger concepts, and meta-concepts. This is not the case with *ab extra* propositions or principles, whose commitment lies with the overall political core from which it emanates. This puts the two commitments or sets of commitments in a position of rivalry. In this case, which commitment should be followed? Will it be the commitments

of philosophy of education or the commitments of the *ab extra* proposition or principle? The insertion of the principle will do violence to the existing commitments of philosophy of education should they not already align, and they can only align if the commitments form part of the organic development of that philosophy of education.

The other sense of ideology concerns operations. By this, I mean the way propositions and principles work in the overall edifice of philosophy of education. A proposition or principle of a philosophy of education has, as we earlier discussed, both intensional and extensional capacities. The intensional capacities concern what the concept contains, e.g., is the concept able to grasp its instances? The extensional capacities concern the reach of the concept to other concepts, e.g., how well does the concept align with existing concepts in the philosophy of education?[27] Operations, by which I mean such activities as judging and making inferences, including hypothesis-formation, abduction, deduction, and induction, as well as syllogistic reasoning, are enhanced when concepts align and are frustrated when they do not. In a judgment involving syllogistic inferences, for example, propositions *ab extra* interfere with the path from premises to conclusion, as the conclusion must already meet the mandate of the ideological proposition. It will do to provide an example of this, so consider the meta-concept, curriculum. One of the subordinate concepts in curriculum might be:

> 'All children have the right to a fair evaluation of their progress.'

The meta-concept, curriculum, grasps this subordinate concept. To do so, this concept must relate to other concepts that the meta-concept grasps. So, for example, this concept must relate to or align with the following concept:

> 'All children must have access to the same instructional resources, should these be warranted.'

Now, we see that these two concepts align; indeed, we might even say they are interdependent. Let us inject a concept *ab extra* into the meta-concept, curriculum, for example:

> 'Children are to be sorted by intellectual inventories as regards their access to curricular materials.'

Now, this concept *ab extra* does not align with the other two. For the other two to align with it, they must undergo, at a minimum, the addition of ad hoc hypotheses which weaken their range, as well as their intensional capacity. For example, the concept 'All children must have access to the same instructional resources, should these be warranted,' will require the additional qualification 'except insofar as they are successfully sorted to use the more advanced curricular materials.' Prima facie, this appears to be a contrary, if not

contradictory, proposition. It certainly hinders what counts and what does not count as an instance of the general principle of fairness which the first proposition rests on. In turn, this will affect the meta-concept, curriculum, as it will now contain a proposition or concept that is contrary to itself and requires just such an ad hoc adjustment.

Matters are more significant when broad political claims are inserted into philosophies of education. For example, the concept,

> 'All children must complete the same course requirements to successfully graduate,'

will require a great deal in the way of finessing the previous concepts 'All children have the right to a fair evaluation of their progress' and 'All children must have access to the same instructional resources, should these be warranted.' Specifically, these will require ad hoc hypotheses that burden their coherency and consistency as well as their range. If the mandate is inflexible (as mandates are), then it will always serve to police the other concepts in the meta-concept. The net result is that it takes the lead in determining what the pathway will be for the other concepts, with all roads leading to the mandate.

There are also flatly contradictory concepts that are introduced *ab extra*. Consider Dewey's philosophy of education, which has one of its meta-concepts the never-ending growth of the individual.[28] Consider the concept *ab extra*, 'formal education for labourers ends with middle school.' Now, this was a leading mandate of the practices and policies of schools and schooling at the fin de siècle and it hobbled any philosophy of education that would suggest otherwise. If the mandate were somehow injected *ab extra* into Dewey's extant philosophy of education, it would have been disastrous. Fortunately, it was not. Alternately, consider the even more damning mandate 'All forms of protest must be given equal consideration as valid examples of civil disobedience.' This would undoubtedly affect the relationship of concepts and larger concepts in the meta-concept, curriculum. In fine, it would force claims such as 'All children have the right to freedom from racist, gendered, or otherwise obnoxious curricular materials,' to qualify themselves before the mandate, with the result of their jettisoning or reconstruction. The mandate serves to drive the meta-concept. As propositions or concepts that act as mandates are incontrovertible—for they do not form part of the philosophy of education and therefore, are not susceptible of reconstruction or jettisoning—they become in practice the origin or end of that philosophy of education. As the only rigid and static components, they are the linchpin around which every other proposition and concept turns, or alternatively, the end to which they drive. In fact, they hold the philosophy of education hostage to their rigid commitments.

2.4.2 Philosophy of Education and Political Claims

In saying that philosophy of education must avoid ideological propositions and concepts, we are saying philosophy of education must resist the temptation to import these, *ab extra*. Instead, philosophy of education is to develop and follow its own propositions and concepts. This means that philosophy of education handles its own political claims. Political claims in philosophy of education are not imported, *ab extra*; they are developed from origins to concepts, to larger concepts, to meta-concepts. Here, it will be useful to trace the purported development of a political claim that is suitable for a philosophy of education. To begin with, we start with an originary question, so let us recur to that discussed earlier:

1) What is the nature of the process of the social transmission of the (normative) features of human existence from one generation to another?

2) What subject matter is necessary for the cultivation of the person-in-community-in-society (including cosmopolitan society) that is in accord with the answer(s) to the question of teaching and learning?

3) What aims, ends, and make-up (structural and interpersonal) must the school possess to carry out the obligations of teaching and learning and the curriculum as set forth in questions 1 and 2?

Taking this as an originary question, all propositions and concepts henceforth are instances of their deductive consequences, duly transformed into principles. These principles, in turn, will encounter refractory, resistant, or recalcitrant instances. The instances, however, are *not* ideological mandates; they are instances of the deductive consequences as set out by the principle, and this principle stands or falls on its ability to grasp the instances it predicts. A philosophy of education is responsive to practices, but only to practices that follow from deductive consequences, or the instances of the principle. They have nothing to say about practices that follow from some other principle, unless and until that principle and the principle of philosophy of education are somehow organically drawn together in and by a set of mutually related practices. In this case, principles are compared as to their fitness to grasp the instances in question. Philosophies of education grasp their own instances, and not the instances of other theories, disciplines, or most importantly, ideologies.

These questions will in turn generate deductive consequences. Let us take, for example, a deductive consequence of schools and schooling (which is also aligned with teaching and learning and the curriculum).

> 'Have schools as the institutions that carry out the ethical obligations associated with teaching and learning and subject matters.'[29]

This consequence follows from the questions above. Here, ethical obligations arise from teaching and learning and subject matters; they are not imposed *ab extra*. What makes them obligations is their necessity given the specific scaffolding of concepts and meta-concepts. Political claims *arise out of* the concepts that operate as components of the edifice. All political claims, therefore, take their cue from propositions and concepts *already present* in the philosophy of education, and do so as deductive consequences from a specific hypothesis; these consequences have their instances in various ideas and practices. The inability of the instances to be grasped by a general principle is tantamount to the failure of the hypothesis, and this invites jettisoning or reconstruction.

2.4.3 Political Theory and Philosophy of Education

What, then, is the proper relationship between philosophy of education and political theory? *In all cases, it can only be a political theory that is formulated ground-up from the philosophy of education.* The political theory developed must be consistent with the philosophy of education from which it develops. This means there must be an organic connection between the two. This militates against imposition of political claims *ab extra* on the philosophy of education, but it implies more than just this. Philosophy of education alone has the right to make political claims and these claims can only be hypothetical insofar as they are fallible. The hypothesis will gain a set of deductive consequences that are bivalent and biconditional; these consequences will be actualized in specific instances of the consequences, and should this be successful, it will gain a principle. Instances that are not grasped by the principle of course denote limitations to that principle. Enough of these limitations place the principle in jeopardy. Specific instances that are unable to be grasped by the existing political principle or claim are limiting of that principle. *Political principles are just as fallible as other principles in the overall system and have no more justification for rigidity and inflexibility than any other principle*.

As political claims and principles emanate from the formation of concepts in the overall edifice, they align with other claims and principles. Though there can be contrary claims and principles, there cannot be contradictions in the edifice. What this means is that principles cannot be ideological in a philosophy of education, for there cannot be unwavering commitments to this or that policy or platform. There cannot be a core of liberalism or socialism, or any other political ideology in a philosophy of education.[30] What core there is comes about only in and through the nested structure of propositions and concepts that form the philosophy of education. We might say philosophy of education remains agnostic to political ideologies, as it is unable and unwilling to adopt *ab extra* any core that would prescribe claims, mandates, or policies.

Policies that emanate from a philosophy of education will consist in propositions and concepts of that philosophy of education and nothing further. This means that existing policies—whether ideologically liberal, conservative, or socialist—are unfit for a philosophy of education. They can serve neither as the origins for presumptive questions nor as ends to which philosophy of education would be driven. For a philosophy of education, policies are developed from within, not from without. Of course, specific instances of this or that deductive consequence, if they are finite, material, and practical, will resemble this or that ideological policy. In the case of schools and schooling, many if not most of the extant policies are ideologically motivated. These finite instances may or may not be grasped under a philosophy of education's stock of principles. If they are, it is not because they are ideological, rather they happen to fit as instances with the principle. Note that they do *not* correspond to the deductive consequences of the principles or hypotheses of the philosophy of education; they can only *resemble* these consequences because they are not instances of the deductions, nor instances of the principle. So, there can be no question of a full-scale appropriation of these instances. As far as political theories are concerned, then, they cannot be adopted, either in whole or in part, by a philosophy of education without at once committing that philosophy to ideology.

The above immediately raises the following question: given that we are surrounded by policies, practices, and mandates from the dominant political ideology (liberalism), together with the encroachment of a strong minority ideology (socialism), how is it indeed possible for philosophy of education to defend itself from incursions a*b extra*? This in turn invites a discussion of the central core of liberalism and socialism, together with a robust response as to how philosophy of education can combat their incursion. We are undoubtedly in the grips of an ideology of liberalism, with its core consisting in liberty, negative freedom (freedom from), equality, and basic human rights.[31] The ideology of liberalism is currently being challenged by socialism, with its core consisting in the social welfare state, equality of outcomes, and equity.[32] In the United States at least, there seems to be a rise in the ideology of conservatism, with its core consisting in tradition, reaction, and the subscription of sociality to an extra-human order.[33]

Educational policies, mandates, and practices of the liberal ideology include a concentration on freedom and human rights, equality of access and opportunity, due process, a focus on the individual, and a curriculum that stresses the emergence of liberalism from pre-liberal or unliberal sources to its present procedural manifestation. Policies, mandates, and practices of the socialist ideology include a concentration on (social) democracy and its attendant functions, newer Declarations of the United Nations, including the Rights of Women, Children, and the Indigenous, equality of outcome, (re)distributive justice, a focus on groups and communities, and a curriculum that stresses the inclusion of hitherto unheard voices and narratives. Finally, the policies, mandates, and practices of the conservative ideology include a return to tradition, the re-

establishment of religion in civil society and the state (both in policy and practice), a nation-centered curriculum, and a skepticism of the novel, especially novelties that challenge the nation's self-understandings. The task of philosophy of education is to recognize these for what they are, namely, ideologies, and it is to defend itself against incursions *ab extra* of these into its edifice.

It is political theory that deals with the ideologies of liberalism, conservatism, and socialism. Political theory is at once broader and narrower than political philosophy: it is broader because it is inclusive of normative and empirical dimensions of political life.[34] It is also narrower because it does not directly tie questions of the justification or nature of (political) institutions, to a logical, metaphysical, epistemic, and ethical worldview.[35] It does not, therefore, reach back to its presuppositions and original suppositions. When we speak of an account of political theory for a systematic philosophy of education, we have already understood that philosophy of education as comprising a political philosophy, which, as systematic, contains a logic, metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and ethics.

As liberalism is the central ideology practiced in North America, I will direct most of my attention to it. Some of the philosophical presuppositions that presume to guide the formation of a philosophy of education emerge from the political philosophies that, together, are liberal in ideology. For example, procedural liberalism has had an oversized impact on the philosophical discourse of liberalism in the past 50 years, and to say it is a presupposition of philosophy of education means that any philosophy of education that would build an edifice consisting in concepts and larger concepts of political philosophy must consider this as a necessary, though obviously not sufficient, point of departure. Now, procedural liberalism here operates not as a *supposition*—which is a hypothesis in need of further demonstration through its deductive consequences and practical instances—but a *presupposition*. This status immediately raises the spectre of it being ideological in operation.

The relationship of presuppositions, which are philosophical, and suppositions, which stem from the originary questions of philosophy of education, is one of ground (not cause) and consequence. Presuppositions are the point of departure for grounding a philosophy of education in suppositions,[36] those questions from which further concepts and meta-concepts develop. They do not on their own constitute the basis for the development of these original questions of philosophy of education. Presuppositions cannot be further reduced or analyzed, and in serving as the point of departure for the philosophical scaffolding they support the development of concepts and meta-concepts in the philosophy of education. They are therefore the very condition of the philosophical scaffolding that accompanies the growth and development of the concepts and meta-concepts. Note, however, that presuppositions are *philosophical*, not *ideological*; the core mandates of liberalism, for example, can never act as presuppositions for a philosophy of education—only a *philosophical* presupposition will do in this role. As it is important to

distinguish presuppositions from suppositions, I will provide an example. Consider Hobbes's famous dictum:

> 'All men desire power and glory.'

This is *not* a stand-alone philosophical presupposition; it is a claim with its basis in the nature of the human being that has been extracted from an overall political philosophy. On the other hand,

> 'A contract between citizens and sovereign is necessary for human beings to emerge from their state of constant warring,' [37]

is a philosophical presupposition. What is the difference? The first is a claim that is dependent on a political philosophy, whereas the second is the *basic condition* of that political philosophy. Hobbes's political philosophy contains numerous claims, concepts, larger concepts, and even meta-concepts that together, form an edifice. The edifice partly determines the ground. In this case, the edifice presupposes the state of nature of humankind in the narrative of the social contract. The edifice then relies on this presupposition to support its end.

One claim or mandate extracted from the philosophy, and put into service for another, does *not* count as a philosophical presupposition. Instead, we must look to the very condition that makes such a claim valuable in light of the overall thesis. Ideologies such as liberalism and socialism and their various claims and assertions do *not* have the edifice of philosophy of education and *cannot be* considered philosophies. They, or their various claims and assertions, cannot therefore be considered as presuppositions for philosophy of education. Presuppositions of the philosophy of education are coterminous with the aims and ends of the overall edifice and this is because presuppositions *condition* these aims and ends. Ideologies have cores, which are immutable claims and/or mandates, such as equality in the case of liberalism or equity in the case of socialism. These have no further presuppositions; they are bedrock. Ideologies build from these outward, to further mandates, policies, and practices, and this is not the case with philosophy of education.

The question we now return to is how is it indeed possible for philosophy of education to defend itself from incursions a*b extra*? The answer is to ensure that its presuppositions are *philosophical*. We cannot base our philosophy of education on isolated claims, concepts, or mandates drawn from this or that political philosophy; we can base our philosophy of education only on original questions, which are in turn conditioned by presuppositions that are strictly philosophical. A philosophical presupposition, then, is a condition or set of conditions to which any philosophy of education must adhere, and not a shard or fragment of a philosophy suitable for political purposes pushed into service as

the origin or end of a presumed philosophy of education. This presupposition provides the condition for the growth and development, aim and end, of the philosophy of education by giving structural support to its concept-formation at all levels.[38] To think otherwise is to risk ideological contamination at the outset. I will have much more to say about logical and metaphysical presuppositions in Chapter Three.

A final question: can philosophy of education direct itself from within towards a dominant political ideology or aim? The answer is yes. Given the dominant political theory operative in North America is liberalism, and the ideological core of liberalism consists in equality, merit, etc., a philosophy of education whose political claims and concepts *correspond to* these is perfectly acceptable, provided the impetus comes from within, not from without. (The same could be said of socialism or conservatism). However, the philosophy of education must be self-sufficient enough to resist embedding the ideological commitments of liberalism into its edifice; this is the paramount issue. Therefore, while a philosophy of education may go in the direction of liberalism, it cannot be counted as liberal. This may mean its acceptance by the larger philosophical community is imperiled; nevertheless, the point of a philosophy of education is not to garner academic or public acceptance or praise; it is to establish a consistent and coherent set of concepts and meta-concepts that sufficiently exhibit the edifice of education.

In summary, there can be no ideological commitments forming part of a philosophy of education. To do so is to render that philosophy of education susceptible to the commitment, either in terms of the former's origin or its end. This is to effectively take over the philosophy of education through the establishment of an ideological commitment and place it in the service of an ideological agenda. There is no virtue in philosophy of education surrendering its consistency and coherency to a rigid, fixed, and ultimately tautology-inducing commitment. The way forward for philosophies of education is to build themselves ground up, with the establishment of an original question or questions, and follow the deductive consequences of this question. The metaphysical, logical, knowledge-theoretical, ethical, and socio-political concepts and meta-concepts will emerge from the consequences, together with a set of principles that are of tentative value in grasping instances of educational thinking and practice. We should stop trying to tailor our philosophies of education to existing educational circumstances, ideas, and practices, and instead develop coherent and consistent philosophies of education that grasp their own ideas and practices. We should also call out ideological commitments in philosophy of education and in their place practice and militate for flexible principles not constrained by politics. Our politics, and the political theory that a philosophy of education holds to, must follow from, and not precede, the edifice of propositions, concepts, and meta-concepts that together make up the philosophy of education.

Notes

1. I say crudely because there were idealist Americans and functionalist Germans. For example, Wilhelm Wundt, who did consider himself an idealist, was the leading researcher in psychophysics in Germany in the 1870's.

2. See John White, "Reply to James Muir," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 36, no. 4 (2004): 455-458; Kaminsky, *A New History of Educational Philosophy*; James Kaminsky, "The First 600 Months of Philosophy of Education—1935-1985: A Deconstructionist History," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 18, no. 2 (1988): 42-9; and Muir, "Is there a History of Philosophy of Education? John White vs. the Evidence." For an argument that places philosophy of education's beginning in the mid-19th century, see J.J. Chambliss, *The Origins of American Philosophy of Education: Its Development as a Distinct Discipline 1808-1913* (The Hague: Martinus Nijoff, 1968). This debate is not confined to Muir, White, and Chambliss. Gert Biesta has weighed in, as have Megan Laverty and David Hansen, in their introduction to the series, *A History of Western Philosophy of Education.* For Laverty and Hansen, following Muir, they see the enterprise of philosophy of education stretching back to Plato and beyond, and see this enterprise as "an unbroken conversation," though the direct animus is Progressive Education and its forebears. See Gert Biesta, "Is Philosophy of Education a Historical Mistake? Connecting Philosophy and Education Differently," *Theory and Research in Education* 12, no. 1 (2014): 65-76. Megan Laverty and David Hansen, *A History of Western Philosophy of Education in the Contemporary Landscape*, ed. Anna Pages (London: Bloomsbury, 2021), IX, XIII.

3. Here, I am making a distinction between educational thought and philosophy of education; a distinction that is premised by the latter's self-conscious establishment in an institution, together with self-proclaimed scholarship. I will have to defend this claim separately, which I will do in a subsequent section. For now, though, I turn to the examination of the defense of Muir's thesis and the question of philosophy of education's proper origins.

4. Terry Papillon, "Isocrates' Techne and Rhetorical Pedagogy," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 25 (1995): 49-163.

5. Plato, "Meno," in *Plato: Complete Works*, trans. G.M. Grube, ed. J. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997), 870-897.

6. Plato, "*The Republic,*" in *Plato: Complete Works*, trans. G.M. Grube, ed. C.D.C. Reeve and J. Cooper (Indianapolis, In: Hackett, 1997), 971-1123.

7. Papillon, "Isocrates' Techne and Rhetorical Pedagogy."

8. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, trans. R. Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

9. Paul Kalligas, Chloe Balla, Effie Baziotopulou-Vlavani, and Vassilis Karasmanis, *Plato's Academy: Its Workings and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

10. Joyal, McDougall, and Yardley, *Greek and Roman Education: A Sourcebook*.

11. The standard story rivals the history of the development of progressive education, beginning with Jan Comenius' *De Orbis Pictus Sensualis*, leading to Locke and Rousseau, Basedow, Pestalozzi, Herbart, Froebel, Dewey, and Montessori, to the present-day attempts at an integrated curriculum and cultural inclusivity. Whereas religion was the concern for much of the 18th and 19th century, tolerance, pluralism, and inclusivity became the concerns of the 19th, 20th, and 21st.

12. Kaminsky, *A New History of Educational Philosophy*; J.J. Chambliss, *The Origins of American Philosophy of Education*; JJ. Chambliss, "John Dewey's Philosophy of Education before Democracy and Education," *Education and Culture* 19, no. 1 (2003): 1-7. Chambliss locates the first inklings of philosophy of education in the work of the early 19th century. The earliest work on education which may fairly be considered to have a place among the origins of the philosophy of education as a distinct discipline is Joseph Neef's *Sketch of a Plan and Method of Education* in 1808. Needless to say, Kaminsky and Chambliss's thesis has been criticized by those that stretch the history of philosophy of education back to Socrates and Plato.

13. Laverty and Hansen, "Series Introduction," in *A History of Western Philosophy of Education in the Contemporary Landscape*, XVI.

14. Thomas Tate, *Philosophy of Education, or The Principles and Practices of Teaching* (New York: Bibliolife, 1857/2008).

15. Rosenkranz published a variety of articles on pedagogy beginning with those in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy (1874). These were translated into English by G. Stanley Hall and Anna Brackett. They formed the material that would later be published as *Philosophy of Education* by Harris in 1886. Karl Rosenkranz, *The Philosophy of Education*, trans. Anna Brackett, ed. W.T. Harris (New York: D. Appleton, 1886).

16. W.T. Harris, "Addenda," in K. Rosenkranz, *The Philosophy of Education*, 11.

17. Rosenkranz, *The Philosophy of Education*.

18. Kaminsky, *A New History of Philosophy of Education*.

19. Here, I disagree with Avi Minz, who seems to want to include other fields of thought in philosophy of education for the purposes of correcting past thinking according to present circumstances. To me, this sort of philosophy of education is strictly ideological. See Avi Minz, "The Use and Abuse of the History of Educational Philosophy," *Philosophy of Education Society Yearbook* 2016, ed. Natasha Levinson (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 2017): 406-13.

20. E.g., Johnston, *Problems in the Philosophy of Education*, 162-163.

21. Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 76, 79.

22. Johnston, *Problems in the Philosophy of Education*, 162-163.

23. Boler, Feeling Power.

24. E.g., Johnston, *Problems in Philosophy of Education*, 162-163.

25. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 37.

26. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 77-84.

27. I refer the reader to the earlier discussion of intensionality and extensionality in Chapter One.

28. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, MW 9, 5.

29. E.g., Johnston, *Problems in the Philosophy of Education*, 214.

30. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 77-88 for the notion of a core.

31. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 77-84, 241.

32. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*,77-84, 426.

33. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 77-84, 340-341.

34. Flathman, *Political Theory*, 720-721.

35. James Sterba, “Political Philosophy,” in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (1999), 719-720. Subject-matter as such belongs to political theory, whereas our context is a systematic philosophy of education.

36. The basic notion of presuppositions come from R.G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940). For Collingwood, metaphysics consisted of “absolute presuppositions,” which were not only basic to Western metaphysics, but they were also irreducible and incontrovertible. These presuppositions were Christian and trinitarian. Our sense of presuppositions is not absolute, as it was for Collingwood: our sense is rather the irreducible, incontrovertible necessity of their capacity to condition further questions, further hypothesis, in the program of philosophy of education. Presuppositions work to establish conditions that philosophy of education must operate with, and these presuppositions are mandatory.

37. Hobbes, Leviathan, *The Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2021).

38. This is why there are presuppositions for each of logic, metaphysics, the theory of knowledge, ethics, and politics. One might seem to legitimately criticize this attempt at invoking an entire system or edifice in place of a single claim or proposition, with the result the same—that is to say, ideology. We will have to discuss how a philosophical presupposition operates and how it is used in a philosophy of education. It turns out that, as a presupposition, it operates as a condition that places limits on the originary questions and the further questions developed in and by that philosophy of education, and not as an opening premise from which all further consequences are deduced.

Chapter Three

The Presuppositions of Logic and Metaphysics in Philosophy of Education

3.1 'Isms' or 'Branches': How Best to Describe the Philosophy of Education

With this chapter, we move away from the consideration of aims and ends and of original questions, towards the philosophical presuppositions that lay behind any question put forth in a philosophy of education. Presuppositions do not emanate from educational issues and concerns; nor do they emanate from original questions asked on behalf of philosophy of education. Rather, they ground these questions by supplying a condition or set of conditions that must be ensured for the philosophy of education to remain resistant to incursions *ab extra*, as well as to prevent the original questions and the hypotheses that arise from these from falling into the trap of infinite regress. This is occasioned when there is no ground to which the question can appeal, with the upshot of the establishment of further and further grounds, *ad infinitum*.[1] Presuppositions supply this ground because they cannot be further reduced. From the vantage point of a philosophy of education that would establish original questions and from these, hypotheses that would be tested in an overall methodology, the presuppositions which are most important to affirm are those of logic and metaphysics. To isolate these, we must first examine their provenance, and this requires us to look at the branches of philosophy. However, prior to this, we need to challenge a dominant way of approaching the discipline of philosophy of education, a way that is not suited to isolating presuppositions; this is the 'isms' approach to philosophy of

education. This task will be undertaken in the first section of this chapter. Once complete, we will move on to examine the specific presuppositions of logic and metaphysics, and how and why these are necessary for any philosophy of education that would purport to resist incursions *ab extra*.

Here, I look at the two leading approaches to understanding philosophy of education: 'isms' and 'branches.' The 'isms' approach takes its cue from philosophy and divides philosophies of education either into schools of thought (idealism, realism, rationalism, empiricism, pragmatism, existentialism, etc.) or philosophies and/or theories of education indebted to those schools of thought (essentialism, perennialism, reconstructionism, etc.). The approach might also include political and/or ideological divisions (liberalism, socialism, Marxism, conservatism, etc.). Regardless of how it is done, the argument that these are the best (or at least competent) rubrics for describing philosophies of education is put forth. The 'branches' approach takes a different tack; it draws philosophies of education from the well of philosophical practices, namely, the questions, concerns, and issues philosophers have, together with how they approach their subject matter. Philosophies of education are therefore thought to have their genesis, if not their entire conceptual apparatus, in these branches. The branches are not schools of thought, but rather the branches of philosophy: logic, metaphysics, the theory of knowledge, ethics, and (sometimes) politics. A similar argument for these as foundational is made.

As I will discuss further, there are certain problems with each of these characterizations of philosophy of education. In fine, they do not consistently grasp what they intend to grasp. The first 'schools of thought' approach turns out to house many contradictory notions (what constitutes an idealist and who fits comfortably in this model?) and this makes it difficult to appropriate for philosophy of education. Philosophies and/or theories of education indebted to these schools of thought do not draw on the same claims and concepts, nor do they follow the same thinkers said to be representative of those schools. The 'branches' approach fairs better, for it insists that at least one account of logic, metaphysics, the theory of knowledge, ethics, and politics is essential to any philosophy of education, together with avoidance of the problems common to the 'isms' approach.

It is my contention that one variant of the 'branches' approach works admirably well for any philosophy of education that would claim consistency and coherency. This variant is one in which the branches of philosophy provide philosophical *presuppositions*—conditions that are not further reducible, yet necessary for the establishment of questions that philosophy of education asks and answers. The minimum requirements for this approach would be the isolation of specific presuppositions from each of the branches, and the establishment from these of a set of conditions from which questions original to the philosophy of education are developed. This would, of course, be in line with the methodological generation of questions according to hypothesis formation, deduction,

and induction—the model that is needed for generating further questions from the original questions of philosophy of education.

I begin this undertaking with a discussion of the 'isms' approach. This will lead me to examining how various textbooks in philosophy of education manage a simple and basic 'ism': idealism. It turns out there are different responses to the question of what idealism is, and there are even different thinkers considered idealists. Some of these might reasonably be considered otherwise and the potential idealists even have contrasting philosophical agendas. Then I turn to some of the issues with 'isms' more generally. I claim that these issues inhibit the 'isms' approach from being viable for philosophy of education. Following this, I examine the 'branches' approach. I start with a discussion of the basic branches common to philosophy of education and proceed to discuss the issue of presuppositions. I claim that understanding the branches of philosophy as offering presuppositions which condition accounts of philosophy of education is the best way to ensure a novel philosophy of education remains consistent and coherent. I also address the problem of ideology and the injection of claims and concepts *ab extra* that do not properly belong to the philosophy of education, and following this, move us towards the question, which approach—'isms' or 'branches'—best handles this. Needless to say, I side with 'branches.'

3.1.1 The 'Isms' Approach

Historically, the 'isms' approach to philosophy of education was divided into philosophical schools of thought on the one hand, and theoretical outgrowths within education on the other. The former consisted of well-understood standpoints such as realism, idealism, rationalism, empiricism, and later, pragmatism, existentialism, etc. The latter consisted of theories and even movements that had their origins partly in the former schools of thought and partly as a response to existing educational concerns. These included such approaches as essentialism, perennialism, progressivism, social reconstruction, critical theory, etc. Disambiguating the two is important; while the former can comfortably claim their provenance in philosophy, the latter are solely and completely within education. Gerald Gutek, for example, disambiguates these by assigning the 'isms' of philosophy to one category, the 'isms' of ideology (nationalism, liberalism, socialism, conservatism, Marxism) to another, and the 'isms' of theories to the final category (essentialism, progressivism, social reconstructionism, and critical theory).[2]

In the 1940's and 1950's contemporary philosophy of education reviews often contained both under its rubric. For example, John Brubacher understood both as contained within philosophy of education, though he considered the latter more important than the former, because they helped to push philosophy towards educational matters and concerns.[3] It has been said in the years that followed, attention was placed more on specific issues and concerns and less on wholesale rubrics such as essentialism, perennialism, and the

like, though this has not seemed the case with respect to primers and textbooks in philosophy of education.[4] The suggestion that such rubrics belong more to history than philosophy has been made, and I concur:[5] ideal types such as perennialism and essentialism (and a host of others) do a very good job of encapsulating a range of philosophical, theoretical, practical, and aspirational concepts and aims, but do a poor job of isolating that bit of philosophy which goes into their make-up.

I shall concentrate on textbooks in philosophy of education from here on out. These are for the most part, primers designed to introduce (North American) undergraduate teacher candidates to philosophy of education. For most of these students, in North America at least, it is the *only* acquaintance with philosophy of education they will make. These textbooks tend to carve up philosophy of education into distinct (philosophical) schools of thought, ranging from realism and idealism to more modern schools, such as pragmatism, postmodernism, and existentialism. In some regard at least, they map the historical terrain philosophy of education has trodden in its uptake of these schools. They also have the tendency to understand philosophy of education as an historical enterprise of the past 2600 years, and this is to be found in their inclusion of Plato and Aristotle among the representatives under consideration.

Approaching the philosophical foundations of education from an 'isms' approach is the most accepted of the various alternatives extant. Most current texts favor the philosophical 'isms' over the educational 'isms' – the latter 'isms' being those that were favored in the past. This is not to say that there is a strict line between the two; Howard Ozmon and Samuel Craver, for example, comingle the traditional schools of thought (realism, idealism, pragmatism, etc.) with the educational 'isms' of reconstructionism and behaviourism, and Gutek comingles nationalism, ethnonationalism, and American exceptionalism, alongside realism, idealism, and pragmatism. Most of these authors remain aligned to the philosophical schools of thought, yet the overall approach is riddled with problems. For example, there is a wide discrepancy in how each of these authors understands idealism. Furthermore, some of, for example, the idealists featured are only controversially included in the pantheon of idealism. Finally, the educational conclusions drawn from the description of idealism and idealists do not suit the deductive consequences of idealism itself. In the upcoming section, I examine the case of idealism in more detail.

3.1.2 Idealism and Philosophy of Education

I look at several texts here: Gerald Gutek's Philosophical and Ideological Perspectives in Education, Nel Noddings's Philosophy of Education, David Jacobsen's Philosophy in Classroom Teaching: Bridging the Gap, Sheila Dunn's Philosophical Foundations of Education, Barbara Thayer-Bacon and Charles Bacon's Philosophy Applied to Education,

and Howard Ozmon and Samuel Craver's Philosophical Foundations of Education. Gutek considers Socrates, Plato, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, idealists. For Gutek,

> Idealism asserts the primacy of the mental, the spiritual, and the ideal as the basis of reality. It affirms that reality is essentially spiritual or mental and denies the possibility of knowing anything except ideas. In explaining the universe, Idealism posits ultimate reality solely in the mind and argues that the universe is an expression of a highly generalized intelligence and will.[6]

Gutek's characterization of Idealists as championing absolute mind and will makes it seem as if all idealists are Platonists. While this *is* true of Plato (characteristically enough) at least in his middle and later dialogues, it is *not* true of Hölderlin, Schelling, and Hegel, all of whom are *immanentists* as much as transcendentalists, and in Schelling's case (at least in the 1790's) a *naturalist*.

Another misfire is Gutek's claim that Idealists wish "individual mind" to "contemplate the universe according to a total perspective that orders time and space."[7] "The properly functioning individual mind, striving to imitate the Universal Mind, seeks to fashion a coherent perspective into the universe."[8] Again, while this may be true of Platonism, it is *not* true of German idealism, which at its best sees *philosophy*, *not individual minds,* in the role of fashioning the coherent perspective that Gutek ascribes. Again, Gutek claims, "According to Idealist epistemology, education's major goal is to stimulate learners to achieve a more vital and fuller identification with the Absolute Mind, or the Macrocosm."[9] This is highly misleading. While it may be the case (again) that Platonists wish this in their educational programs, it is a moral and cultural self-education (*Bildung*) that the German idealists strive for, *not* a manifestly metaphysical one. Taken together, these statements run Platonism and German idealism too close to each other, to the detriment of the latter.

Noddings's *Philosophy of Education* is likely the most commonly used textbook on philosophy of education extant. Her book has the advantage of including a chapter on the beginnings of philosophy of education that stretches back to Plato, but unlike James Muir, she does not place significant stock in the claim that these thinkers self-consciously claimed a philosophy of education. She discusses Kant though she does not discuss him in terms of self-consciousness, but rather in terms of ethics and moral education.[10] Her accounting of Kant is generally sound. She presents a critical section on Kant (as well as other thinkers) that runs through the common objections to his claims. As Noddings approaches ethics and moral education from a broadly feminist perspective, feminist critiques of Kant are included in the work. Hegel is discussed in reference to John Dewey and his philosophical development, but sadly, not beyond this.

Jacobsen has the virtue of not running Platonists together with German idealists. In fact, he approaches the philosophers chronologically, and this has advantages, since the reader can see how the philosophers responded to one another. Kant and Hegel are

given separate chapters. We are treated to a short (but sadly, error-ridden) biography of each, followed by a brief exposition of their thoughts. In terms of Kant's run-in with the censor on the eve of the publication of what would become the first chapter of *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason,* several misleading statements are put forth, for example, "Although Kant was a champion of freedom of thought and expression, he remained silent on these issues, believing the will of the king to be more important than his inalienable rights."[11] As well, Kant is misleadingly described as having the categories lie in wait for sensory material (a charge, incidentally, with which Dewey concurs). Additionally, Jacobsen says that "Kant referred to these descriptions of reality, such as permanence vs. change, as categories, and he believed the mind imposed its own categories on the sensory experience of the individual,"[12] despite the fact that there is *no* category of change (though there is of substance, causality, and community) in Kant's table! Finally, he mischaracterizes Kant as maintaining that "ideas or knowledge are inherent in the mind and not necessarily learned." This reduces cognition to the status of thought-objects, which is precisely the criticism Kant levels against the Wolffians.

Jacobsen's discussion of Hegel also leaves us wanting. There are numerous biographical details that are incorrect; more importantly, the discussion of Hegel suggests his strongest influences are Platonic ones. While this may be true in the uninteresting sense that many (if not most) philosophers draw on Plato, it overlooks the actual fact that Hegel *consciously drew his inspiration not from Plato but Aristotle, Spinoza, Hölderlin, Schelling, and Kant*, together with the tradition of German mysticism. Furthermore, Jacobsen claims that:

> Hegel subscribes to the position that ideas are real. Ideals appear in or are formulated by the mind; therefore reality is composed solely of ideas in the mind…On the other hand, Hegel would argue that material things are less real because they have beginnings and ends and are therefore finite…. With this in mind, Hegel says ideas are more real than material things...[13]

This is patently incorrect. Ideas are real, but so are *material things*, and the point of the chapter on sense-certainty in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is to show the *irreducibility* of mind (self) and world (being). Further, Jacobsen uses the now-discarded ascription of 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis' to describe Hegel's dialectic, and downplays Hegel's commitment to religion. Sadly, for all of the talk of self-consciousness in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, Jacobsen misses the opportunity to discuss this in his pedagogical section. Jacobsen's construal of Hegel has him more of a Platonist than is actually the case.

Dunn's book does not discuss Kant. It does discuss Hegel in passing, in relation to John Dewey. What amounts to only a paragraph of information on Hegel is sadly riddled with errors. Dunn falsely characterizes Hegel as having a dialectics of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.[14] She claims that "Hegel believed that dialectical logic would lead to the

creation of the ideal state!"[15] Evidently unaware of Hegel's discussions of community or civil society in either *Phenomenology of Spirit* or *The Philosophy of Right,* Dunn seems to think that Hegel believed an actual state could be constructed out of the tissue of ideas.

Thayer-Bacon and Bacon's book is similar to Noddings's book in that it treats Kant in the context of ethics. Their exposition of Kant is the fullest of the group looked at here, and they have the advantage of discussing Kant's epistemological works in relation to his ethical ones. Unfortunately, their exposition also leaves us wanting. They claim Kant to be the last systematic philosopher of the Euro-Western world—a claim that might be news to Hegel scholars.[16] What they say about Kant's epistemology is largely confined to Kant's separation of known from unknown; they do not discuss Kant's talk of self-consciousness. Hegel is not covered, though he is mentioned in conjunction with Kant. When Hegel is discussed, it is in reference to Kant's shortcomings; Kant has not been able to overcome the force of Hegel's objections that his Categorical Imperative is ahistorical.[17]

On idealism, Ozmon and Craver's book is arguably the best of the bunch. There is a humility in the discussion that is absent from the other works. Specifically, the authors point to the pluralistic understandings that idealists have and the many differences between the various thinkers. They do characterize idealists as being concerned, for example, with self-realization and character education, but are quick to point out that these differ from thinker to thinker. They also include a critical section on the idealists, while the other texts do not. (Though Noddings, and Bacon and Thayer-Bacon do so with respect to Kant.) However, this section supplies the received view of idealism as bookish, intellectualist, elitist, anti-individualist, and generally unconcerned with social problems. As well, there are some disturbing claims, e.g., "Generally, idealists believe that ideas are the only true reality. It is not that all idealists reject matter . . . rather, they hold that the material world is characterized by change, instability, and uncertainty, whereas some ideas are enduring."[18] While this certainly applies to Plato's middle and perhaps late dialogues, it does *not* fit well with either Kant or Hegel's thinking.

Ozmon and Craver are correct to see Kant as recognizing the primacy of the self in thinking, but they conflate Kant's concept of phenomenon with an aspect of the thing-in-itself (which Kant does not). They also claim that "Each experience (phenomenon) of a thing is one small, additional piece of knowledge about the total thing (noumenon)."[19] This is also false; Kant does *not* conflate noumena with the total *thing*, as if there were an absolute thing in which all phenomena participate. On Hegel, they fare better. They are critical of the received view of Hegel's logic as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and they don't, as others do, consider mind and nature as separate, dualistic entities. They do, however, gloss the topic of Hegel's seemingly absolutist state, and this may lead readers to believe that Hegel *promoted* such a state.

Hegel's thought no longer holds the pre-eminent position it once held. One reason is that his system led to a glorification of the state at the expense of individuals. It led some of

his followers to believe in a mystical, foreordained destiny in the face of which individuals are powerless. In this view, individuals are mere parts or aspects of the greater, more complete, and unified whole: the state.[20] Unfortunately, the authors do not tell us who these followers are, nor how Hegel himself understood the state differently from them.

Taken together, these textbooks paint a sorry picture of German idealism. Several run Platonism together with German idealism. None discuss the other influences (Leibniz on Kant, Aristotle on Hegel, Spinoza on Schelling, or the role of Fichte in German idealism) that thinkers in idealist circles draw upon. In some cases, Kant is missing, even though he was a central figure (perhaps *the* central figure) in German scholarship. As well, most do not bother to discuss the criticisms of idealism, and those that do tend to repeat the received opinions without comment. When they do discuss these thinkers (specifically, Kant) they do so in the context of ethics and moral education, not epistemology or metaphysics. Most importantly, with the exception of Ozmon and Craver, they say little or nothing about the self, identity, consciousness, or self-consciousness. Though we cannot expect textbooks to comment extensively on criticisms, we must realize that, failing this, students leave the classroom with the impression that this is the *truth* about German idealism.

Ozmon and Craver and Gutek have the most detailed discussions of the various 'isms.' Ozmon and Craver rightly bring forward the chief concern and/or criticism of philosophy and education, namely, whether there is a logical connection between the two. Ozmon and Craver then dodge the question in claiming that, regardless, philosophers and educators have seen fit to develop programs, curricular content, and models of teaching and point back to their philosophical pedigree,[21] but this will not do. No accounting of the 'isms' in philosophy of education will ever satisfy the logical need for a coherent and consistent account of philosophy's relation to education and education's relation to philosophy. Only a self-developed, self-correcting edifice of philosophy of education can do that. However, neither Ozmon and Craver nor Gutek, nor any of the other extant primers on philosophy of education supply this.

3.1.3 The 'Branches' Approach

In this approach, the branches of philosophy take centre stage. Any further ideological and theoretical accounts take their points of departure from these branches. In effect, this places philosophy at the core of further interventions. Gutek seems to recognize this, as he begins his introduction with a nod to these branches, and he suggests that teaching, for example, arises out of accounts of these.[22] Yet, these remain constrained to philosophy, and are only related to education in the educational theories, for example, of perennialism, essentialism, progressivism, and social reconstructionism. The branches of philosophy are basic to further excursions in philosophy of education, and it will do to examine these in some detail before pressing the claim that they, and not the 'isms' of

educational theories, should be the point of departure for any novel philosophy of education.

Gutek identifies four branches, or "subdivisions" of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and logic.[23] What gives these their educational provenance is the questions they raise about educational theories and practices. For example, logic deals with the rules of correct thinking, and this has what seems to be immediate consequences for teaching and learning.[24] We would presumably want to get our teaching and children's learning in line with these rules of correct thinking if we are to cultivate better equipped students. From there, the consequences somehow segue into educational ideologies and theories. They "give substance to" and "guide" educational processes and curricular designs—although exactly how they do so is left as a mystery.[25] These questions are referred to the various 'isms' discussed in the chapters that follow and concern the educational aims and goals of each.

We have seen the problem with the 'isms' approach as regards idealism: in the hands of philosophical primers at least, it does a poor job of capturing the varieties of thinkers therein and the nuances amongst them. Not only that, but the individual 'isms' aims and goals for education turn out to depend on the specific thinker in question. This requires a sophisticated analysis of each thinker's contribution, which is generally not to be found in these primers, and probably ought not to be, given their avowed purpose of introducing teacher candidates to philosophical thinking in education. Such an analysis can be undertaken, however, and there are a variety of strong examples to show this, but even with an analysis as a guide to understanding this or that thinker's considered opinion on education, it does not get us any closer to a philosophy of education that would generate its own questions and answers. This is, after all, the goal. We must reconceive the relationship between the branches of philosophy and their role in supporting a novel philosophy of education if we are to make headway in this regard.

Rather than suggesting that the branches of philosophy act as springboards for important educational questions and concerns, I recommend they operate to give us *presuppositions* that inform both the methodology and conceptual content of a philosophy of education. Furthermore, I suggest that they serve as points of departure, not for educational issues and concerns, rather for the sorts of questions a philosophy of education would develop from its own, originary questions. For the branches of philosophy do not suggest questions that have their educational provenance stamped on them; they suggest presuppositions that serve as conditions for questions that in turn have deductive consequences. These consequences, in turn, have their specific instances. These instances are then gathered up in principles or kinds which identify them as educational (e.g., this or that specific instance of teaching and learning, or curriculum, or schools and schooling). What this means requires spelling out, and this is my task in the rest of this section.

The branches of philosophy are interrelated. We can say, for example, there is a logic to our metaphysics, or a metaphysics to our ethics. Likewise, there is a theory of knowledge to our ethics. The case for there to be an ethics to our logic, or a politics to our metaphysics, is more controversial. Certainly, our logic can aim at something highly valued—an intellectual virtue, perhaps—as it did for Plato and Aristotle, but there is also an argument to be made that certain logics—the logic of first-order predicate calculus, for example—is, or at least should be, unaffected by ethical normativity. This argument is even more compelling for politics, and it is of course my contention that politics should be kept as much as possible out of the other branches of philosophy.

Thus, while logic and metaphysics, for example, have strong roles to play in ethics and politics, it is not the case that ethics and politics have, or should have, strong roles to play in the former. Indeed, in the case of politics, we should avoid conscious affirmation of political claims in our logic and metaphysics. This is a difficult argument to maintain because on the one hand, I want to claim that each of the branches is irreducible—that it has its own intrinsic account, unaffected by the accounts of others—and at the same time, the branches are related in such a way that invoking a metaphysical account is to invoke a logical account. Thus, irreducibility and interrelatedness stand as contraries, if not contradictories. To further complicate affairs, while politics is not reducible to metaphysics or logic (for it has its own accounts, and its own content), the relation between it and them is partly hierarchical; they influence it, but it does not seem to influence them.

We might see the relationship between politics and metaphysics and logic as follows:



In this diagrammatic representation, metaphysics is partly dependent on logic (as method), and politics is partly dependent on logic and metaphysics (and ethics). The account of politics is irreducible in terms of its content (the questions asked and answered) but requires the conceptual conditions which logic and metaphysics supply to sustain itself. Indeed, if Aristotle and many others after him are right, politics is an outgrowth of ethics, which is itself partly dependent on accounts of logic, metaphysics, and the theory of knowledge.[26] Of course, this raises the question, what *is* the proper

philosophical content of politics? We can quite easily discern the proper philosophical content of logic, metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and even ethics, but if the relationship with politics is semi-hierarchical or even one-way, what content is there for politics? The answer is, the *deductive consequences* of logic, metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and ethics.

The relationship between ethics and politics is of tremendous importance here. Ethics has its questions in the deductive consequences of logic, metaphysics, and the theory of knowledge, and from these consequences, it forms novel questions. These questions in turn have their own deductive consequences, which form the basis for questions in politics. To say that politics (indeed, any of the branches of philosophy) is irreducible is to claim that its content is unique to it; yet its questions are drawn from the deductive consequences of ethics, which are itself drawn from the deductive consequences of the other branches of philosophy. The uniqueness of its content lies in its complexity; no other branch of philosophy brings the content of the other branches together with the determination of politics.[27] Politics unifies what is seemingly contrary in the other branches. Yet, politics is composed of the deductive consequences, together with their questions, of the other branches. The wherewithal of politics lies in its powers of unification, its capacity to resolve disparate and contrary propositions, claims, and concepts of the other branches by bringing them together. In this regard, politics *does* influence logic, metaphysics, the theory of knowledge, and ethics; it influences them as *politics*, that is to say, they are transformed under its rubric. They are what they are in terms of their accounts when considered isolated and independent, yet when considered by politics as politics, they become something else: at the risk of circularity, they become political. Indeed, this relationship of lower account to higher account is emblematic of the entire relationship of the branches; each branch functions to unify the accounts of the other branches while it remains irreducible. Thus, metaphysics is dependent on a certain logic to carry out its arguments, the theory of knowledge is dependent on a certain metaphysics in determining what counts as foundational, ethics is dependent on the theory of knowledge for its accounts of justification, and politics is dependent on ethics for its isolation of what is right and what is wrong. Each of these is dependent on the other, though none of these is defined wholly by the other. For each has its specific content in and for itself, and this remains even in the uptake of one to the other.

What, then, constitutes the inappropriate injection *ab extra* of a claim from one branch of philosophy to another, and why is politics such a dangerous example of this? To begin with an example: suppose we have a metaphysical premise injected into a logical account of philosophy of education. Our logical account—the one we have been working with in this book—is the methodology of hypothesis formation, deduction, and abduction. Hypotheses cast their deductive consequences, which are bivalent and biconditional. These in turn suggest their specific instances. A rule that includes all these instances is

generated and this serves as the kind or principle that is the formal concept under consideration. If we were to inject a metaphysical claim into the heart of the enterprise, let us say, 'all good argumentation is God-given or divine,' then we would be committed to saying that our methodology is divine. This would immediately conflict with the standing condition of our fallibilist and self-correcting methodology and would invite at least the prospect of contradictoriness, which, if it were shown to indeed be contradictory, would violate the very methodology we say is a *presupposition* of our logic.[28] It would, in effect, place a rival claim at the base of our account, with no means for adjudication.

Something similar, I am arguing, occurs when we place a political claim, concept, or principle at the heart of the methodological enterprise. The enterprise is now beholden to the claim, and no longer functions as a fallibilist, self-correcting model of philosophical inquiry. If we were to take the claim

> 'All children must be treated according to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,'[29]

we would be taking what *seems* to be an innocuous principle (and one which is broadly, if not generally, held) and injecting it *ab extra* into a philosophy of education. We would be saddling that philosophy of education with the expectation that, no matter what questions and consequences the philosophy of education develops, it will have to accord with the claim *ab extra*. It is to put the entire apparatus at the behest of the claim, with the consequence that the claim will drive the subsequent accounts. This injection of a claim *ab extra* into a self-correcting, self-supporting enterprise, *is* ideology.

While any injection of a claim, concept, or principle *ab extra* into a philosophy of education is disturbing, there are unsettling consequences associated with political ones. Political claims are often the most contentious and controversial, and for numerous reasons—not the least of which are the implications for the humanity, dignity, and moral personality of those affected. Schools and schooling in particular are susceptible to large political changes, and if philosophy of education endorses these *ab extra*, it will be held hostage to prevailing political influences and interests. This will not only reduce the shelf-life of the philosophy of education in question, but it will also make it less desirable (if not wholly unacceptable) to many that are suspicious of and/or do not share its aspirations. More trenchantly, it will have directed its accounts and operations to an end that has not been developed from its propositions, concepts, and meta-concepts, and this militates against its *philosophical* objective.

3.1.4 Branches over 'Isms': Pressing the Advantage

Following the 'branches' approach against the 'isms' approach provides us with some safeguards against the incursion of claims and concepts *ab extra*. For the 'branches' approach insists on the stepwise development of accounts of logic, metaphysics, the theory of knowledge, and ethics, all brought under the rubric of politics, all the while remaining substantially the same considered in and for themselves. The 'isms' approach does not provide this guarantee. We might consider in more detail how the 'isms' approach fails to resist the incursion of a claim *ab extra*, while the 'branches' approach, if modelled on the recommendations I suggest, is successful in this regard. Let us take, for example, the following claim:

> 'Without exception, children have the right to be educated in their families' religions.'[30]

Now let us choose one of the philosophies of education expressed by Gutek, namely, postmodernism. On Gutek's reading of postmodernism, accounts and claims regarding culture and religion are relative, not absolute, and differing cultural and social contexts determine the treatment of children.[31] If this is the case, such a claim as above will contradict certain leading claims of the postmodernist philosophy of education since the claim above is set in an absolute legal framework, whereas—if Gutek is to be believed—postmodernism adopts a relativist framework in which such absolutes are set aside. Existing claims and concepts, even those as accepted as the UDHR's position on religious upbringing, do not jibe with the philosophy of education in question. How will the philosophy of education in question handle the seeming contradiction? Will it suggest an ad hoc qualification to its general principle, or will it leave the contradiction in place, threatening the viability of the entire program?

Of course, all of this presupposes that postmodernism is amenable to incursions *ab extra*, or it sees itself as responding to this or that educational claim, practice, or concern. If it does not—if it sees itself as generating its own questions and concerns—then the conundrum above will not apply. However, if it sees itself as generating its own questions and concerns, then it is not postmodernist in origins, for it does not conform to the leading postmodernist principles or to the conclusions of the leading postmodernist thinkers. This is precisely how following a 'branches' approach to philosophy of education succeeds over an 'isms' approach: the former relies on philosophical presuppositions that are the point of departure for further accounts, whereas the latter is dependent on the various thinkers and ideas generated (often, contradictorily) under its rubric.

In the 'branches' model, each branch contains presuppositions that, in turn, inform the questions of philosophy of education. Logical presuppositions regarding the way methodology should be understood condition the actual formation of a methodology for

philosophy of education. Metaphysical presuppositions regarding the form and content of concepts condition the actual formation of concepts in a philosophy of education. A similar conditioning occurs for ethics and politics. The relationship between presuppositions and suppositions is not *causal*; presuppositions *do not cause us* to have suppositions. Suppositions are caused by other suppositions through the methodology of hypothesis formation, deduction, and induction.[32] Presuppositions *condition* suppositions by constraining their roles, range, and scope. Whereas in the 'isms' model, philosophers of education are free to choose amongst the varied contents of thinkers and thoughts, in the 'branches' model, presuppositions condition suppositions or hypotheses, and the method of hypothesis formation, deduction, and induction generates the leading concepts. The 'isms' model leads to arbitrariness in one's philosophy of education, and this weakens its reserve against incursions *ab extra*. Whereas the consistency and coherency displayed by the 'branches' model augurs for its resistance to any such incursions.

If, as I claim, the aim of philosophy of education is to define itself with regard to the self-sufficient and self-correcting use of its own questions and concepts, then the 'branches' approach to philosophy of education works better than the 'isms' approach. The 'branches' approach has the distinct advantage of allowing the philosophy of education to draw on presuppositions, rather than suppositions or claims dependent on further claims. Presuppositions are bedrock; they are not further reducible, and as such, can be referred to by the suppositions when questions of grounds and/or limits arise. This is not the case with 'isms,' which are dependent, for example, on the specific idealism in question, as well as a range of claims not always or even often agreed upon by idealists. The specific model I endorse consists in presuppositions from each of the branches of philosophy that serve to inform or condition the suppositions or hypotheses of the philosophy of education. These presuppositions also have the virtue of not contradicting one another; for example, the presuppositions of logic (methodology) are congruent with (though not coeval with) the presuppositions of metaphysics, ethics, and politics. Drawing on the presuppositions alone guards against the injection *ab extra* of claims, propositions, and concepts, which do not belong to the philosophy of education.

3.2 The Role of Logic and Metaphysics in Contemporary Philosophy of Education

Logic and metaphysics are underrepresented in contemporary philosophies of education. If, as I shall assume, it is immensely important to have a logic and metaphysics operating at the base of one's philosophy of education, this situation is little short of disastrous. How and why philosophy of education gradually diminished and abandoned its accounts of logic and metaphysics is a story too vast to tell in the confines of this book. Nevertheless, a recent scan of extant philosophies of education show that the diminution of each is indeed the case.[33] Here, it was shown that no topics involving logic or logical methods

directly factored in the research agendas of philosophers of education discussing their own research programs. While it may not seem to be within the purview of philosophy of education to dwell on logical and metaphysical issues, these nevertheless support the edifice of a philosophy of education and therefore demand exquisite attention if the philosophy of education is to be viable.

Attention to logic and metaphysics is important for several reasons, three of which I will discuss in some detail here, and more fully further on. To begin with, all philosophies of education must have some account of how they operate with and manage their various claims, assertions, propositions, concepts, and meta-concepts; there must be an account of logic that helps us to define of these terms and how they operate. There must also be a consistent logic for relating these to one another. How, for example, are failing concepts identified? How do we handle the reconstruction and jettisoning of concepts? What are the conditions under which these operations take place? What are the limits or boundaries for such operations? All these questions, and more, are answerable only with and through an account of the logic of the edifice. Further questions arise: What is the beginning and end of a philosophy of education? Are they to be found in a universal question concerning humankind,[34] a set of abstract and/or axiomatic premises about education,[35] or the daily lives of schoolchildren?[36] Why these and not other beginnings? Does a philosophy of education have a destiny? If so, what is it? If it does not, to what does it aim? What sort of method do we use to arrive at the beginning and end of a philosophy of education? Is this method itself metaphysical, and does it matter? Finally, to what do we refer challengers and critics of our philosophy of education? What component or aspect of the philosophy of education handles the criticisms? When a criticism as to this or that aspect of our philosophy of education is raised, what is the point of departure for a response? Do we turn to the logic and its attendant methods of our enterprise? To its beginnings and endings? Or, if it is to some component within the edifice, what makes this component assured? Without logic and metaphysics as crucial components of a philosophy of education, questions raised will remain begged, to the detriment of the overall edifice.

3.2.1 Why Don't We Pay Sufficient Attention to These?

It might be thought that other aspects or components of a philosophy of education can replace logic and metaphysics. This is perhaps one reason (though not the only one) why logic and metaphysics are hard to find in contemporary philosophies of education. As well, it might be thought that philosophy itself has done away with, or contributed less to, logic and metaphysics in the contemporary age, and that this is part and parcel of philosophy of education's moving away from giving these accounts. It might also be surmised that philosophy of education's landscape is no longer the same as it was 75 years ago when some attention to logical and metaphysical issues prevailed; instead,

philosophy of education follows the mainstream in scholarship, and this is the chief reason for the turn away from logic and metaphysics.

Now all of these are likely candidates as reasons for the departure. (Though not one of them, by itself, could account for the transformation in thinking.) As I think they all contribute to logic and metaphysics' demise, I will examine each of these in more detail. To begin with, it might be thought that contemporary philosophies of education can do without logic and metaphysics, or more specifically, that they can do without logical and metaphysical accounts of extant philosophers. I personally doubt any philosopher of education would claim that they have no need of a logic for their specific pursuit, therefore there must be some acknowledged or unacknowledged invocation of another philosophers' logical account. (The case for metaphysics is more complicated, as I will discuss further.) There obviously must be accounts of concepts, propositions, judgments, etc., that philosophers of education rely on, even if covertly. The question to be raised, then, is where do these accounts come from?

If, for example, the author of a philosophy of education writes in the Deweyan vein, following Dewey's philosophy of education, together with his logic, then it can be reasonably assumed that the author is invoking Dewey's logic for her own enterprise. Likewise if they follow Karl Popper, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, etc. It becomes more difficult to ascertain the specific logical invocation when the philosopher of education draws on multiple philosophers, or from outside the acceptable philosophical canon, or from other disciplines, such as English, Cultural Studies, Gender Studies, etc. No doubt there *is* a logical account at play here, but it may be difficult to pinpoint. Yet, getting clear on what logical account is invoked and involved, and making this a highlight of the overall edifice, is necessary if one is to be forthright and clear to readers and critics alike. The practice of deeply embedding one's logic in one's philosophy of education, or worse, assuming it and responding only when pressed, is unacceptable for a philosophy of education that presents itself as consistent and coherent.

Additionally, it might be thought that philosophy itself has done away with, or contributed less to, logic and metaphysics in the contemporary age, and that this is part and parcel of philosophy of education's moving away from giving these accounts. It is correct to say that issues in logic and metaphysics galvanize the philosophical academy less than they did in previous eras, but this is not to say that strong programs dealing with logic and metaphysics are nowhere to be found in philosophy. Symbolic logic has continued apace,[37] applied logic has become more and more of a force in philosophical logic,[38] and histories of philosophy focusing on logical accomplishments of thinkers maintain a significant readership.[39] Despite what seems to be a wholesale turn to neo-Marxism, Critical Theory, and Poststructuralist political philosophies and theories in the past 50 years or so, there remains a strong role for logic to play in philosophy.

The case for metaphysics is somewhat different. Mainstream metaphysical texts, or texts purporting to deal with exclusively metaphysical issues, were less abundant in the period after the Second World War and are only now attempting a comeback.[40] Nevertheless, the metaphysics currently put forward differs in several respects from what might be considered textbook metaphysics, not the least in abandoning the very question of ultimate beginnings and endings. It might also be surmised that philosophy of education's landscape is no longer the same as it was 50 years ago, when some attention to logical and metaphysical issues prevailed. On this surmise, philosophy of education follows the mainstream in education scholarship and this is the chief reason for the turn away from logic and metaphysics. This response, I think, gains the most traction, and it will do to look at it in a bit more detail than the others. It is a truism to say that what counts as academic subject matter in education has changed in the last 50 years. The range of topics that academics in education consider has vastly expanded from the standpoint of the 1970's. This range has also expanded for philosophers of education. Since its disciplinary inception in the 1920's, philosophy of education has always considered itself in relation to issues and concerns of theory and practice; it has always been the case that philosophy of education was responsive to existing forces in education.[41] The pace at which philosophy of education has responded to existing concerns has accelerated;[42] so too has the depth into which philosophy of education immersed itself in these pursuits. In particular, philosophy of education has become more politicized than ever before.

Continuing in this vein, the almost wholesale attention to issues and concerns of educational theory, policy, and practice masks a corresponding diminution of interest in issues of logic and metaphysics. As logic and metaphysics are largely internal to philosophy of education, they seem, at least at face value, removed from the more important (and fashionable) issues and concerns of educational policy and practice. The issues and concerns I have in mind here are both political and politicized; they invoke and involve legislative, policy-related, institutional, and organizational mandates, and are very often responded to with countervailing legislative, policy-related, institutional, and organizational imperatives. This entire spectrum of 'call and response' is *ideological*; claims and mandates are imported wholesale into educational theory and practice, and these become the linchpins on which further programs, policies, and practices, turn.[43] Educational theory, policy, and practice, is thus unable to avoid the injection of ideological claims and mandates, i.e., claims and mandates inserted *ab extra*. The spectacle of education is thus one appearing to us as ideological to its very roots.

We are faced with two broad attempts in contemporary philosophy of education to deal with logic and metaphysics: the first is to avoid them entirely (which turns out to be impossible), and the second involves invoking them silently by drawing on one or another existing philosopher or philosophical account. If we adopt the first, we risk either the edifice collapsing under the weight of scrutiny or susceptibility to ideology as a result of

the lack of presuppositions that condition the various claims, statements, and propositions. If we adopt the second, we risk either the importation of an account that is not consistent or coherent with our own philosophy of education, or we are faced with the spectacle of a logical or metaphysical account as if ex nihilo when criticism prevails. Neither attempt is acceptable for a philosophy of education that would be consistent, coherent, and conceptually aligned.

As it is the thesis of this chapter that accounts of logic and metaphysics are necessary for a philosophy of education that would claim consistency and coherence, it should come as no surprise that if what we want is a coherent and consistent philosophy of education - a philosophy of education that does not fall apart when subjected to criticisms—none of the purported reasons for the demise of these accounts in the contemporary era are satisfactory. Indeed, no good reason can be given to support this demise. What does a philosophy of education that privileges its logic and metaphysics look like? Answering this question will take us through an examination of what was important about logic and metaphysics in the short span (approximately 100 years) of institutionalized philosophy of education, as well as the criteria needed for an account of how philosophy and education and logic are to relate. We will begin with logic and, in a separate section, follow with metaphysics.

3.2.2 Logic

If, as I suggested in *Problems*, we confine our examination of philosophy of education to that time when it was made self-conscious through the establishment of organizations, programs, and publications, we shall find that logic was never a strong concern. What counted as a strong concern was education as a social-political institution, and this included its teaching and learning, curriculum, and schools. Nevertheless, leading philosophies of education had accounts of logic, or at least, logical methods which they used, and in some cases, extolled. Dewey's philosophy of education, for example, extolled an experimental logic, one in which no a priori principles were to be found. Instead, Dewey offered "postulates" that had their worth in the operations they performed in and for abstract and universal concepts, as well as generic propositions, or kinds and classes.[44] Herman Harrell Horne's philosophy of education proceeded with a dialectical methodology, one in which opposing conceptions were reconciled in a larger concept that had the power to maintain the opposition of the other two, while overcoming them both.[45] Neither Dewey nor Horne paused to consider a formal account of logic as appropriate for philosophy of education, although they nevertheless did admit the claims and assertions of a presumed one.

Attention in the 1960's and 1970's to specifically logical topics and logical methods took place under the aegis of analytic philosophy of education.[46] The logic inherent in teaching and learning began to garner attention amongst philosophers of education. Robert

Ennis's work on developing a logic for teaching, Green's *The Activities of Teaching*, and John Passmore's *The Philosophy of Teaching*, for example, contained specific content involving logical arguments and methods.[47] Ennis's work in particular was notable for the attempt to educate teachers in logical thinking as well as to promote the instruction of logic amongst academics. These thinkers did not develop a full-fledged logical program for philosophy of education. Instead, they stressed the rhetorical advantages of attending to logic and logical methods, together with the importance of providing logical instruction to teachers who would then display strong logical skills and teach these to their students. Though there are rules of elementary logic that each thinker finds important enough to highlight for teacher instruction (and certainly, for philosophy of education), there is nowhere a concerted attempt to develop a specific logic of, or for, philosophy of education.

It will do to provide some specific examples of logical accounts in philosophy of education with the aim of demonstrating their overall applicability to teacher education. Robert Ennis's *Logic in Teaching* is perhaps the greatest example of an attempt at providing a logical schema for the practice of teaching—a practice that involves hypothesis formation, deduction, induction, the establishment of symbolic representations in place of ordinary language, syllogistic logics, and the logic of first order predication.[48] Unfortunately, Ennis does not establish a corresponding metaphysics, nor the required schemata for a philosophy of education. More hopeful in this latter vein is George Kneller's *Logic and Language in Education*, which treats education to a conceptual analysis of its important terms and definitions.[49] Kneller's book has the virtue of claiming that all educational policy and practice derives from a philosophy of education, though admittedly, this is no longer a popular claim.[50] However, his extension of logic to philosophy of education does not include a stand-alone logical theory, nor a methodology for philosophy of education to undertake. Nor, incidentally, does Harvey Siegel's later *Educating Reason*.[51] Siegel's book deals broadly with the justification of critical thinking against those that would take a sceptical standpoint. Siegel's aim is not to develop a logic for philosophy of education, but rather to show the epistemic worthiness of critical thinking. Others have invested in logical arguments to support one or another claims regarding ethics, morality, autonomy, and the uses of reason.[52] A logical theory of erotetics (a logic of questions) in teaching has also been put forward.[53] In none of these cases, however, is a philosophy of education developed.

Paradoxically, part of the reason for the paucity of logical accounts in philosophy of education is the lack of a sense of need to buttress corresponding accounts of metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and ethics.[54] In fact, I cannot find a single philosophy of education, with the exception of Dewey's, that has a logical account (including an accounting of methods involved in the philosophy of education) robust enough to support accounts of metaphysics, the theory of knowledge, and ethics. Philosophers of education very often concentrate on the latter two but forego the others. A stand-alone account of

logic is very well and good, but by itself it is incomplete unless it is bound together with these other accounts. This certainly applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to epistemic and ethical accounts. On the other hand, a set of logical claims does little in the way of a philosophy of education if it is merely driven towards a specific educational problem or concern. The other part of the reason is the attention to issues and concerns within education, broadly understood, with a corresponding lack of attention to issues within philosophy of education. Specific issues and concerns within education but outside of philosophy of education will demand not a full account of logic, rather a set of claims suited to that issue or concern. This militates against a logical account that would buttress a philosophy of education.

Now, there may be good reason for the above. Logic is different than other branches of philosophy in that it is given over to formulae, rules, theorems, etc., as well as being amenable to symbolic representation. Indeed, logicians are encouraged to use specific representations, formulae, and rules when investigating their problems. The total account of logic, whatever that may look like, is relatively unimportant in this regard. What matters is whether the problem at hand can be solved. So, there is a strong argument for philosophers of education to use logical formulae, principles, theorems, etc., to solve pressing educational issues, e.g., the nature of critical thinking. For example, consider Cantor's axiom for pairs:

> 'Given any sets A and B, there exists a set, denoted by {A, B} which contains A and B as its only elements. In particular, there exists a set {A} which has A as its only element.'[55]

According to this axiom, there would be a set of predicates that have only these, and no other, predicates as its element. Predicates such as hungry, inattentive, and restless, would be the sole predicates (duly symbolized) in a set that might be called a triad. This would be useful to those logicians that map the use of language in concept-formation and operation in educational contexts. However, this is not coterminous with a logical account for philosophy of education, and this is, after all, what is wanted. A philosophy of education will have a logical account that buttresses the overall branches of philosophy therein; it will have an account that supports the propositions, claims, assertions, and concepts of the meta-concepts, teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling. Individual formulae, axioms, principles, theorems, etc., brought to bear on specific issues *cannot* supply this need.

I am tempted to call the use of components of existing logical claims, accounts, programs, and theorems for educational issues and concerns (with reservations) 'cut and paste logic.'[56] We might imagine a philosopher of education who uses Dewey's discussion of judgments in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* without appropriating—or at least implying the appropriation of—the entirely of the latter's account of universal and generic propositions.

This would be tantamount to 'cut and paste.' I have no idea how often this happens in our scholarship, but my guess is frequently. For a philosophy of education that would be consistent, coherent, and indeed, systematic, this will not do. A methodical appropriation of logic is demanded and must be provided. We will want to keep this in mind as we move to our next section.

3.2.3 Philosophical Presuppositions

A presupposition is a bedrock claim about this or that state of affairs.[57] We can go no deeper than a presupposition to further ground or analyze the claim.[58] A *philosophical* presupposition, on the other hand, I understand as a bedrock *condition* that is *necessary*, in that any and all suppositions are dependent on the conditions it sets. For a presupposition, this necessity is categorical, not hypothetical.[59] We could not establish the supposition without the conditions set by the presupposition, for the presupposition is the very condition in and from which a supposition operates. For example, Russell had the entirety of his early papers on sets in mind when writing the *Principia Mathematica* with A.N. Whitehead (1910-1913). We might have the entirety of Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* in mind when formulating our logical account of a philosophy of education. The philosophical presuppositions must undoubtedly be congruent with all those axioms, postulates, claims, and assertions accepted by the community of logicians in researching and operating with logic, but there is more. How logic is operationalized must be front and centre of any discussion of its use in a philosophy of education, and this requires certain conditions to be in place for logic's execution. It does little good, for example, to invoke Cantor's axiom of pairs if no corresponding set of rules is provided for how and when it is to be used, or what the limits or boundaries of its usage are. Needless to say, if we want to avoid question-begging, we should limit the amount and frequency of presuppositions we involve and invoke in our philosophy of education.

As it has its role in grounding and conditioning these further concepts, a presupposition acts as a point of departure. A philosophical presupposition for philosophy of education might be:

> 'All concepts that operate in (this) philosophy of education are subject to the conditions of hypothetical necessity and fallibility.'

Each concept that is formulated in this philosophy of education will therefore have this condition as part of its make-up. The origin of this presupposition is dependent, in turn, on the bent or temperament of the philosopher of education in question. What I mean by this is, whereas one philosopher of education might take a broadly pragmatist direction in her use of presuppositions (as above), another might take a more Aristotelian or Thomistic approach. Still another might take a manifestly Derridean approach. As to presuppositions, the field is wide open.[60] What is important are the logical conditions that

follow on those presuppositions, e.g., are the suppositions that follow logically conditioned by and from these presuppositions? Do they align? The relationship between the presuppositions and suppositions must be one of constraint by the former on the latter, and this must be evidenced in the analysis of every supposition in the philosophy of education.

Another important consideration is that logical presuppositions must relate and not contradict metaphysical, knowledge-theoretic, and ethical presuppositions. If, for example, one of the logical presuppositions invoked is

> 'There is no such thing as an 'either-or' claim that is justifiable,'

then the very possibility of contradictory claims is ruled out. All of these will be shown to be congruent under some specified circumstance. So, the corresponding presuppositions of metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and ethics must also bear this condition. All presuppositions will have to be shown to be united in some greater whole. (Perhaps this will be the metaphysical presupposition!) Presuppositions across the branches of philosophy need not be, and indeed, are not logically *equivalent*, but they must be logically *congruent*. This means there must be some logical mechanism posited to reduce or remove contradictions amongst the claims, assertions, and concepts involved in them.

Philosophical presuppositions, then, are at the disposal of the individual philosopher of education who instantiates them as grounds or conditions for the further branches of philosophy, as well as the specific propositions, concepts, and meta-concepts with which they work. This almost guarantees that individual philosophies of education differ as to their grounds, and (internal) aims and ends. Philosophical presuppositions, as bedrock, do not alter even though the philosophy of education's suppositions—its hypotheses and concepts—do. There is a one-way line from presuppositions to suppositions, though there is obviously a negative feedback loop from suppositions as hypotheses and concepts, to further concepts and meta-concepts, and back. This loop takes on the characteristics of a retroductive posit, as discussed in Chapter One: the larger or meta-concept posits congruence amongst the various concepts, including single propositions, claims, and assertions. This in turn widens their extensive capability, which generates more and deeper meanings. We might take the following diagram of a logical presupposition as instructive:



With this, we have the wherewithal to condition a set of suppositions for the philosophy of education that will serve in the formulation and operation of subsequent concepts.

We must not confuse philosophical presuppositions and their suppositions with the original questions and hypotheses of the philosophy of education. Although these run parallel to one another, they are not the same. The former concern the specifically philosophical edifice of the philosophy of education; the latter concern the content—the questions, hypotheses, deductive consequences, specific instances and their kinds, classes, and principles—or what the philosophy of education purports to demonstrate and maintain. Presuppositions work beneath the surface and provide the ground and conditions for the content that is built up through the asking and answering of questions. To see that this is the case, we must now look at the relationship between the presuppositions and suppositions of a philosophy of education and its method of asking and answering questions through hypotheses formation, deduction, and induction.

3.2.4 Hypothesis Formation, Deduction, Induction

We see immediately the role of presuppositions and suppositions in naming the procedure by which we establish questions and consequences leading to principles. For the method established is a supposition that has its presupposition in a set of claims and accounts made by Charles Saunders Peirce, and specifically, the role and scope of scientific method.[61] The presupposition in this case leads to a supposition that it is the best method of ensuring the tentative and fallibilist nature of the concepts under discussion. From here, an account of the role of method in bringing out questions and their consequences may be established. Although the method concerns a cycle that is

also a negative feedback loop (with recursive properties), I will treat each of the phases separately. To begin with, let us look at the enterprise as a whole:



As participating in a negative feedback loop, the generalized principles are always tentative; they are never fixed and final. They work to grasp their instances until instances abound that cannot be grasped, or a rival principle proves itself worthy to capture the other principle's instances. In either situation, on the failure of the generalized principle, a new hypothesis is formed. This in turn leads to new deductive consequences, leading to new instances of those consequences, and finally, a new generalized principle.

I want to look at the relationships amongst each of the phases separately. Let us begin with the hypothesis. Hypotheses take the universal, hypothetical 'if-then' form. Thus, they operate as subjunctive conditionals.[62] Their condition is always one of hypothetical, not categorical, necessity.[63] The relationship of the hypothesis to the deductive consequences is as follows:



To give an example of an original question from *Problems*,

> ‘If we are human, then we engage in social transmission by receiving from elders and passing to children.’

From this, the following deductive consequences may be noted:

1. The establishment of a means to socially transmit facts, norms, roles, etc. from elders to children.
2. The establishment of the end or aim of engaging in social transmission.
3. The development of social institutions (families, relations, groups, formal institutions such as schools, etc.) to engage in social transmission.

As the consequences are deductive in nature, they are tautological; they do not provide any new facts or suggest any new claims beyond the hypothesis itself.

There are, as we discussed in the first chapter, two further logical conditions at play in this relationship: *bivalency* and *biconditionality*.[64] Bivalency concerns the truth or falsity of the hypothesis; it is one or the other. Bivalency is thus a hallmark of two-valued logic. Putting forward the hypothesis is tantamount to claiming it as true; it is a taking-true of the claim, which will be evaluated for its ability to produce instances that are grasped by and through a generalized principle. The deductive consequences follow the hypothesis in that they are conditional on its truth and the hypothesis is conditional on their truth. This situation is biconditionality, the second condition of the relationship. We might think of the first relationship, bivalency, in terms of this schematic representation, with A and B as the two alternatives: [65]



Secondly, this Venn diagram represents the biconditional:



where the dark blue area counts for true. The hypothetically necessary condition of this relationship must once again be emphasized. Truth and falsity are tentative and depend on their capacity to withstand further incursions by instances that follow from deductive consequences or rival concepts that do a better job at including these instances. Either of these situations demand jettisoning or reconstruction of the principle.

Deductive consequences portend specific instances. That is to say, the material consequence in question is a specific instance of the hypothesis. If the hypothesis is,

> 'Children in schools will demonstrate successful completion of all required evaluation materials,'

then the specific instances will match the deductive consequence of this. So,

> 'All children demonstrate successful completion of all required evaluations materials,'

as the consequence, captures this and that specific instance of children demonstrating successful completion. Specific instances are possible as well as actual; in an ideal system, deductive consequences portend specific instances that are possible, though not (or not yet) manifest as actual. So, for example, the deductive consequence,

> 'All propositions in this system are congruent with one another,'

demands all possible instances prove congruent with one another. The question of possibility vs. actuality is dependent on the hypothesis. If the hypothesis concerns an actual state of affairs, then the specific instance is actual. If the hypothesis concerns abstract relations, then the specific instance is ideal and possible, unless and until it is

manifested in an actual specific instance. The important consideration is that the specific instance follows directly and logically from the deductive consequence.

Specific instances, whether possible or actual, are gathered or included under a principle, which is a universal or general.[66] This is of course, the process of induction. The gathering of like instances is a matter of probability, not an all-or-none affair. It is a matter of prediction, in which likelihood of *this* specific instance being of a kind with *that* specific instance, is predicted. This is demonstrable in and through a relative frequency distribution.[67] The worthiness of the principle stands or falls on the predictive power of the kind in question to gather and include its instances. Weak predictive powers, as measured by a correlation coefficient,[68] augur for the failure of the principle, since there are numerous instances that will require ad hoc hypotheses on the part of the principle to accommodate extraneous specific instances. Strong predictive powers augur for success of the principle, together with the likelihood it will continue to grasp its specific instances.

Inductive or generalized principles, therefore, are never all or none; they are stronger or weaker. The stronger the correlation coefficient, the more power represented in the ability of the principle to grasp its intended instances. The weaker the correlation coefficient, the less power. Weaker principles must supplement their waning powers through a process of ad hoc hypothesizing. Here, qualifications are added to the principle. Let us take, for example, the principle of discipline, as a feature of the meta-concept schools and schooling. A strong principle will grasp specific instances of the deducted consequences of a hypothesis such as, 'discipline in schools consists in practices of calling out and shaming.' If the kind—discipline—is inclusive of this, specific instances of calling out and shaming will be grasped by the principle and the principle (at least in this regard) will have strong predictive powers for such instances. When questions arise as to whether calling out and shaming are indeed forms of discipline (and not something else entirely), ad hoc hypotheses must be appended to the principle such that 'the kind, discipline, includes all of the specified practices except calling out and shaming.' The predictive power of the kind declines in proportion to the number of exceptions. Gradually, the kind is whittled down by these qualifications and collapses under its own weight.

The failure of a kind or principle is to be noted in its weak or absent predictive power. More acutely, it is felt in the inability to grasp specific instances of that which it is designed to grasp. This necessitates jettisoning or reconstruction, and both involve the establishment of a new hypothesis in place of the old principle. This is tantamount to Peirce's doubt-inquiry model of scientific method.[69] The new hypothesis is more than a mere qualification appended to an old principle; the novel reconstruction is a significant departure from its previous form. In the example above, if the old principle or kind is discipline, and it contains calling out and shaming, then the new hypothesis will not only not have these instances as a condition both for itself and for its deductive consequences (though this by itself would merely be an ad hoc adjustment), but radically reconstrues

what counts as discipline. For example, associated practices logically linked to shaming and calling out, would also be excised from any possibility of becoming consequences of the hypothesis. A hypothesis of the following sort might be put forth: 'If discipline is to be undertaken, it must not engage in practices that undermine the dignity and moral personality of students.' This would in turn, have its consequences deduced, with specific instances following on these.

3.2.5 Role in Overall Philosophy of Education

The role played by such a method in philosophy of education is to ensure consistency and coherency across the range of propositions, statements, assertions, concepts, and meta-concepts, together with the provision of a flexible and self-correcting enterprise for novelty in grasping instances. There is a descriptive claim as well as a normative one here. The descriptive claim consists in saying that the method of hypothesis formation, deduction, and induction, together with the requisite philosophical presuppositions (e.g., Hegel's account of reflection, Peirce and Dewey's logical theories), ensures consistency and coherency across the range of concepts. So, we should be able to demonstrate that the negative feedback loop established by hypotheses, their deductive consequences, and the specific instances of these consequences, influence the general principle and all subsequent hypotheses that arise from the failure of this principle. The normative claim consists in saying that we must follow such a method *if* we wish to ensure consistency and coherency across the edifice of our philosophy of education. This latter claim is itself a hypothesis that has its deductive consequences and specific instances that follow. Thus, it has tentative force, and hypothetical necessity at best. Demonstrating it to be the case requires the establishment of a general principle from specific instances - a general principle that can fairly grasp these and do so under predictive circumstances. As many other propositions, concepts, and meta-concepts (including teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling) are involved in the establishment and maintenance of this hypothesis, it would have to align with these, and in no case contradict them. This would be a tall order for any hypothesis that would purport to establish the operative capacity of its edifice, and I suppose, is the fundamental concern of any edifice that would proclaim itself a philosophy of education.

3.2.6 Metaphysics

The case for metaphysics is somewhat different than for logic. Whereas almost everyone would admit the importance of some logical theory (and certainly, some logical rules) for their philosophy of education, together with some account of how arguments are made and what counts as good and bad examples of these, I am not convinced that there is the same standing attached to metaphysics. Though metaphysics has a storied history in philosophy, it does not have such a history in philosophy of education.[70] Furthermore,

there was a pronounced anti-metaphysical bent to philosophy as practiced in 20th century Anglo-America. As well, continental philosophers in the latter half of the twentieth century in Anglo-America were often viewed as anti-metaphysical. For example, structuralists and poststructuralists on the continent were often read back as anti-metaphysicians in Anglo-American circles (incorrectly, as it turns out).[71] This has begun to change. Post-analytic philosophers have re-discovered Kant, Schelling, and Hegel; better readings of the poststructuralists emphasize their metaphysical proclivities, and a turn to realism, including its metaphysical bases, is now upon us. In philosophy of education, however, except for re-readings of seminal figures (most recently, Derrida), there is little to show for this.

Note that I am *not* advocating a nostalgic return to a by-gone era, nor a flight to some mythical metaphysical land, nor am I advocating for the re-emergence of philosophy as a wholesale metaphysical enterprise. I am, however, advocating for a turn to, if not return to, *metaphysical questions* in philosophy of education. Yet, to do so, to see the question philosophy of education asks (and answers) as inextricably metaphysical, is to re-examine its history with the aim of answering the questions, where and how metaphysics became important. As it turns out, there are no developed metaphysical accounts in philosophy of education, though there are metaphysical answers to educational questions.[72] What we find in the case of the former is discussions of this or that philosopher's account of metaphysics, and its establishment as a set of claims for the pressing educational issue. Occasionally, we find a philosopher of education who gathers a set of claims from disparate thinkers and brings these to bear on an educational concern. There are some significant examples of this in the literature, a few of which I will highlight.

A good place to begin, of course, is with Dewey. He famously eschewed metaphysical claims and arguments in his philosophy of education and preferred to set his claims in the context of experience and specifically, the experiences of children and teachers. When Dewey encountered metaphysical claims, it was often in a critical vein, and when he did support them, he preferred to focus on their social and communal upshots.[73] In contrast, idealists in the later half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th were avowedly metaphysical. Karl Rosenkranz's *The Philosophy of Education* began from immutable principles of society and socialization;[74] W. T. Harris's *The Psychological Foundations of Education* followed in the main the prevailing cultural epoch theory of society, which for him was indebted to Hegel's organic development of the community from the individual.[75] H.H. Horne's *Philosophy of Education* drew exclusively on the metaphysical unity and wholeness of nature to claim that education was a biological and cultural imperative.[76] In each of these latter cases, a prior metaphysics (in this case, an idealist metaphysics with its assumed source in Hegel) was drawn upon and specific claims were produced that were then put into service describing and/or interpreting educational ideas and practices.

Almost all subsequent philosophers of education noted the importance of metaphysics (at least in terms of its claims) for making sense of certain questions in education, as well as its importance for certain historical philosophers and their accounts. There were generally three ways in which philosophers of education dealt with metaphysics and its attendant issues and concerns. The first was to include a specific chapter on metaphysics and the issues it brings to education.[77] The second was to present philosophies of education as a set of 'isms,' each with its own account of, or approach to, metaphysical issues and concerns.[78] The second way proved far more popular (and more successful) than the first, and it has become a mainstay of philosophy of education texts. (We discussed the 'isms' approach in the previous section of this chapter.) The third way was to concentrate on issues and concerns specific to educational theory and practice and tease out the metaphysical implications of these. This too, has proven popular, especially with primers and survey-level texts.[79]

The issue-driven approach to metaphysics in philosophy of education has its charms. To begin with, it gets to the heart of matter, or at least the claims proximate to the issue under scrutiny. If one's issue is school discipline, then metaphysical claims regarding the inherent depravity of the human condition, or claims involving the child's inherent dignity and moral personality, are most valuable. These can then be isolated and an attempt made to show where they play a role in the defence or criticism of the practice, or they can be used to show where the practice comes up short. Not surprisingly, many—if not most—of the metaphysical claims under examination play a role in ethical issues.[80] Questions of human nature, what is right and wrong, which norms and behaviours children are learning, the ways in which children learn these norms and behaviours, and the like, are often invoked in attention to these issues.[81] For example, if it can be established that a leading principle or practice in education rests on a (faulty) metaphysical presumption, the way is clear for a challenge, if not a reconstruction.

We must be wary, however, of saying what we do when we attend to metaphysical claims in educational issues and concerns is the formulation of an account. We are merely attending to a claim that has its roots in some metaphysical presumption, whether about human nature, ethics and morality, or the political management of peoples. Part of the problem is no doubt the lack of corresponding accounts of logic, theory of knowledge, and ethics and politics. Without these accounts in place, it is exceedingly difficult to develop a systematic account of one branch of philosophy. I think that a deeper problem is at hand. There is a disconnect between metaphysical claims that serve educational issues and concerns that can be summarily exposed to the good of the overall practice, and metaphysical claims that are embedded in our ways of approaching what counts as an issue or concern and which are difficult for us to reveal. The operating premise here is that (to paraphrase), 'all educational issues and concerns are metaphysical.'

Unfortunately, we are loath to examine these, for they may turn out to disrupt or damage our philosophies of education.

Metaphysics in this latter understanding is something of a hornet's nest: we want to get rid of it, but we do not want to bring it down at the risk of getting stung. Unfortunately, the only way to thoroughly interrogate metaphysical claims is to come face to face with them. This means examining not only the claims, but the accounts from which they stem—in other words, not just the hornets, but the nest itself. Few make this attempt. In the established understanding of what philosophy of education is and does, it is only necessary to stomp out individual claims. On this understanding, when we proceed from issues and concerns back to metaphysical claims and propositions, we need only deal with those that directly influence the theory or practice at hand. We do not (or do not find the) need to investigate the entirely of the account. If we were to investigate the entirety of the account, we would likely find ourselves coming to the same conclusion, for we surmise the individual claim is indicative of the account, and since the claim is problematic, so too is the entire account. This is an entirely understandable approach to metaphysics, but it is in the end, unjustifiable. It commits the same problem that much attention to logic in philosophy of education commits: cut and paste. It involves the extraction of an individual claim from the broader context and the criticism of this claim without due attention to that context, including the related claims and propositions. Instead of taking the entirety of the context into consideration, it deals almost exclusively with those claims that are no longer acceptable for our times and situations.[82] However, this is an unacceptable approach: what we require to do justice to any metaphysical claim we encounter is nothing less than a full investigation and (re)interpretation of its context.

3.2.7 Towards a Methodical Appropriation of Metaphysics

Since the cut and paste approach to metaphysics in philosophy of education is untenable, a different method must be developed. As with logic, philosophical presuppositions of metaphysics are the condition for further suppositions. Unlike presuppositions, suppositions are fallible; they are testable and replaceable. Suppositions operate as hypotheses, which have deductive consequences that are bivalent and biconditional. These consequences, in turn, generate specific instances, ideal and practical, that are then included in a general principle of kind. This principle has its operational worth in its ability to gather and include these instances. Failure is the inability (judged through predictive power) of grasping its instances. I will discuss this methodology with attention to the role played by metaphysical presuppositions as conditions on its origin, role, and scope.

3.2.8 Presuppositions

Since presuppositions are bedrock conditions, and ideological claims are e*x hypothesi* forbidden in a philosophy of education, no stand-alone claim that does not invoke a constellation of other claims is acceptable as a presupposition. What this means, in effect, is that an entire program is demanded of any claim that would be a presupposition for philosophy of education. We cannot, for example, simply take as a presupposition the claim, 'all educational practices tend toward the good.' As a claim that serves as a ground of further claims, it is in this form ideological. What would be required to forestall ideology is to admit an entire account of how practices tend towards the good, including an account of the good itself. As a hypothesis, the claim might otherwise bear fruit, but in the guise of a presupposition it is ideological. *Indeed, there are no stand-alone metaphysical claims that can be considered as presuppositions without operating in an ideological fashion.* Claims about 'this is the way the world is,' or 'this is how education should/must be understood,' are ideological if placed in the guise of presuppositions. Instead, it is better to think of presuppositions as conditions any further hypothesis must meet—here we are on surer and safer ground. For these presuppositions will align with the presuppositions of other branches of philosophy—including logic—and serve to support these and their associated hypotheses. Furthermore, they establish no claim about this or that state of affairs other than conditioning further claims and commitments as hypotheses to be formulated.

Philosophical presuppositions for metaphysics, as conditions to be met in all hypotheses that would operate in a program of philosophy of education, both invite and invoke corresponding claims that together form the backdrop to that program.[83] The specific conditions I wish to consider presuppositional are transcendence and immanence. These two presuppositions are in fact, twinned, and to invoke one is to invoke the other. As these presuppositions ground the specific suppositions of the philosophy of education that I am interested in putting forward, it will do to spend some time discussing these at some length. Transcendence is to be understood as the appeal to a domain unavailable by ordinary cognition, requiring some sort of (transcendental) ideal to establish cognition's reach to that domain in identifying and sometimes explaining what it does not have the concepts to handle. Immanence is the enfolding or embracing of cognition in a larger and overall schema—a schema that can handle contrary propositions, concepts, and meta-concepts by revealing their otherwise invisible relations. Of course, these conditions are more complex than might be suggested in this summary, and I will refer to some of these complexities, below.

In *Problems*, transcendence was dealt with in part through a discussion of *descriptive metaphysics*: a metaphysics that inventories the basic principles involved in an account of reality. This idea stems partly from Kant and his interpreters, and partly from P.F. Strawson and his account in *Individuals*.[84] A descriptive metaphysics is a transcendental

metaphysics insofar as the principles under discussion are involved and invoked in any account of truth and reality, and what lies behind principles is a commitment to the ground or condition of *necessity* they provide to these. Descriptive metaphysics consists in the limits of the concepts that are operative in the overall edifice. We may think of descriptive metaphysics as tantamount to the limit-conditions of these concepts, including their role, scope, and operations. A descriptive metaphysical account is one in which the inventory of concepts is assessed according to each concept's operations, reach, and limitations. A descriptive metaphysics, in examining its concepts, has as its condition, *transcendence*, because it is to an account of *necessity* that we turn to answer the questions of a concept's limits.[85] I want to specifically discuss the role of transcendence as a condition for all questions, including questions of origin in the philosophy of education; the principles of reality that I am interested in are those involved in a philosophy of education, and these are generated by the logical method discussed above.

Transcendence, as I understand it, concerns *the approximation to* truth and reality. Charles S. Peirce famously described the relationship of existent scientific findings to the truth, asymptotically, as a function:[86]

$$y = a + b/x$$

The scientific community gets closer and closer to the ideal limit of truth and reality with more and subsequent experimentation, leading to more accurate predictions, with higher and higher correlation coefficients, until the state of affairs examined is thoroughly predictable under all possible and actual circumstances.[87] Of course, we do not get beyond approximating the truth, as the truth is a coefficient of a statistical relationship. What we have is a *regulative ideal*: an ideal of truth and reality and what it would mean to capture these. The idea as I understand it is broadly Kantian and Peircean; where our cognition cannot go (or cannot go far enough), we must have recourse to an ideal in which truth and reality inhere and/or are realized.

The transcendental purport of a philosophy of education is to be found in the ideal limit of this or that concept or meta-concept. For example, the meta-concept teaching and learning has sufficed in philosophy of education since at least its inception,[88] and has been a consistent practical concept since at least ancient Egypt and Greece. There is every evidence to suggest it will continue to do so, but we cannot know with absolute certainty the likelihood of its continuation. What we can do is predict it as closely approximating its certainty based on all the events in which it has been invoked and has captured its specific instances. Thus, as a meta-concept, it more than proves its usefulness. We establish its truth and certainty in accordance with an ideal limit, in which the meta-concept approximates the truth and reality of teaching and learning, inclusive of its ideas and practices. Transcendence always implies a limit beyond which our knowledge cannot go. It represents to us the unknown: the domain where absolute truth

and certainty lie. We can have an idea of this domain and what it would take to have knowledge of it, but we cannot know it, nor can we know what is in it, i.e., truth and reality. Transcendence thus serves a vital purpose; it limits our pretensions to absolute truth and reality of any finite scientific claim. It acts as a boundary beyond which we engage in hubris. It also serves as a sort of end to which all our knowledge, all our claims, propositions, concepts, and meta-concepts, tends. Ultimately, however, it is accessible only in thought, and never *in actuo*.

Immanence, on the other hand, is the power that certain concepts have as unifiers of others. The very notion of a constellation suggests its immanent provenance. So too does enfolding, inclusion, and a host of other metaphors to describe the situation in which a larger concept encompasses a smaller or lesser one. Immanence is a presupposition because it is not further grounded in a separate condition; it is a way—*the* way in this characterization of metaphysics—that concepts relate to one another. Let us take the example of the relation of concept to its meta-concept. For example, we have, with Freire, the large and complex concept, 'pedagogy of hope.'[89] This concept is nested in a further concept: teaching and learning. We are of course, calling this latter concept a meta-concept. It is a meta-concept insofar as it nests the larger concept, 'pedagogy of hope,' and others like it, within.

Immanence works in conjunction with transcendence on this model. What is immanent is what is made available to us by way of cognition. We can know what is immanent because what is known is always already known in reference to a larger or meta-concept. Human dignity and moral personality, for example, are already known in the larger concept, 'pedagogy of hope,'[90] and this is already known as a component or aspect of the meta-concept, teaching and learning. Thus, the condition of immanence provides cognitive support to concepts that rest within the larger or meta-concept. This is done through relating the concept to other concepts within the constellation, i.e., these concepts align. They are logically congruent, meaning that even though they appear as contraries, they are not contradictory, and can be brought together under the larger concept. The power of an individual concept lies not only in its intension (ability to grasp its instances) and extension (range), but in its place within a larger or meta-concept.

The relationship of immanence and transcendence is vital in accounting for their mutual place and role as metaphysical presuppositions of a philosophy of education. Immanence serves as the standpoint in which transcendence is overcome. Admittedly, this idea borrows heavily from German idealism and the various accounts of the two therein.[91] With transcendence, the limitation of the concept augurs for a transcendental domain in which regulative ideals, or 'as if' principles, operate to give us the sense of what lies beyond our cognitive limitations. We obviously cannot know with certainty whether diurnal hunger causes children to do poorly (or less well) on comprehensive examinations, but we can certainly predict with ever closer approximation its likelihood. Absolute certainty, or a

prediction of 100 percent, is akin to a regulative ideal or ideal limit. What immanence does is supply us with a larger concept—a meta-concept—in which absolute certainty is understood as not just a matter of further and closer absolute approximation, but a finite, actual realization.[92] In fine, it gives us the concept of what consists in an actual case of absolute certainty with respect to this or that claim. So, we have a concept—a principle—of certainty with respect to the claim, and not merely an idea of what the concept would look like, or an 'as if' characterization of its force. This principle of certainty is, of course, tentative; as with all concepts in the philosophy of education, it has its limitations. It takes itself as certain, as truth. Even though, in grasping its instances, it is far from certain (for these change), it takes itself as certain because it is certain of its grasp on the instances it contains and of its capacity to actualize these. The point bears repeating: an immanent standpoint differs from a transcendental standpoint in so far as it is a concept with operative force that serves to actualize the claim, proposition, or concept, and is not merely an ideal that suggests the limits of certainty yet goes no further.

An example will do here. Suppose the 'pedagogy of hope' has an immanent role to play as regards 'all children have dignity and moral personality.' This means that within the 'pedagogy of hope,' dignity and moral personality are not merely 'as if' ideals, but they have actual and operational force. To bring them under the auspices of the 'pedagogy of hope' is to immanentize them, and this means to align them with every other concept contained in the 'pedagogy of hope.' All concepts under the larger concept must logically align, i.e., they must be congruent. They can be contraries, but only to one another, and not to, or under, the larger concept; under the larger concept, they can never function contrary to one another. Under the 'pedagogy of hope,' two rival claims, 'child A's dignity is served by introducing her to her heritage in bondage,' and 'child B's dignity is served by introducing him to his heritage as a settler,' are made congruent. These cease to be mere contraries when placed in the domain of the larger concept.

3.2.9 Transcendence, Immanence, and Deductive Consequences

Together, transcendence and immanence serve as the philosophical presuppositions for any metaphysics involved in a philosophy of education. It is now incumbent on us to examine how presuppositions condition suppositions, and this leads us once again to the methodology of a philosophy of education. We may refer to the diagrammatic representation earlier charted for logic. The relationship of presupposition to suppositions for metaphysics follows the same pattern as it does for logic: there are deductions of the presuppositions set forth, and these deductions serve as conditions for any further suppositions. In our case, deductions follow from the transcendence and immanence as conditions of the philosophy of education. From transcendence we get:



For immanence:



We could go further with our deductions. The important consideration here is that all subsequent propositions must be aligned with transcendence and with its deductive consequences, which serve, in turn, as conditions. The same obviously goes for immanence. With these consequences as conditions, we have the basis to begin formulating suppositions. It is the case that all claims, propositions, assertions, concepts, and meta-concepts that follow from the conditions set by the presuppositions of logic and metaphysics have their metaphysical roots in transcendence and immanence. The establishment of these presuppositions ensures that the overarching conditions for every further proposition and concept are guaranteed and that propositions and concepts that do not meet these conditions cannot and will not serve in a philosophy of education.

3.2.10 Role in Philosophy of Education

The role of immanence and transcendence in philosophy of education should by this point, be obvious, but perhaps it will do to spell it out further. The presuppositions of metaphysics tell us how to understand the role of concepts in terms of their limits. This is important because the limit of the concept is the boundary of its operations. It is the point beyond which the concept cannot go, and the point beyond which the concept no longer operates as it should. Transcendence, as a presupposition, invokes issues and notions of certainty, absoluteness, comprehensiveness, and grasp. It also gestures to the beyond of the concept, i.e., what lies without. Perhaps most important from an operational viewpoint, it suggests what needs to be in place for the concept to realize itself, or function *in actuo*. This, of course, invokes other concepts, other relations which it must have to carry out its operations. Immanence, on the other hand, gestures to the overall unity which conceptual operations supply to the various lower propositions, principles, and concepts. It suggests that even contrary concepts can be reconciled under the aegis of a larger, more complex concept, and that contraries do not necessarily imply the failure of the concept.

We are saying that all concepts, small and large, including all claims, assertions, statements, propositions, and their meta-concepts, have transcendence and immanence as their metaphysical conditions. Concepts are limited and self-limiting, approximating truth and reality as an ideal limit, and they are under the auspices of greater concepts, which supply them with relations to other concepts that then serve as their actualizer, making them certain in terms of their operation.[93] *No concept in a philosophy of education does without these two presuppositions and the conditions they set out.* For every concept encountered in a philosophy of education, there is the corresponding assumption that it is understood in terms of the standpoints of transcendence and immanence. From the standpoint of transcendence, it will always remain limited, and the idea of it approximating to truth and reality, aspirational. Whereas, under the constellation of concepts and meta-concepts, it will emerge as a vital concept in and through the condition of immanence, in which it is fully operational and suited to grasp its instances. In a Hegelian flourish, from the standpoint of immanence, it is certain of itself.

3.2.11 From Presuppositions to Suppositions: The Role of Necessary Conditions in a Philosophy of Education

Cut and paste logic and metaphysics operates similar to ideology, that is, as a claim, assertion, statement, proposition, or concept torn from another context, another program or account. Cut and paste logic and metaphysics are *ab extra* and placed into an existing edifice of philosophy of education, where they surreptitiously drive that philosophy of education towards an end that is not consistent with the overall edifice. We of course,

want to avoid this at all costs. Metaphysical presuppositions, as necessary presuppositions that generate conditions that all suppositions must meet, goes at least some of the way in avoiding this peril. To see that this is the case, we will need to further discuss the ways in which presuppositions relate to suppositions, that is, how logical and metaphysical conditions operate on and for the suppositions that arise in a philosophy of education. We begin with the originary questions discussed in the earlier part of this chapter. Recall, these were,

1) What is the nature of the process of the social transmission of the (normative) features of human existence from one generation to another?

2) What subject matter is necessary for the cultivation of the person-in-community-in-society (including cosmopolitan society) that is in accord with the answer(s) to the question of teaching and learning?

3) What aims, ends, and make-up (structural and interpersonal) must the school possess to carry out of the obligations of teaching and learning and the curriculum as set forth in questions 1 and 2?

These originary questions are bedrock as far as philosophy of education is concerned. Out of these arise its suppositions. We are saying that each supposition that arises from these questions has its conditions established in logical and metaphysical presuppositions that have no further basis or reducibility. The methodology of the movements of the concept, from the simplest claim all the way to the meta-conceptual constellations of teaching and learning, the curriculum, and schools and schooling, is conditioned by the logical presuppositions. As regards their concepts, all suppositions are equally bound to the conditions of transcendence and immanence.

Presuppositions dictate the necessary conditions that concern logic, metaphysics, and indeed, all the branches of philosophy. All suppositions are grounded in these presuppositions and their conditions, which are the bedrock. The *content* of the suppositions does not spring from philosophical presuppositions, although their *form* does. What I mean is that the suppositions must be in line with the formal constraints the presuppositions place on them, which in the case above, are the methodology of hypothesis formation, deduction, and induction, and metaphysics of transcendence and immanence. The relationship is one way: the presuppositions are never amenable to modification, and this is what is meant by having necessity as their central characteristic. They do not change or transform under varying circumstances—only suppositions do. Presuppositions and suppositions are different kinds: every presupposition, whether logical, metaphysical, ethical, or socio-political, is bedrock and does not transform. Every supposition is hypothetical, flexible, and amenable to reconstruction or jettisoning.

Since presuppositions and suppositions are different kinds, there can be no straightforward development of a supposition from a presupposition. Suppositions develop only from other suppositions, which have their origin in basic questions, as above. Presuppositions may intimate certain extant accounts of logic, metaphysics, ethics, and socio-politics, and even empirical accounts such as science and social science, as preferable to others. However, the relationship is indirect, not direct. Nevertheless, all our suppositions leading out of original questions are susceptible of the conditions placed on them by the presuppositions of the philosophy of education. Failure to abide by this constraint renders the entire edifice susceptible to ideology. If, for example, the suppositions do not follow the logical constraints placed upon them by the presuppositions of methodology, the likelihood of a claim or proposition introduced *ab extra* with no recourse to its reconstruction or jettisoning augurs for an ideological operation within the edifice. Let us once again, examine the presupposition, transcendence:



Notice that the deductive consequences that follow from transcendence apply as conditions for all operative concepts in a philosophy of education and not as suppositions that follow from original questions. In other words, consequences such as ‘all claims have their ideal limit’ concern the constraints placed on any concept in a philosophy of education, and not the actual content of that concept. We must keep in mind the difference between presuppositions, which have their consequences in logical, metaphysical, ethical, and socio-political constraints on suppositions and suppositions, which are the concepts operative within a philosophy of education.

Cut and paste logic and metaphysics are prevalent in contemporary philosophy of education. In this enterprise, philosophers of education take a claim, proposition, or concept from among one or many specific philosophers or schools of thought and insert

that claim into their account of an educational issue or concern. The insertion is often context-less, and as such, has no dependence on the conceptual fabric from which the claim is torn. It takes on an ideological patina in its capacity to serve subsequent claims. This will not do for a philosophy of education. What is instead demanded is a presupposition for logic and metaphysics that supports—and does not thwart—the suppositions that are formulated through that philosophy of education's methodology. This means that the presuppositions for logic must result in the conditioning and constraining of the method, and the presuppositions for metaphysics, the establishment of conceptual limits and conceptual unity and wholeness. Indeed, the very movement of hypothetical claims through to their deductive consequences, and again to their specific instances which are generalized to a principle, presupposes the conditions of method, limits, unity, and wholeness.

Philosophy of education operates with a method and a set of limits that serve to define its concepts. This method and these limits in turn define the how and what of specific moments and movements within. The method of hypothesis formation, deduction, and induction common to philosophy of education is the linchpin on which the formulation and development of all concepts turns. The transcendence and immanence of claims, propositions, concepts, and meta-concepts is the metaphysical condition in and through which all concepts within the philosophy of education obtain their limitations and self-realizations. Their limitations are to be found in their inability to do more than approximate their truth and reality; their self-realizations are to be found in their ability to relate to other propositions, other concepts, under the auspices of a larger or meta-concept, which brings together seeming opposites in unity, and assures the concepts' meaningfulness as a vital, operative force in the overall edifice.

Notes

1. In what follows, I use the term ‘ground’ and the term ‘condition’ synonymously. We might also say that the term ‘determination’ is included in this. All of these, however, are distinct from the term ‘cause’ in order to maintain the distinctness of these terms from the notion of efficient causation.

2. Gerald Gutek, *New Perspectives on Philosophy and Education* (Columbus, OH: Pearson, 2009), 11. Gutek does not pause to explain why Marxism is not a philosophy, nor for that matter, Critical Theory.

3. John Brubacher, “The Challenge to Philosophize about Education, Modern Philosophies and Education,” in *The Fifty-fourth Yearbook for the National Society for the Study of Education*, 289-322 (Chicago: National Society for the Study of Education, 1942).

4. Howard Ozmon and Samuel Craver, *Philosophical Foundations of Education*, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill Prentice Hall, 2003), 11.

5. Richard Moser, “Perennialism in Education,” *History of Educational Journal* 2, no. 3 (1951): 80-85.

6. Gutek, *New Perspectives on Philosophy and Education*, 18.

7. Gutek, *New Perspectives on Philosophy and Education*, 18.

8. Gutek, *New Perspectives on Philosophy and Education*, 21.

9. Gutek, *New Perspectives on Philosophy and Education*, 21. The picture Gutek paints of idealism is less like Hegel and more like the neo-idealists of Great Britain, for example, F. H. Bradley.

10. Nel Noddings, *Philosophy of Education* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). This text is likely the most popular amongst the variety of primers available to teacher candidates.

11. David Jacobsen, *Philosophy in Classroom Teaching* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2003), 151.

12. Jacobsen, *Philosophy in Classroom Teaching*, 152.

13. Jacobsen, *Philosophy in Classroom Teaching*, 168.

14. Sheila Dunn, *Philosophical Foundations of Education* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2005), 183.

15. Dunn, *Philosophical Foundations of Education*, 183.

16. Barbara Thayer-Bacon and Charles Bacon, *Philosophy Applied to Education: Nurturing a Democratic Community in the Classroom* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1998), 103.

17. Thayer-Bacon and Bacon, *Philosophy Applied to Education*, 107.

18. Ozmon and Craver, *Philosophical Foundations of Education*, 14.

19. Ozmon and Craver, *Philosophical Foundations of Education*, 23.

20. Ozmon and Craver, *Philosophical Foundations of Education*, 26.

21. Ozmon and Craver, *Philosophical Foundations of Education*, 6.

22. Gutek, *New Perspectives on Philosophy and Education*, 3.

23. Gutek, *New Perspectives on Philosophy and Education*, 10. Why not politics and/or political philosophy? Perhaps, as with Aristotle, Gutek sees politics as the outgrowth of ethics.

24. Gutek, *New Perspectives on Philosophy and Education*, 6.

25. Gutek, *New Perspectives on Philosophy and Education*, 10.

26. Aristotle, *The Politics and the Constitution of Athens*, trans. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

27. Aristotle, *The Politics and the Constitution of Athens*.

28. I will discuss presuppositions more fully in Section 2 of this chapter.

29. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx

30. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx

31. Gutek, *New Perspectives on Philosophy and Education*, 139.

32. The metaphors of informing and conditioning are deliberate. Within the limits set by the presuppositions, suppositions, or concepts, emerge from original questions. The use of the term ‘grounds’ is *not* to be understood causally, as if grounds are what cause effects to somehow come into being. ‘Grounds’ is used in the Kantian sense as the condition (Kant uses the term ‘form’ in German) for all further judgments. See Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason,” in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*, ed. and trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), B 98-99. What the specific constraints are is a question taken up in the next section.

33. Matthew Hayden, “What do Philosophers of Education do? An empirical study of Philosophy of Education Journals,” *Studies in Philosophy of Education* 31, no. 1 (2011): 1-27. A quick scan over the last 10 years shows the situation remains roughly the same as it did in 2011.

34. Joseph Dunne, *Back to the Rough Ground: Practical Judgment and the Lure of Technique* (Bloomington, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).

35. Robin Barrow, *Plato and Education* (New York: Routledge, 2014).

36. We may consider Phillip Jackson, *Life in Classrooms* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1990) and Phillip Jackson, *The Practice of Teaching* (New York:

Teachers College Press, 1986) as exemplary of grounding teaching and learning, as well as the curriculum, in the daily activities of pupils.

37. There are a number of journals devoted (almost) exclusively to formal logic. These include *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, *The Journal of Mathematical Logic*, *The Journal of Logic*, *The Review of Symbolic Logic*, *The Annals of Pure and Applied Logic*, and *The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*.

38. Journals include *The Annals of Pure and Applied Logic*, and *The Journal of Applied Logics*.

39. For example, *The History and Philosophy of Logic*, and *The History of Philosophy of Science*.

40. The metaphysical positions of leading poststructuralists (e.g., Derrida) are beginning to take on currency, and the revival of a materialist metaphysics amongst neo-Marxists is also underway. Meanwhile, isolated programs, such as Speculative Realism, have captured the attention of a new generation of scholars.

41. The development of the JDS and PEA in North America are redolent of this.

42. Boler, “An Epoch of Difference.”

43. I discuss the overall outlines of ideology in Chapter One.

44. John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, *The Later Works of John Dewey Vol. 12*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 253-254.

45. Herman Harrell Horne, *The Philosophy of Education: Being the Foundations of Education in the Natural and Mental Sciences* (London: MacMillan, 1910). Like Harris before him, Horne had the tendency to equate philosophy of education with the science of education, including individual and social psychology.

46. D.C. Phillips, “Interpreting the Seventies, or Rashomon Meets Educational Theory,” *Educational Theory* 50, no. 3 (2000): 321-338.

47. John Passmore, *The Philosophy of Teaching* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). Chapter Two of Passmore’s *The Philosophy of Teaching* is given over to issues of logical development of concepts.

48. Robert Ennis, *Logic in Teaching* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969).

49. George Kneller, *Logic and Language in Education* (New York: Wiley, 1966.) A similar project might be thought to take place in R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters, eds., *Education and the Development of Reason* (London: Routledge, Kegan, Paul, 1972), especially the second major section: Reason.

50. George Kneller, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York: Wiley, 1971).

51. Siegel, *Educating Reason*.

52. Dearden, Hirst, and Peters, eds., *Education and the Development of Reason* is a landmark text in this respect. Epistemic aspects of morals and ethics, and attitudes and tempers of critical thinking, etc. are well represented in Parts 1 and III.

53. C.J.B. MacMillan and James Garrison, *A Logical Theory of Teaching. Philosophy and Education*, vol 1 (Springer, Dordrecht, 1988) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3067-4_10

54. By this I mean full accounts of each and not simply an account of one or another. Epistemic accounts in Analytic philosophy of education abound, although in my estimation they do not pay sufficient attention to the logic though which they are developed.

55. David Bostock, *Russell's Logical Atomism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

56. The reservations are directed at those that draw on philosophical and/or mathematical logic that asserts *no overall program or theory*, rather individual claims.

57. See also the discussion in Chapter One

58. Collingwood, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. My understanding and use of presuppositions comes from Collingwood's analysis of absolute presuppositions. Absolute presuppositions are bedrock; they operate much like creeds in religious contexts. Collingwood had the creedal understanding of the Trinity as the presupposition for the idea of history as it is understood in the West.

59. A categorical presupposition would be one that is necessary and unavoidable for the supposition. A hypothetical presupposition would be one that is tentatively necessary, though it can be proven false under certain circumstances. Presuppositions as we understand them here are categorical; they are not part of the system of hypothesis, deduction, and induction to which the concepts in a philosophy of education belong. Here, I am thinking of Kant's distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives in Section II of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals," in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*, ed. M. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Chris Martin has discussed how categorical presuppositions have been used in philosophy of education from R.S. Peters to his own work on ethics in Christopher Martin, *Education in a Postmetaphysical World: Rethinking Educational Policy and Practice through Juergen Habermas' Discourse Theory* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012). Martin's understanding of the categorical imperative is different than mine. Whereas his hews more closely to Kant's notion of a rule or principle, mine consists in a presupposition of conditions that limit further concept-formation, as I discuss more fully in a later section of Chapter Three.

60. Though, obviously, not for the propositions and concepts that follow on, or are conditioned by, these presuppositions. These propositions and concepts are grounded in these.

61. Charles Saunders Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” *The Essential Peirce*, vol 1, ed. N. Hauser and C. Kloesel (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 124-141.

62. Here, I follow Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. But it should be said that Dewey himself follows Peirce on abduction.

63. Churchill, Introduction to Logic.

64. Cheryl Misak. Truth and the End of Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

65. https://tex.stackexchange.com/questions/282092/analytic-tableaux-smullyans-style

66. C.S. Peirce, “Induction, Deduction, and Hypothesis,” *The Essential Peirce*, vol 1, ed. N. Hauser and C. Kloesel (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 188-200.

67. For Peirce and Dewey, relative frequency distributions were the leading understandings of probability distributions available. The idea was, the more instances in the data set, the more confidence in approaching full probability or its converse. Asymptotic progression to truth or reality, for Peirce, is roughly analogous to approaching full probability, r = 1.

68. When r (the correlation coefficient) is near 1 or −1, it is strong. When it approaches 0, it is weak.

69. C. S. Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” and “The Fixation of Belief,” *The Essential Peirce*, vol 1, ed. N. Hauser and C. Kloesel (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992). Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*.

70. Here, I am thinking of Kaminsky and White, as against Muir. I am also thinking of *Educational Theory*’s edition devoted to the first 50 years of its history, published in winter 2000.

71. I count early commentaries on Derrida, such as that by Jonathan Culler, as well as leading interpreters such as Peggy Kamuf, as giving us a distorted view of Derrida’s standpoint on metaphysics as one of absolute denial under the rubric of ‘the metaphysics of presence.’ See Jonathan Culler, *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982); Peggy Kamuf, *Signature Pieces: On the Institution of Authorship* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).

72. These answers were generally supplied in the latter half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th. Thinkers such as Harris, Rosenkranz, Horne, and Bogoslovsky were at the forefront of providing metaphysical responses to educational questions. For an overall account of the role of idealism in Anglo-American educational thought, see J. Donald Butler, *Idealism in Education* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

73. E.g., Aristotle’s claim that all men are rational and politics is the master science is taken to mean all men are social and therefore inherit their customs, etc., from their social group.

74. Karl Rosenkranz, The Philosophy of Education.

75. W. T. Harris, The Psychological Foundations of Education.

76. H.H. Horne, Philosophy of Education.

77. J. Haldane, "Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Education," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 23, no. 2 (1989): 171-183. Haldane discusses this with respect to older primers in the philosophy of education.

78. Noddings, Ozman and Craver, Jacobsen, and Gutek's introductory texts all direct attention to this approach, as we have seen in the earlier section of this chapter.

79. T.W. Moore, Philosophy of Education: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1982).

80. For example, in the *Oxford Handbook to Philosophy of Education*, under the section, "Moral, Value, and Character Education," each of the authors traces existing concerns in educational theory and practice back to metaphysical questions. See Harvey Siegel, ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Similarly, the *Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Education* deals with issues of theory, historical figures, and practice, but has no section on metaphysics. See Richard Bailey, Robin Barrow, David Carr, and Christine McCarthy, eds., *The Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Education* (Sage Publications, Inc., 2010).

81. Ryan McInery, *Philosophy and the Metaphysical Achievements of Education* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), makes a similar argument for the role of childhood development, including formalized learning, in the development of rationality. McInery follows a number of leading post-analytic scholars in his assessment of reason and its development in children. In this regard, his text is similar to David Bakhurst, *The Formation of Reason* (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).

82. A good example of this concerns the reading of Kant's theory of morality. In stressing only the Categorical Imperative as the Command of Practical Reason, Noddings has narrowed the focus to one issue that sits among a range of issues important for Kant, including the role of free will and determinism, which the Categorical Imperative (as moral lawfulness) is designed to address. One exception (and there are few in philosophy of education) is Joseph Dunne's *Back to the Rough Ground*, which skillfully discusses Aristotle without creating an anachronism of him, or injecting present understandings into his corpus.

83. The specific program I am thinking of here is that of German idealism, although any philosophical presuppositions of metaphysics will invite and invoke a program.

84. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*; Graham Bird, *The Revolutionary Kant* (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 2006); P.F. Strawson, *Individuals: A Study in Descriptive Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959).

85. This seems to me to be what is missing from extant discussions of metaphysics and/or transcendentalism in philosophy of education. Discussions of necessity do come up in exhortations on the topics of reason and critical thinking. Peters provides the classic response: a form of argument that involves and invokes abstract standards by

which ordinary human beings can appeal is required, even if the particular answers are unconvincing. Later thinkers (Siegel, Stefaan Cuypers, Martin, Walter Okshevsky) follow this general dictum. However, this is different from transcendentalism as a presupposition to a philosophy of education, which provides no specific ground, but rather a set of conditions on the hypotheses that follow. I will discuss this issue more fully in the Epilogue. See R.S. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (London: RKP, 1966), 114.

86. Peirce, "The Law of Mind," *The Essential Peirce*, vol 1, ed. N. Hauser and C. Kloesel (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992).

87. Peirce, "The Law of Mind."

88. And long before this, if we are to believe James Muir.

89. Freire, *The Pedagogy of Hope*.

90. Freire, *The Pedagogy of Hope*, 8-9.

91. Schelling, *The System of Transcendental Idealism*, trans. P. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Hegel, The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline: The Science of Logic.

92. The absolute in Absolute Certainty is a specific, time and concept-limited claim to certainty given all the conditions the Concept has grasped in its self-awareness. It is not an eternal and fixed grasp of everything there is, or of all history. Rather, the Absolute takes itself as certain and gives itself the moniker 'certain,' and for that matter, the moniker 'Absolute.' The enfolding of history in its freedom is not Absolute subjectivity - it is rather obverse. See Hegel*, Phenomenology of Spirit*, Chapter 8: Absolute Knowing, trans. T. Pinkard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

93. The certainty here has to do with their fitness to serve, and not some eternal and fixed condition or end. It designates them as fully equipped to order their instances. Only the presuppositions themselves have metaphysical certainty as regards concepts.

Epilogue

Scholarship and Implications

A careful reviewer has prodded me to discuss two related (and important) issues arising from this unique reconceiving of philosophy of education: associated scholarship and implications. Although I was somewhat loath to respond, at least initially, I now see the benefit for a discipline that is so closely tied to practice as to seem in some manner inseparable. The first issue concerns scholars in philosophy of education that take, or have taken, the transcendental turn. This turn concerns foundations for further epistemic concerns, e.g., concepts, moral principles, virtues, as well as attitudes and dispositions such as autonomous thinking, intelligence, open-mindedness, curiosity, and their role and scope in education and particularly, schools. The second concerns what implications, if any, can be intuitively and/or immediately drawn from presuppositions such as the logical and metaphysical ones discussed in the previous chapter. As I will attempt to show, though these issues are germane to an overall program of philosophy of education that places great weight on presuppositions, they cannot be adequately dealt with until a full range of presuppositions are in place. I will discuss these two concerns in some detail and proceed to discuss the fuller range of presuppositions (including the logical and metaphysical presuppositions we have already discussed) to show the folly of attempting to forecast the implications ahead of the establishment of these.

Scholarship

The logical and metaphysical presuppositions of *Meta-Education* may superficially appear transcendental. This is a mistake, as I will later show. Yet, there are certain features of these presuppositions that invite such a conclusion. To begin with, they appear to be from nowhere: they appear to have no further foundation or anchor that yokes them to a related concept. They appear to be rock bottom. Indeed, for the purposes of *Meta-*

Education as a program, I have characterized them as such. They therefore share a trait common to the transcendental, to wit, their resistance to any further grounding. However, they are not transcendental, either in the Platonic understanding as heavenly and eternal, or in the Kantian sense as noumenal, absolute rules or principles. They are neither ideas that hold the furniture of the universe together, nor rules to be identified with our rational nature. As presuppositions for the concepts and meta-concepts that go into *Meta-Education*, they are absolute: but this absolutism is more *creedal* than transcendental, as I will discuss.

I have discussed, though briefly, some thinkers invoking transcendentalism and the transcendental in philosophy of education, including R.S. Peters, Harvey Siegel, and Chris Martin. A brief canvass of the existing scholarship on transcendentalism in philosophy of education highlights the profound impact of Siegel, Stefaan Cuypers, Martin, Okshevsky, as well as the previous scholarship of Peters, Richard Dearden, Paul Hirst, and the so-called analytic school.[1] Working on various topics in philosophy of education (rationality and reason, critical thinking, ethics, and political justification of educational policies and practices), this loose assemblage of scholars draws on a shared understanding of the importance of transcendentalism and transcendental arguments. Some scholars, such as Siegel, draw quite heavily on the analytic traditions in philosophy; others, such as Cuypers and Martin, on the earlier scholarship of Peters and his acolytes. Still others, such as Martin and Okshevsky, draw on Kant and neo-Kantians such as Juergen Habermas, as well as the broader analytic and post-analytic tradition. What unites these thinkers is their attitude towards, and use of, transcendental arguments. They all appeal to an argument premised on transcendental understanding of grounds, together with the importance of grounds as reference for these. In the Kantian and neo-Kantian approximations of this, a universal condition is revealed at the heart of discourse. This condition is unassailable. While there may be functional conditions for specific discourses, discourse generally has as its condition a universal rule of principle. As each and every specific discourse takes place in the context of a general discourse, and the universal condition, rule(s) or principle(s) condition all discourse, specific discourses fall under the auspices of the universal condition.

The claims for presuppositions in *Meta-Education* are not coeval with this understanding of the universal condition, or its abstract principle(s) and rule(s). The presuppositions of logic and metaphysics, for example, imply the concepts and meta-concepts they presuppose. There can be no talk of their existence outside and beyond the concepts and meta-concepts they undergird.[2] This is the great advancement of German idealism over rationalistic philosophies: while there is indeed an ungrounded ground that serves as foundation for all further concepts, this ground is nothing without the concepts it grounds.[3] On the argument of German idealism, transcendentalism attempts to vitiate this conclusion, with the consequence that it cannot support what it presupposes without

lapsing into a vicious circularity. The Kantian attempt at a self-grounding ground (best developed as Practical Reason) itself turns on the human capacity for rationality and the argument devolves on just what it means to be a rational creature, acting morally. To avoid the seeming circularity of transcendentalism, the presuppositions of *Meta-Education* suppose only those concepts and meta-concepts of *Meta-Education*. Presuppositions of other programs in philosophy of education vary insofar as they support those programs. The presuppositions of those programs will not match the presuppositions of *Meta-Education*, for there are *no universal presuppositions of philosophy of education* that can dictate each and every program that could conceivably be developed. As such, the foundationalist inclinations of transcendentalism broadly understood are rejected by *Meta-Education* in favour of a more coherentist model that emphasizes the presuppositions though in their conceptual context.

Implications

All of the above augurs for a set of presuppositions that imply the program they undergird. This is not a straightforwardly philosophical program if that is to mean a search for and description of the furniture of the universe. It is a program of, and for, education. The establishment of presuppositions is for a conceptual scaffolding I am calling *Meta-Education*, and not for a one-size-fits-all transcendentalist undertaking. I hope to have made this clear here and in the previous chapters. One implication that stands out is that *there can be no transcendental ethical or political consequences arising from the presuppositions alone*. Ethical and political consequence must develop organically in and from the concept-formation that presuppositions condition. They cannot be allowed to appear otherwise. This differentiates the program of *Meta-Education* from otherwise associated programs in philosophy of education. Whereas many other programs in philosophy of education have a detailed set of implications for policy and practice, or at the very least, a detailed proposal for encountering these, *Meta-Education* does not. Nor can it, for to do so would be to establish consequences ahead of developed concepts and this is precisely the seductive practice of ideology.

While political implications of most existing philosophies of education (e.g., Cuypers, Martin, Okshevsky) favour broadly social-liberal and democratic policies and practices and do so from the vantage point of their philosophical findings, *Meta-Education* does not. *Meta-Education takes no position on these policies and practices unless and until they develop in and through its conceptual framework* and this is the key difference between transcendentalists and others closely allied in the pursuit of ethics and politics of justice, and *Meta-Education*. It is best to say that *Meta-Education* offers no concrete implications, for it has not yet built itself sufficiently to offer these, whereas other programs in philosophy of education have done so, though at the risk of exposing themselves to ideological constraints. What *Meta-Education* can incorporate into its existing folds of

concepts and meta-concepts is guided by its presuppositions, together with the intensional and extensional capacities of its various concepts as they encounter existing policy and practice. However, this license, this permissibility/impermissibility, is by itself not sufficient to cover implications that involve policies and practices remaining merely associated with this or that concept. A proper implication would have to arise from the concepts and meta-concepts, and not simply be licensed by them.

Notes

1. Harvey Siegel, “Naturalized Epistemology and First Philosophy,” *Metaphilosophy* 25 no.1-2 (1995): 46-62.

2. Stefaan Cuypers, “Analytic Philosophy of Education and the Concept of Liberal Education,” in *International Handbook of Philosophy of Education*, ed. P. Smeyers (Dordrecht, Nl: Springer, 2018) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72761-5_48; Stefaan Cuypers and Christopher Martin, *R.S. Peters* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); Walter Okshevsky, “Discourse, Justification, and Education: Jürgen Habermas on Moral Epistemology and Dialogical Conditions of Moral Justification and Rightness,” *Educational Theory* 66 (2016): 691-718.

3. Something like this can plausibly be directed to Cuypers, Martin, and Okshevsky with respect to liberalism and/or democracy. These would serve as meta-concepts whose presupposition consist in universal conditions of discourse, but this would considerably weaken the avowed transcendentalism of such approaches.

4. G.W.F. Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, ed. and trans. H.S. Harris and B. Cerf (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1977).